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Worms have been improved and a range of sophisticated techniques have been 
integrated, which make the detection and response processes much harder and 
longer than in the past. Therefore, in this thesis, a STAKCERT (Starter Kit for 
Computer Emergency Response Team) model is built to detect worms attack in 
order to respond to worms more efficiently.  
 
The novelty and the strengths of the STAKCERT model lies in the method 
implemented which consists of STAKCERT KDD processes and the 
development of STAKCERT worm classification, STAKCERT relational model 
and STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. The new concept introduced in this 
model which is named apoptosis, is borrowed from the human immunology 
system has been mapped in terms of a security perspective. Furthermore, the 
encouraging results achieved by this research are validated by applying the 
security metrics for assigning the weight and severity values to trigger the 
apoptosis. In order to optimise the performance result, the standard operating 
procedures (SOP) for worm incident response which involve static and dynamic 
analyses, the knowledge discovery techniques (KDD) in modeling the 
STAKCERT model and the data mining algorithms were used. 
 
This STAKCERT model has produced encouraging results and outperformed 
comparative existing work for worm detection. It produces an overall accuracy 
rate of 98.75% with 0.2% for false positive rate and 1.45% is false negative rate. 
Worm response has resulted in an accuracy rate of 98.08% which later can be 
used by other researchers as a comparison with their works in future.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter gives a brief background to the current state of the cyber threats 
posed by worms. Moreover the research motivation, and the research aims and 
objectives are laid out in order to give the reader a glimpse of what inspired this 
research. The original contributions and the thesis structure are also covered in 
this chapter. 
 
1.1 Background 
     Computer worms have become a real threat to computer users for more than 
a decade. Worms reproduce themselves and defensive measures have focused 
on stopping or slowing their spread. Ultimately, though, there is no defence 
better than a comprehensive security strategy that embraces user education, 
crisis-response teams and technologically sound security measures including, 
but not limited to, those that relate specifically to the threats posed by worms 
(Saudi and Jomhari 2006, Hawkins et al. 2000). Defence against harm can 
consist of preventing the harm from occurring, limiting the extent of the harm or 
recovering from the harm after it has occurred. For the past few years, incident 
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response has been seen as one of the fastest growing and most important 
issues in computer security (Killcrece et al. 2003, Schultz 2007). An incident is 
referred to as an adverse event that threatens security in computing systems 
and networks (Schultz 2007). When an incident occurs, the action which can be 
triggered by human or computer systems is known as incident response. The 
incident response not only helps to minimise the damage from the incident, but 
also takes possible incidents into consideration and prepares the system before 
the incident happens (Schultz and Shumway 2001). Nowadays, it is really hard 
to think about confronting a cyber world incident without integrating the 
approach with an incident response procedure. Incident response helps to 
minimise the damage caused by security incident by providing the standard 
operating procedures on how to react and solve for each security incident. 
Furthermore, Schultz (2007) states that the potential growth of computer 
forensics in future, which is part of the incident response itself. With 
improvements in technology, vulnerabilities in systems or applications can be 
easily exploited in a fraction of a second. Statistics taken from CyberSecurity 
(2010) show that three types of major security incidents are often reported (i.e. 
fraud, intrusion and malicious code) as displayed in Figure 1.1 
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Figure 1.1. Incident Statistics for 2010 in Malaysia. 
(Adapted from CyberSecurity Malaysia Incident Statistics (2010)) 
  
Indeed, based on a report by the New Zealand Computer Crime and Security 
Survey 2010 (Quinn 2010) it would appear that the two most costly and most 
widely experienced computer security incidents were related to virus 
contamination and malware infection, each of which contributed 37% and 22% 
respectively. Furthermore, in this survey it is stated that many organisations 
were struggling to detect and remove the Conficker worm and millions of 
computers around the world were infected by it. Also in this survey, it stated that 
fake anti-virus software installed on a victim’s computer is another common 
problem faced by many users and organisations. It took several days of effort to 
detect and remove this malicious software. Therefore, if the incident response is 
being applied in an organization, there is possibility that these issues can be 
solved faster and efficiently.  Furthermore, if a comparison between current 
trends and those of 10 years ago is made, these historical worm attacks and 
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infections ensured the reputation of the attacker and thus gaining respect from 
other attackers or hackers was paramount (Whitty 2007). In contrast, the 
motivation for cyber attacks in the past 5 years is profit. Currently attackers try 
to steal passwords or credit card information by phishing, installed keyloggers 
and backdoors on end user computers to steal confidential information or are 
involved with launching bots from end user computers to perform ongoing 
attacks. These cyber attacks have caused loss of millions which is estimated 
around $1 billion and productivity for many organisations and end users (Liu and 
Uppala 2006).   
     There are numerous ways to handle worm incidents. These include keeping 
anti-virus software updated (MyCERT 2009a), keeping the operating system 
updated with the latest patches (Microsoft 2008), not opening unknown email 
attachments and never following links that ask for id and passwords for online 
banking purpose (MyCERT 2009b). Unfortunately, there are still many users 
who lack the experience or the knowledge to detect when their computers are 
infected by worms (Schroeder 2005). 
     In this research, a model called the STAKCERT model is introduced. The 
acronym ‘STAKCERT’ stands for Starter Kit for Computer Emergency Response 
Team. It is a new model which consists of STAKCERT worm classification, 
STAKCERT relational model, STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm and with 
an improvement method which is called as STAKCERT KDD Processes (refer 
Figure 3.5).This STAKCERT model is an improvement on the traditional incident 
detection and response models. This STAKCERT model is built to detect and 
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respond to worm incidents. It is the integration of incident response, data 
mining, security metrics and the apoptosis concept. The STAKCERT model has 
been simulated and tested, and it is indicated that this model has successfully 
detected and responded to worms with a detection accuracy rate of 98.75% and 
a response accuracy rate of 98.08%. This detection accuracy result 
outperformed the comparative existing works (refer to Chapter 4, section 4.4.3). 
As for worm response, this thesis has provided an accuracy rate which in future 
can be used by other researchers as a comparison with their works (refer 
Chapter 5,section 5.4).  Moreover, in terms of worm response, the STAKCERT 
model has introduced a new concept called apoptosis, which is useful for 
indicating if the victim’s computer is severity affected by worm infection. 
Apoptosis is also known as cell-programmed death is a concept borrowed from 
human immunology system. In this thesis, the apoptosis has been mapped into 
worm’s perspective, where the network connection of a severely infected 
computer will be disconnected to avoid the further propagation of the worm 
Based on the results achieved and the contributions made, this research has 
successfully achieved all the objectives it targeted. 
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1.2 Motivation  
     The motivation for this research came from industries’ needs for a reliable 
worm detection and response model in order to defend information 
infrastructure (Liu and Uppala 2006, Nicol 2005). The researcher’s experiences 
with the real world during an attachment with the Malaysian Computer 
Emergency Response Centre (MyCERT) has given this research much needed 
input and insight into the problems faced by industry and by the public at large. 
A lack of understanding and knowledge and proper procedures for worm 
detection and response have led to money loss, reduced productivity and the 
tarnishing of organisation’s reputations (Mitropoulos et al. 2006). 
     Currently the worm characteristics have been greatly improved and more 
sophisticated techniques have been integrated, which make the detection and 
removal processes harder, and which take longer than has been the case in the 
past (Smith 2008). From 2001 to 2011, worm attacks mainly focused on 
exploiting vulnerabilities in applications and in operating system such as in 
Windows (Schneier 2005, Microsoft 2011, Kaspersky 2011). Figure 1.2 is a 
summary of the days taken by different worms to be created, based on the day 
on which the vulnerabilities were released.  
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Figure 1.2. Timeline for Worms’ Exploitation. 
     It can clearly be seen that the days needed for the worms to be created were 
reduced tremendously from 2001 to 2004. It took an average of 23 days for 
these worms to exploit these vulnerabilities during the period 2004 to 2008. The 
Conficker worm is one good example of a worm that exploits Microsoft’s 
vulnerability in the victim’s computer. Most worrying is the Stuxnet worm since 
this worm exploits the vulnerability in Windows before the software developers 
were aware of it and this kind of exploit is known as a ‘zero-day’ vulnerability 
(Kaspersky 2011, Bradley 2010). Apart from this, social network sites such as 
Facebook, MySpace, Twitter and Buzz have also been misused, and have been 
targeted by worms such as Myspace XSS worm in 2005 (Laborger 2005), 
followed by the Koobface worm in 2008 (Vamosi 2008) and the XSS exploits in 
2009 (Robert 2009). These worms have been successful due to the vulnerability 
of these sites. Shepherd (2003) explains that this vulnerability as a form of a 
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flaw which has later been exploited to allow unauthorized access, elevation of 
privileges and denial of service (DoS). To a certain extent, even though the 
vulnerability has been patched, a worm can still infect a victim’s computer via 
USB and shared folders with weak passwords. Therefore, it is suggested that 
the incident response is applied and integrated in analysing the way the worm 
infects and propagates. 
     One of the most common mistakes made by an end user or by an 
organisation when dealing with a worm infection is not following the right 
procedure or steps for eradication (White and Granado 2009). Following the 
standard operating procedures is the heart of an incident response. Thus it not 
only helps to reduce response time, but also reduces the financial and 
productivity loss due to a worm incident. In an incident response, the main aim 
is to recover quickly and effectively from a security incident, to respond 
systematically by following standard procedures, and to minimize the impact 
caused by disruption in critical computing services (Schwetzer 2003). It has 
been estimated that the average total cost for large organisations for computer 
security incidents is between £280,000 and £690,000 (Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers 2010). Moreover, according to this report, there were a few changes in 
the security landscape during 2010. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 
1.3. 
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Figure 1.3. Comparison between 2008 and 2010 for Security Landscape Changes. 
Adapted from Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2010 Information Security Breaches 
Survey (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2010).  
 
Based on Figure 1.3, there was an increment of 26% in the year 2010 compared 
to year 2008 for ongoing security training provided by organisations for their 
staff. Apart from that, the implementation of security policies and ISO 27001 
indicates the growth of security awareness among users.   
     For worm detection, it is noticed that most of the work carried out such as 
that by Schultz and Shumway (2001) and Henchiri and Japkowicz (2006) 
particularly focused on the features of worm detection. In contrast to this thesis, 
this thesis explored in more depth the worm threats and architecture which is 
later used as the input to develop a better method and model for worm detection 
and response. While in terms of the incident response perspective, there are a 
few studies related to incident response in general (Mitropoulous et al. 2006; 
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Goel and Gangolly 2007) none explain in detail the incident response that is 
associated with worm detection and response. 
     Also in 2011, Bejtlich et al. (2011) raised an issue related to the incident 
detection and response team about using the traditional incident detection 
response model. Bejtlich et al. (2011) claimed that this traditional model should 
be improved since it failed to identify application-level compromises. Moreover, 
Bejlicth et al. (2011) said that nowadays intruders are more concerned with 
accessing data rather than owning the computer. They also list four main 
problems with regard to the incident response team. These are: firstly, a lack of 
understanding of the different applications; secondly a lack of understanding of 
the subtle activities undertaken by the intruder with regard to the applications; 
thirdly a lack of understanding of different instrumentation used to interpret the 
logged data; and lastly a lack of knowledge about how to interpret the logged 
data. One of the biggest mistakes made by most security analysts was to 
assume that all intrusion issues can easily be solved by using network 
appliances to sniff the network for any abnormal activities. To a certain extent, 
these devices cannot detect the abuse and misuse at the application level, 
where clear information about user actions and data access is really hard to 
monitor (Garfinkel and Rosenblum 2003). 
     In conjunction with the challenges raised by Bejlicth et al. (2011), a solution 
is needed to help users to confront the worm infection while waiting for the 
incident response team to offer its analysis and help. The solution or model 
developed must evolve with time, and must be capable of isolating a worm 
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infection from propagating further, so later any new method integrated by the 
worm especially the polymorphism and stealth worm can be detected and 
isolated easily. At the same time, it must also help the user to detect and 
respond to the worm incident. Based on this thesis studies and observations, 
one of the most promising approaches to responding and isolating a worm 
infection is by using the apoptosis approach, which has been tested and 
showed an encouraging result ( refer Chapter 5,section 5.4.2). Apoptosis is one 
of the specialisms found in human immunology and is known as cell-
programmed death. It has the ability to kill itself once it has killed the intruder. 
Apoptosis is explored and integrated into this thesis. From a worm response 
perspective, the apoptosis disconnects the infected computer from the Internet 
or network once it has identified the victim’s computer is in a dangerous 
position. Here the challenge is how to decide when the apoptosis should be 
triggered. This thesis claims to have successfully solved this challenge and 
arrived at a solution whereby weight and severity are the most important factors 
to trigger the apoptosis condition. Indeed, the STAKCERT worm apoptosis 
algorithm has been developed to solve this challenge. 
     Based on all the motivation issues discussed here, this thesis intention is to 
make significant and new contributions to the security field, especially in the 
worm detection and response field. This particular area of research will 
therefore be focused on. 
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1.3 Research Aims and Objectives  
     The main aim of this research is to come up with a new model for worm 
detection and response by integrating the best techniques from incident 
response, knowledge discovery, security metrics, apoptosis and data mining, 
with the goal of creating a new model which is more effective than the existing 
ones. The scope of the research is on a Windows platform only. Prior formation 
of the new model, a thorough and in-depth study on the worm architecture, 
worm classification, worm analysis, worm detection techniques and worm 
response techniques were carried out to obtain a better understanding of the 
underlying methods and techniques in the existing works, so that any related 
improvements can be done along the way. 
 
The objectives of this research are: 
 To conduct an in-depth study of worm architecture and worm 
classification and to introduce a new worm classification and relational 
model.  
 To conduct an in-depth study of the existing methods of worm analysis 
and to introduce a new technique to improve worm analysis techniques.  
 To improve the existing worm detection techniques to give a better 
accuracy.  
 To introduce a new technique of applying apoptosis to worm response to 
avoid the worm from further propagating. 
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 To conduct an in-depth study of the requirements needed to trigger the 
apoptosis and to formulate new algorithm with regard to how to trigger 
the apoptosis.  
 To provide an accuracy rate for the STAKCERT model for worm 
response which can be used as a comparison by other researchers in 
future. 
 
1.4 Research Contributions 
The contributions for this research are:  
  A STAKCERT model for worm detection which consists of: 
o STAKCERT worm classification. 
o STAKCERT worm relational model. 
o Enhanced STAKCERT KDD processes for worm analysis which is 
the integration of static analysis, dynamic analysis, statistical 
analysis and standard operating procedures with regard to incident 
response. 
 An improved overall accuracy for worm detection rate as a result of using 
the STAKCERT model compared to existing works. 
 A STAKCERT model for worm response which consists of: 
o A new technique to respond to worm infection by applying 
apoptosis. 
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o A STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm on how weight and 
severity rank and value are assigned to trigger the apoptosis 
based on security metrics. 
 An accuracy rate for worm response as a result of using the STAKCERT 
model which can be used as a comparison by other researchers in future. 
 
To support the contributions listed above more, reviewers’ comments from an 
internationally recognized conference, publisher and local seminars have been 
taken into consideration. Improvements have been made to ensure the quality 
of the research and to ensure that this research has made a significant 
contribution. A list of the publications related to this research can be seen within 
the research publications section. 
 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 contains a literature review where related studies and the 
fundamental knowledge of the subject matter are discussed. This includes the 
worm study, which consists of the definition, comparison with viruses and Trojan 
horses, worm classification, incident response and apoptosis. Existing works 
related to this research are also explained here. 
 Chapter 3 discusses in detail the research methods and the performance 
criteria used for this research. The STAKCERT KDD processes for worm 
analysis and response which is the integration of static analysis, dynamic 
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analysis, statistical analysis, security metrics, data mining and standard 
operating procedures in terms of incident response is also presented in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 4 explains of the STAKCERT model for worm detection in detail. It 
consists of the experimental results, the STAKCERT worm classification and the 
STAKCERT worm relational model. Different testing techniques and a 
comparison with existing work was conducted to prove the effectiveness of the 
STAKCERT model for worm detection. Here the limitations of this thesis are 
included. 
Chapter 5 discusses the STAKCERT model for worm response in detail. It 
consists of the experimental results and the STAKCERT worm apoptosis 
algorithm which apply weight and severity. Different testing techniques and a 
comparison with existing works were conducted to prove the effectiveness of 
the STAKCERT model for worm response. Here the limitations of this thesis are 
included. 
Chapter 6 concludes the research by summarizing and discussing the 
contributions made and future work. 
 
1.6 Summary 
     There is an urgent need to produce more research about worms. Worms are 
always seen as one of the main threats in the cyber world and it is a topic which 
has been discussed ever since the first worm was invented. The motivation to 
pursue research in this area is to solve the challenges to detect and respond 
16 
 
effectively to the threat of worms. Based on these thesis objectives and the 
contributions made, this thesis can be used as a guide and basis for further 
exploration for other researchers all over the world who have the same 
interests. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature where related studies and the 
fundamental and core knowledge of worms and apoptosis are discussed. This 
includes worm studies which consist of definitions, comparison with other 
malicious code categorizations, worm classifications and worm detection and 
response techniques. Furthermore, apoptosis is discussed because of its key 
role in terms of worm response in this research. Nevertheless, previous works 
that are related to this research are presented and studied in order to deal with 
the gaps found in these previous pieces of research. 
 
2.1 Worms  
     In this section, apart from the definition and comparison of worms, previous 
work that is related to this thesis is presented, in terms of worm classification, 
worm detection and response techniques.  
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2.1.1 Definition 
     A clear definition of a worm is a must, as is an understanding of the worm’s 
architecture. According to Nazario et al. (2001), a worm is defined as an 
independent replicate, and autonomous agent, that is capable of searching 
through the network for a new host system which it may then infect. The 
structure of a worm is divided into six main components. These are 
reconnaissance capabilities, special attack capabilities, command interface, 
communication capabilities, intelligence capabilities and unused attack 
capabilities. Nazario et al. (2001) claimed that a divided worm structure eases 
the process of worm detection and prevention. Helenius (2002) defined a 
computer worm as an independent program that can replicate recursively by 
itself. He classified malicious code in accordance with their characteristics and 
the infected objects. Skoudis and Zelster (2004) provided a further definition of a 
worm where they defined it as a self-replicating piece of code that spreads 
through networks and does not need help from human interaction in terms of 
propagation.  
     For the purposes of this research, a worm is defined as a malicious program 
that can replicate itself, moving from one computer to another or can propagate 
via a network without human intervention or an owner’s consent. A worm may 
be further classified into a host or a network worm.  
     Ellis (2003) defines a network worm as program which has the capability to 
execute a copy of itself in a remote computational computer and which can 
evolve. Meanwhile FitzGerald (2008) defines a network worm as a program 
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which consists of several segments, with each segment running on different 
computers and using different networks for communication purposes. As for the 
host worm, it would infect a computer and remain inside that computer. It would 
then use the network connection to spread itself to other computers. It would kill 
itself after it has replicated itself to other computers (FitzGerald 2008). Table 2.1 
is the comparison between a host and a network worm based on the analysis 
conducted in this thesis. 
 
Table 2.1. Comparison between a Host Worm and a Network Worm. 
Host Worm Network Worm 
1) It is self replicating and self-contained. 
 
2) It consists of one segment and uses 
networks to spread itself only. Can also 
spread via other media such as 
removable drives. 
 
 
 
 
3) Once it infects a computer, it runs on it 
and remains in the infected computer. If it 
propagates and infects a new computer, it 
replicates itself identically and terminates 
the original worm.  
1) It is self replicating and self-contained. 
 
2) It is composed of multiple segments 
with different functions. It has one main 
segment which coordinates with other 
segments in the different infected 
computers. It uses networks for different 
purposes such as for communication and 
propagation. 
 
3) Once it infects a computer, it runs on it 
and tries to spread itself through networks 
as much as possible to a new computer. It 
will not terminate the original worm and 
can evolved. 
 
There are many other worm categorizations that can be further classified under 
host and network worms. Cohen (1992) referred to Internet worm attacks as 
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being totally dependent on specified bugs or vulnerabilities in a victim’s 
computer, whereas it does not evolve and replicate itself identically. Examples 
of Internet worms are the Nachi Worm, SQL Slammer, Nachi and Conficker 
worms. These worms exploit vulnerabilities found in a victim’s computer. 
     On 10th July 2009, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks took place in 
Korea and the USA. These caused severe damage to many organisations in 
these two countries. Not only was there a loss of money, due to data being 
corrupted, but they tarnished the reputations of many organisations, especially 
organisations which were involved in online banking. It caused network 
operation to be intermittent in certain organisations and banks in particular were 
heavily targeted by the attackers. In addition, in Malaysia on 13th April 2011, the 
Malaysiakini - one of Malaysia’s top political news portal - also became the 
victim of the DDoS. This was believed to be linked to the hotly contested state 
elections on Borneo Island. 
     The DDoS attacks were possible due to several factors. The easiest way to 
conduct a DDoS attack is by exploiting vulnerabilities in the victim’s computer. 
Vulnerabilities can be exploited using framing code or by overwriting the normal 
computer program. The DDoS attacks use certain ports to launch the attack. 
The attack launched can be categorized as an internet worm as it exploits the 
vulnerabilities of applications. The Kaspersky website (Kaspersky 2008) defines 
internet worm as a program which distributes itself in many ways, and one of 
these ways is by exploiting operating system vulnerabilities. It is still considered 
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to be a host worm as it remains inside the computer and uses internet 
connections to spread itself to other computers. 
 
2.1.2 Comparison With Other Malicious Code 
     The Internet is constantly being flooded with information about computer 
virus, worm, trojan horse, adware and spyware. These terms have been used 
interchangeably, but most of the time the public do not know that they have 
different meanings and functions. Thus, it is critical to understand this malicious 
code or what is called as computer virus, worm, trojan horse, adware and 
spyware, to ensure the detection and response techniques that will be applied 
are suitable based on its characteristic. Malicious code can be referred to as 
any program that moves from one computer to another or from network to 
network, and can modify a computer system without the consent of the owner or 
the operator (Kienzle and Elder 2003). There are many ways in which malicious 
code spreads. The common media are through email attachments, scripts in 
web pages and network and file sharing. In this research, this thesis specifically 
focus on worm. 
     Cohen (1985) first introduced the term of computer virus in 1983 and formally 
defines the computer virus definition in 1987 (Cohen 1987). Furthermore in 
1989, Adleman (1989) proposed another computer virus definition which was 
based on set theory. Basically these previous works, define a computer virus 
related with a broad range of replicating programs. Therefore, based on the 
experiment and analysis conducted, a computer virus is defined as a program 
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which when executed can add itself to other programs, without permission or 
right. This is done in such a way that the infected program, when executed, can 
add itself to other programs as well. The computer virus inserts itself into the 
chain of command and executes a legitimate program that results in the 
execution of the computer virus together with the program. If relation is made to 
human daily lives, computer virus programming logic mimics its human virus 
biological counterparts. First, it invades the victim’s host by changing the 
underlying structure. Once infected, host files become viruses themselves and 
begin to infect other files. Later, computer viruses mutate and evolve to fight 
anti-virus programs, and this massive infection results in the larger systems 
malfunctioning. 
     On the other hand, based on the analysis carried out, a worm is defined as a 
program that replicates itself from one computer to another and does not need a 
host file to spread itself (Weaver et al. 2003). This is in contrast to a computer 
virus which requires a host file to spread itself. As for a trojan horse, this is a 
malicious program which tricks users into believing that it is a genuine file. It 
must be executed in the victim’s computer and once this has been done, it can 
control the victim’s computer remotely and steal any confidential information 
from it. Apart from that, the trojan horse does not replicate itself. As for adware 
and spyware, they can easily be installed on a user’s computer when the user 
downloads free software or browses the Internet. Adware usually comes 
together with free software or with a demo version of software. Generally, all 
settings in free software are enabled by default. Therefore, the user must be 
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aware of the end user license agreement (EULA) which is provided. Sometimes, 
this software comes together with advertisements or add-on tools and is 
installed automatically together with the free software, without the user’s 
knowledge. It is highly advisable only to install software from a trusted source, 
since there is the possibility that adware will be installed together with the 
downloaded software. The adware tracks the user’s surfing habits so that later it 
can serve related advertisements to the user. To a certain extent, it might try to 
steal the user’s username or password, monitor user activity on the Internet, 
gather information about e-mail addresses and credit card numbers and 
transmit them to someone else. Once it becomes intrusive, it is then categorised 
as spyware, and it should be avoided for privacy and security reasons. Spyware 
is considered as a malicious program and is similar to a trojan horse when the 
user unintentionally installs it together with the genuine program.  
     The differences between computer virus, worm, trojan horse, adware and 
spyware is summarised in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2. Comparison between Worm and Other Malicious Code. 
Computer 
Virus 
Worm Trojan Horse Adware Spyware 
1. Non self-
replicating. 
1. Self-
replicating. 
1. Non self-
replicating. 
1. Non self-
replicating. 
1. Non self-
replicating. 
2. Produces 
copies of itself 
using host file 
as carrier. 
2. Does not 
produce copies 
of itself using 
host file as 
carrier 
(independent 
program). 
2. Does not 
produce copies 
of itself using 
host file as 
carrier 
(independent 
program). 
2. Produces 
copies of itself 
using host file 
as carrier. 
2. Does not 
produce copies 
of itself using 
host file as 
carrier 
(independent 
program). 
3. Cannot 
control PC 
remotely. 
3. Cannot 
control PC 
remotely. 
3. Can control 
PC remotely. 
3. Cannot 
control PC 
remotely. 
3. Can control 
PC remotely. 
4. Can be 
detected and 
deleted using 
anti-virus 
software. 
4. Can be 
detected and 
deleted using 
anti-virus 
software. 
4. Can be 
detected and 
deleted using 
anti-virus and 
anti-rootkit 
software. 
4. Can be 
detected and 
deleted using 
anti-virus and 
anti-adware 
software. 
4. Can be 
detected and 
deleted using 
anti-virus and 
anti-spyware 
software. 
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2.1.3 Worm Classification 
     Based on the experimentation and analysis conducted, it is suggested that a 
comprehensive structure of a worm classification which considering  
characteristics in worm, can be used as the basis for a worm detection and 
response technique. Therefore, a STAKCERT worm classification is produced 
based on the testing and comparison associated with research by Dabirsiaghi 
(2008), Nazario et al. (2001), Helenius (2002), Skoudis and Zelster (2004) and 
Saudi et al. (2008a). The STAKCERT worm classification is based on and was 
formed in accordance with five main attributes. These are infection, activation, 
payload, operating algorithm and propagation. This is explained in detail in 
Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. Based on the experimental results for worm detection 
and response which were explained in detail in Chapters 4 (section 4.4) and 5 
(section 5.4), the STAKCERT worm classification used in this thesis helps to 
increase the accuracy rate compared with existing methods.  
 
2.1.4 Worm Detection and Response Techniques  
     Once an understanding of the worm architecture is gained, a further issue is 
considering different perspectives and analyzing the gaps, drawbacks and 
challenges that should be taken into consideration in producing effective worm 
detection and response techniques. White (1998) discussed problems within the 
research field of computer worms, such as heuristic techniques, the 
epidemiology of worms, the digital immune system, technology in dealing with 
worms and proactive approaches to controlling them. Much more research has 
26 
 
been carried out since then, in order to address the problems and challenges 
raised. Filiol et al. (2006) discussed open problems within computer virology, 
claiming that only a limited number of studies had addressed computer virology.  
     Much research has been conducted in the past few years related to worm 
detection such as that by Henchiri and Japkowicz (2006) who were able to 
increase the accuracy of a virus classifier using the N-gram method compared 
to the approach used by Schultz et al. (2001) where they used the same 
dataset, Tseng and Lin (2009) who used the ‘variant objects discovering 
acquisition’ (VODKA) method as a basis for detecting worms and Agosta et al. 
(2007) who used an adaptive end-host anomaly detector to detect worms. 
Meanwhile, Moskovitch et al. (2008a) conducted experiments using different 
techniques of machine learning to detect worms based on computer behaviour, 
and identified Bayesian Networks as the best algorithm. In addition, Siddiqui et 
al. (2009) used the static features of a worm program to detect worms. Dai et al. 
(2009) incorporated dynamic instruction sequence mining techniques involving 
the runtime features of a worm program to detect worms and Stopel et al. 
(2009) used artificial neural networks (ANN) to detect worms. Each of these 
works has it owns strengths and gaps that can be further improved. Therefore, 
based on this thesis analysis and review of the existing works, it is suggested 
that one field that lacks research and thus needs to be explored in more depth is 
incident response. 
     Incident response is defined as the process that aims to minimise the 
damage caused by security incidents and malfunctions. It also monitors and 
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learns from such incidents (BSI 1999). The lack of standard operating 
procedures, in terms of analysing and responding to a worm infection, may lead 
to disaster for both IT personnel and the end user. It is very hard to separate 
incident response from the worm detection and response field, as it plays a very 
important role within such a field. Improvements and novel standard operating 
procedures, particularly within the detection, analysis and disinfection phases, 
are seen as areas for potential research and exploration (Werlinger et al. 2010).  
     Examples of work related to incident response are those by Mitropoulos et al. 
(2006), Goel and Gangolly (2007), Vasudevan (2008), Kim et al. (2010) and Liu 
et al. (2010). An example of research that proposed a generic incident response 
process within a corporate environment is that undertaken by Mitropoulos et al. 
(2006) in 2006. A year later, Goel and Gangolly (2007) proposed a two tier 
model for handling malicious code. This work integrated an immunology and an 
epidemiology approach in conjunction with a distributed database. At the same 
time, work by Vasudevan (2008) claimed that the system known as MaiTrak 
was capable of tracking malware without using any signature base, eliminating 
the malware and returning it to its prior clean state. In the case of Kim et al.  
(2010), they proposed an incident response system based on DSS framework 
which applied Recency, Frequency and Monetary (RFM) analysis methodology 
and case-based reasoning (CBR), whilst Liu et al. (2010) designed a system 
using an ontological approach and CBR. Both of these works have their own 
approaches to detect and response to the incident. However, based on these 
previous works, research alluding to a combination of worm handling 
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procedures following incidence response has, so far, been scarce. It is 
suggested here that such research could greatly improve matters by detailing 
the required procedures for handling a worm incident. This is one of the 
precepts of the formation of the STAKCERT model for worm detection, of which 
incident response is a part. 
 
2.2 Apoptosis 
     In this section, apoptosis is defined and a comparison between apoptosis 
and worm problems is conducted. Apart from this, this section presents previous 
work that is related to this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Definition 
     The human body is divided into many compartments which provide robust 
security against intruders. These small independent compartments are called 
cells, and they are the basic building blocks of the human system. Each cell 
controls what may enter and exit its membranes, keeping the internal organelles 
protected (Purchon 2000; Sullivan 1994). Individual cells are disposable, so the 
death of one cell does not affect the entire person. Humans live in an 
environment where humans are constantly being attacked by intruders such as 
viruses, bacteria and other organisms, yet the majority of humans survive these 
attacks for many decades. It is not necessary to download any security patches 
since human bodies have adapted to living in such a harsh environment. To 
improve the computer systems survivability, the biology field offers a great deal 
29 
 
of opportunity for further exploration and integration within the computing area 
(Somayaji et al. 1997). Based on the analysis and experimentation conducted in 
this thesis, apoptosis is seen as one of the specialisms in human immunology 
that can be further explored and integrated into this thesis, particularly in 
response to worm infection. 
     Apoptosis or cell-programmed death is a highly regulated process that allows 
a cell to self-degrade in order to eliminate unwanted or dysfunctional cells from 
the body. According to Ishizaki and colleagues (2005), apoptosis is the process 
by which cells die as a natural course of events. It is also means ‘drop out’, and 
was used by the Greeks to refer to the shedding of leaves by trees in the 
autumn; i.e. the loss of cells that ought to die in the midst of the living structure. 
The process has also known as ‘death by default’, where cells are prevented 
from putting an end to themselves due to the constant receipt of biochemical 
‘stay alive’ signals. Furthermore, Martin (1998) stated that during apoptosis, the 
genome of the cell fractures, the cell shrinks and part of the cell disintegrates 
into smaller apoptosis bodies. It is a controlled process whereby the content of 
the cell is kept strictly within the cell membrane as it is degraded. According to 
Martin, the cell is phagocytosed by macrophages before its contents have a 
chance to leak into the neighbourhood. At this point, the apoptosis helps to 
prevent an unwanted inflammatory response. Besides, apoptosis is essential to 
embryonic development and to the maintenance of homeostasis in multicellular 
organisms. In the immune system, cell death eliminates B cells and T cells that 
elicit autoimmune responses, and selects the most efficient lymphocytes to 
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encounter antigen in the process of affinity maturation. Cell death can occur in 
two ways; necrosis and apoptosis, and although both terminate in cell death, the 
intracellular pathways of each process are very distinct. Necrosis involves the 
unregulated death of a cell following cell stress, and results in total cell lysis and 
subsequent inflammation due to the existence of the cell debris. On the other 
hand, apoptosis is a regulated form of cell death with defined intracellular 
pathways and regulators (Kerr et al. 1994). Furthermore, apoptosis is used to 
destroy cells that may be a threat to the organism such as cells infected with a 
virus, cells with DNA damage and cancerous cells. These cells can be disposed 
of without causing harm or stress to other cells. This underlying apoptosis 
concept is the one that is integrated into this thesis. 
 
2.2.2 Applying Apoptosis in Worm Response  
     From a worm response perspective, the apoptosis concept is mapped into 
the computing environment by disconnecting the severely infected computer 
from any network to avoid the worm in the infected computer from further 
propagating to other computers in the same network. If in the human immune 
system, intracellular pathways and regulators need to be defined, this is also 
applied in the computing area where rules and procedures were defined to 
trigger the apoptosis. So later when the apoptosis is being mapped in the worm 
response perspective, a clear understanding on what are the factors that should 
be taken into consideration to trigger apoptosis can be easily identified. In 
responding to worm infection and deciding on the apoptosis condition, a 
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STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm, which is explained in detail in Chapter 5 
(section 5.3.1) is developed. Table 2.3 shows the comparison between 
apoptosis and worm problems. The apoptosis is mapped into the STAKCERT 
model for a better understanding of the apoptosis concept. 
Table 2.3. Comparison between Apoptosis and Worm Problems. 
Apoptosis Worm Problems 
Once a cell is infected by an intruder, 
the cell tries to recover from the 
intruder infection. If the cell cannot 
recover from the infection, instead of 
spreading the infection to other cells, 
it kills itself. This process is known 
as apoptosis. Indeed, if the formation 
of the cell is abnormal, the apoptosis 
is triggered as well. 
 
 
 
Worm infects a computer in many ways such as 
through email and USB. The apoptosis concept in 
computing helps to prevent the worm from further 
propagating. This is done by recognizing a computer 
which is severely infected by a worm and 
distinguishing this from one that is not severely 
infected by a worm.  
In the STAKCERT model, a computer that is 
severely infected by a worm is identified, based on 
five main worm attributes. These are payload, 
propagation, activation, infection and the operating 
algorithm. The STAKCERT worm apoptosis 
algorithm is developed to show how the weight and 
severity value are assigned for the five main worm 
attributes. 
In biological systems, all cells share 
the same apoptosis mechanism, 
hence cell suicide is essentially the 
same process no matter what kind of 
cell it is. 
Computers, however, play very different roles in the 
IT structure. This dictates different ways of dealing 
with the need to sacrifice a particular computer for 
the good of the system as a whole. Dealing with an 
infection in a key database server is a far more 
delicate operation than dealing with an infected 
perimeter computer, especially a PC, PDA or 
handphone. 
In the STAKCERT model, a severely infected 
computer is disconnected from the network. 
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     Apoptosis provides lots of opportunity for exploration to be implemented or 
integrated in the computer security field. It started with research by Tschudin 
(1999) where he discussed the opportunity for integrating apoptosis into 
distributed mobile services. He also discussed security issues such as how to 
secure apoptosis. This paper can be used as the basis for forming other security 
tools. The concept of apoptosis was implemented in different applications with 
different goals. Examples of such works are those of Riordan and Alessandri 
(2000) who used apoptosis to shut down certain services in Windows within a 
computer, once the computer has been identified as vulnerable and had the 
potential to be exploited. Meanwhile Olsen et al. (2008) built the HADES 
system, which included the programmed death concept as one of its 
methodologies. In this system, agents were primarily used for communication, 
and had the authority to do repairs and undertake regeneration, movement and 
death (programmed death). This system relied totally on the existing agents and 
flaws might have arisen due to irregular agent mutation. In 2008, Saudi et al. 
(2008a, 2008b) explained how apoptosis could be integrated into computer 
security and integrated apoptosis in an intrusion detection system (IDS). 
However, this paper focused only on IDS. The challenge would be to implement 
the idea in other security tools. Furthermore, Mulholland et al. (2008), 
introduced a roadmap for the design of a tagging and tracking system for data 
security used in prisons and correctional facilities, whilst Tarakanov (2008), 
introduced an intelligent intrusion detection system using apoptosis as part of 
the system. In addition, Ben Othmane and Lilien (2009) introduced ‘Active 
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Bundles’ to protect data security. Moreover Hively et al. (2010) wrote a paper 
that explained briefly that apoptosis could be mapped easily in a cyber security 
analogy by terminating access to the network when there was any sign of 
unauthorized activity or a violation of security policy. Finally, Sterritt (2011) has 
published a few works related to autonomic computing since 2004, and since 
then has integrated apoptosis in autonomic agent and swarm space exploration 
systems. He also wrote about the potential exploration in future regarding 
autonomic computing and apoptosis. 
     Based on all the previous works discussed above, the main challenges which 
should be considered thoroughly are the method of assigning apoptosis and the 
scope for its implementation, where there is still a lack in terms of responding to 
a worm incident. Therefore, based on the experiments and analysis conducted 
in this thesis, weight and severity are identified as two important factors which 
trigger apoptosis. The STAKCERT model proposed not only focuses on worm 
response, but it also focuses on worm detection, which has also been integrated 
and considered in this thesis. Further details of this STAKCERT model can be 
referred in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
     There are a few studies which have considered weight as part of their work. 
Examples are those of Su (2011), who built a real time anomaly detection 
system for denial of service (DoS) attacks using weighted k-nearest neighbour 
classifiers, Siddique and Maqbol (2011), who used weighting in software 
clustering, Kim et al. (2010), who used weight as part of the log analysis of 
incident response in a DSS system, Fisch et al. (2010), who used weight to 
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optimise radial basis function neural networks for an intrusion detection system 
and Middlemiss and Dick (2003), who used weighted feature extraction using a 
genetic algorithm for an intrusion detection system. Based on these works, it 
can be concluded that there is no standard way of assigning weight, which has 
been seen as an important feature in increasing the accuracy, or optimising the 
performance, of different works in different fields. Therefore, weight is integrated 
within the STAKCERT model and used security metrics and frequency analysis 
to retrieve the rank and the value of the weights. Later, the weights are used for 
assigning the level of severity which triggers apoptosis. 
     In a study conducted by Miles (2001), he assigned a severity incident into 
three categories which are high, medium and low. The high severity involves 
incidents with long term effects to the business or critical system i.e root access, 
denial of service (DoS) and it also involves with unauthorized privilege (root), 
limited access (user), unsuccessful attempt, utilisation of services and probe, 
poor security practices, malicious logic, hardware, software or infrastructure 
failure and espionage. Medium severity involves non-critical system and 
detection of initial attack and low severity involves detection on reconnaissance, 
threats of future attacks and rumours of security incidents. 
     In an open source tool, for example Nessus, the severity is assigned in six 
levels which are none, low, medium, high, serious and critical. ‘None’ represents 
no risk, ‘low’ as useful information to an intruder i.e software versions and 
‘medium’ stands for the existence of a security hole that can lead to privilege 
escalation. As for ‘high’, it enables the attacker to gain administrator privilege, 
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‘serious’ means the attacker can gain profit from the confidentiality information 
retrieved using the administrator or user privilege and ‘critical’ means the 
victim’s host already belongs to the attacker. 
     On the other hand, Reese (2003) defined high severity as posing a threat to 
an entire autonomous system, such as a university network; that is a threat to 
the operation of critical network systems that threatens one or more applications 
that are integral to daily university functions. Medium severity involves a risk to 
isolated and non-production university systems and low severity involves 
minimal exposure of threats. Indeed, the University of Florida (2010) has taken 
the same initiative by dividing the incident severity to high, medium and low. 
High severity involves data security on the critical data i.e bank account, 
intellectual property, legal issues where it might cause loss of money more than 
USD10,000, child porno, copyright violations, magnitude critical service 
disruption, more than 10% of network asset infected, attacking other computers 
and public interest. Whilst for medium severity involves data security on 
sensitive data i.e non-personal data, legal issue with money loss less than 
USD10,000, harassment, 3% to 10% of network assets infected, active 
attacking from inside a computer and public interest. Low severity involves other 
than high and medium severity contents. 
     By referring to the previous studies conducted in assigning severity, this 
thesis came out with a conclusion that severity must consider the data criticality, 
infrastructure availability and loss of productivity where these have been 
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integrated as part of the security metrics. These three factors are mapped in 
security metrics, which can be seen in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.4.3). 
     The STAKCERT model attempts to fill in all the gaps and challenges from 
the previous research to detect and respond to a worm. This thesis aims that in 
the future, this model will be implemented as worm detection and response 
software. 
 
2.3 Summary 
     In this chapter, literature reviews were presented on the underlying 
fundamental and core knowledge required to undertake this research involving 
worm and apoptosis studies. The literature review began with a discussion on 
worm studies which consisted of definitions, classifications and a consideration 
of worm detection and response techniques. Subsequently this was followed by 
a consideration of apoptosis studies which consisted of definitions and how 
apoptosis is applied in different fields. Apart from that, all works related to these 
two core areas of knowledge were also presented in this chapter. The results in 
terms of the improvements made are based on the gaps identified in the related 
works and are presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
STAKCERT RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Chapter 3 explains the STAKCERT research methodology including detailed 
explanations of what methods have been used to collect and analyse the data, 
how the research has been conducted, why these methods were chosen and 
how the findings from this research have been tested and verified. A good 
quality research finding comes from a well structured and systematic research 
methodology, where there are always answers to any questions regarding the 
research and it is replicable by other researchers. The results from a thorough 
methodology will be rigorous.   
 
3. 1 Overall STAKCERT Research Processes  
     Towards this end, this research proposes a model known as the STAKCERT 
model for worm detection and response. All the processes involved in forming 
the STAKCERT model are simplified in Figure 3.1. There are two phases 
involved in this research, which are the worm detection (Phase 1) and worm 
response (Phase 2).  
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Figure 3.1. An Overview of the STAKCERT Research Processes. 
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     Thirteen processes make up these phases, which start by outlining the 
research background. The prior formation of the STAKCERT model and the 
motivation, aims and objectives are well defined and focused to ensure the 
contribution produced at the end of this research has a significant value. Details 
of these can be found in Chapter 1. 
     Once the first process is complete, it is followed by a review of the existing 
literature. The STAKCERT model introduced in this research covers most of the 
gaps identified in an earlier study conducted by previous researchers. A depth 
analysis and a comparison of the previous related works, analysed in terms of 
methodology implemented, findings, strengths and weaknesses, can be found in 
Chapter 2. 
     In this Chapter, the research design is explained in detail. This includes how, 
why, what and which data are collected and explored and the techniques 
applied to fulfil all the objectives for this research. All the processes from 
number 5 to 13 show structured and systematic processes that have been 
conducted to help this research to succeed. Details of these procedures 
implementation can be read in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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3.2 Research Design 
In this section, all the techniques and procedures applied for analysis and 
testing and the datasets source involved, are clearly explained. 
 
3.2.1 Datasets  
     The dataset in this research consists of different types of worms and benign 
executables sourced from VX Heavens (2009). From 66,711 samples 
downloaded from VX Heavens, 5,614 were identified as worms and 331 were 
identified as benign executables. Details of the worm categorisation are 
displayed in Figure 3.2. From Figure 3.2, it can be seen that 3.97% represent 
the email worm, followed by 1.36% for P2P worm, 0.96% represent the IRC 
worm, 0.81% for the internet worm, 0.42% for the instant messaging worm and 
0.86% for other worm. While the benign executables consist of Windows system 
executables, commercial executables and open source executables. The 
datasets were chosen randomly from these worm categories and benign 
executables and STAKCERT KDD Processes were applied to these datasets. 
As a result, 160 datasets which consist of variants of the Windows worm and 
benign executables have been used for this research. 
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Figure 3.2. Worm Datasets. 
 
There are several reasons why this thesis chose to gather data from the VX 
Heavens source; firstly, many studies have used this data for their testing, for 
examples, those conducted by Schultz et al. (2001), Henchiri, and Japkowicz 
(2006), Moskovitch et al. (2008b), Dai et al. (2009) and Khan et al. (2010). 
Indeed, one of the works stated above is used as a comparison with the 
STAKCERT research findings. The second reason is because the variants are 
more important than the quantity of the datasets, since these already represent 
different types of worm in VX Heavens and the third is due to the scope of this 
research, which only focuses on Windows worms. Lastly, it is one of largest 
worm databases freely available from the Internet.  
The datasets for this research were transformed into nominal data after the 
static and dynamic analyses were completed, which is part of the knowledge 
discovery database (KDD) processes. Details of the data transformation are 
explained under section 3.2.3: knowledge discovery techniques. 
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3.2.2 Lab architecture 
     The lab used for this testing is illustrated in Figure 3.3. It is a controlled lab 
environment and almost 80% of the software used in this testing is open source 
or available on a free basis. No outgoing network connection is allowed for this 
architecture. In this lab, the data described above were tested. From these 
tests, the results can easily be analysed and any flaws found can be fixed 
immediately. For testing purposes, a checklist which consists of all the software 
was produced to ensure all the software was installed and working in these test 
lab computers. A list of the software installed in the test lab computers is 
displayed in Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.3. Lab Architecture. 
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Table 3.1. Software Installed in Testing Lab Computers. 
Function Tools Purpose of Action 
Scan tool  TDS-3  
 AVG antivirus  
 Ad aware  
To prepare the scan tool to detect various 
forms of malicious code including those with 
newer signatures. 
Strings research tool  TDS3 
 Strings.exe (from 
Sysinternal) 
To display and extract suspicious sets of 
ASCII characters included in a file. 
Unpack tool  Proc dump 
 Unpack tool 
 UPX tool 
To decompress and unpack the worm code. 
Verification tool  Hashtab v 2.3 To verify the CRC value of the infected file. 
File Integrity 
Checking 
 DigestIT 2004 To verify the system is in a known trusted 
state before the worm makes any changes. 
File Monitoring  Filemon ( from 
Sysinternal) 
To provide a dynamic update of all file 
system activity, indicating which processes 
are opening, reading and writing files. 
Process Monitoring  Prcview v 3.7.3.1   
 Process Explorer(from 
Sysinternal) 
To identify the resources used by all running 
processes, including DLLs and registry keys. 
Process explorer provides a wealth of useful 
information regarding how the worm is 
impacting upon the victim computer. 
Port Monitoring  TDIMon 
 PortMon  
 TDS-3 
To see which ports are listening on the 
trusted system. To record all TCP and UDP 
activity and to see various running programs 
send data out through a port or receive 
incoming data on a port. 
Network Monitoring  NeWT  
 TDS-3 
To look for backdoor listeners recognised by 
NeWT or TDS3. 
Network Monitoring  Ethereal /Winshark 
 Windump 
 Wincap  
To gather all traffic going to and from the 
target system, using a sniffer loaded on a 
system other than the victim computer. 
Network Monitoring  Promiscdetect.exe To determine if the network interface is 
running in promiscuous mode, gathering 
packets destined for all systems on the LAN. 
Registry Monitoring  Regmon ( from 
Sysinternal) 
To display real time indication of all registry 
activity including creating, reading and writing 
registry keys. 
Disassembler / 
Debug Tool 
 Ida Pro  
 OllyDbg 
To perform detailed code analysis. 
Software for data 
testing and 
simulation  
 Java  (WEKA) version 
3.6.2 
 Visual Basic 6.0 
Professional  
To perform data mining analysis and testing. 
Virtual PC  VMWare Work Station To allow multiple operating systems to run on 
a single computer.  
Database tool   Microsoft Access 2007 To save all the databases. 
Design and model 
system 
 Rational Rose 2000 
Enterprise Edition  
To build a related diagram of how the model 
works. 
Flowchart tool  Microsoft Visio 2007 To draw a diagram. 
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     Honeypot, Metasploit and HoneyMonkey are three examples of how worm 
analysis and testing can be conducted. Examples of studies using Honeypot 
include Levin et al. (2003), Dagon et al. (2004), Sadasivam (2005) and Spitzner 
(2003). The concept of the Honeypot is to allow the attacker to play around and 
attack the systems that consist of a few computers with different functions such 
as a web server and a mail server, which are purposely being left as vulnerable. 
However, it only allows incoming traffic to the Honeypot and disallows any 
outgoing traffic from the Honeypot itself. An attacker would not be able to launch 
any attack on other networks or systems outside the Honeypot from inside the 
Honeypot. A few combinations of Honeypots will form a Honeynet. The 
constraints of the Honeypot lie in its capability to allow incoming traffic only and 
in terms of portability. 
     Metasploit is a framework for penetration testers to discover, analyse, test 
and release exploits (Maynor et al. 2007). The only drawback that needs to be 
improved is the predictability of the attack, since most of the vulnerabilities in 
Metasploit are already well known (Jordan 2005). The other possible problem 
that might arise is if a new worm attacks and exploits a new vulnerability that did 
not yet have the payload signature in Metasploit. 
     As for HoneyMonkey, it detects and analyses the website that hosts the 
malicious code (Wang et al. 2005). One example of a worm that can easily 
infect an end user browsing a website is known as the Code Red worm. If the 
victim’s computer is not updated with the latest Windows Update, the worm can 
simply launch the attack by executing itself into the victim’s computer when he 
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browses the infected website. The HoneyMonkey is definitely useful in 
identifying these malicious websites, but it is not suitable to be implemented in 
this research for this thesis, as the scope and goals are different. The same 
applies to the firewall and Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which are 
dedicatedly built to detect the worm attacks. 
     The main reasons why this controlled lab architecture was used are, firstly: 
any worm infection, propagation, operating algorithm, activation and payload 
can be monitored without any constraint in terms of network connectivity and 
secondly: in terms of the portability of the lab, where the lab can be moved with 
ease. Thirdly: the controlled lab environment would not cause any harm to the 
place where the experiment was conducted, since the lab was separated from 
the operational network.  
 
3.2.3 Knowledge Discovery Techniques 
     The phrase KDD was first discussed in a KDD workshop in 1989 (Piatetsky-
Shapiro 1991) and ever since the KDD has been successfully applied in 
different domains all over the world. Knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) is 
defined as an overall process where knowledge or patterns from data are 
extracted, where the patterns extracted must be valid, useful and 
understandable. Data mining is a specific algorithm to extract the pattern from 
the data, which is a part of the whole KDD process (Fayyad et al. 1996 and 
Maimon and Rokach 2010). Many studies that integrate KDD have been 
conducted over the past few years and current research in the year 2010 
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include Lavrac and Zupan (2010) in medicine, Kovalerchuk and Vityaev (2010) 
in financial applications, Singhal and Jajodia (2010) in intrusion detection and 
Thearling (2010) in customer relationship management (CRM). 
     For this research, KDD is used as a technique to identify the worm patterns 
in the datasets. All of the KDD processes are summarised in Figure 3.4.  
Data 
preprocessing PostprocessingData miningInput data Knowledge
-Feature selection
-Cleaning data to 
remove noise and 
duplication
-Data 
transformation
-Clustering
-Classification
-Pattern 
interpretation
Iterative
 
Figure 3.4. KDD Processes. 
 
     The data pre-processing function is intended to transform the worm’s raw 
data into an appropriate format for the next stage of the analysis, which is data 
extraction. The steps involved in this phase include feature selection, data 
cleansing to remove any noise, duplication or outlier and data transformation. 
The data pattern extraction is achieved using data mining; clustering and 
classification are two of the most common techniques used in data mining. The 
type of algorithm implemented under clustering (example: k-means) or 
classification (examples: Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine and Multilayer 
Perceptron) totally depends on the goal that is sought by the end of the KDD 
processes. Once the patterns are extracted from the data, they will be 
interpreted to ensure only valid and useful information or knowledge is kept for 
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further exploration. All the KDD processes are iterative to ensure the result 
achieved is rigorous. Figure 3.4 displays common KDD processes involved in 
developing knowledge. 
 
3.2.4 STAKCERT KDD Processes 
     Enhancements have been made to the KDD data pre-processing and pattern 
extraction process. Under the data pre-processing process, the static and 
dynamic analyses are implemented using the incident response standard 
operating procedures (SOP). While under the pattern extraction process, 
statistical methods comprising Chi-square and symmetric measure and security 
metrics are also introduced, as illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5. STAKCERT KDD Processes. 
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3.2.4.1 Data Pre-processing 
     The raw worm and benign executables data received from the VX Heavens 
source needed to be transformed into a format that could easily be used for 
subsequent analysis. This is the stage at which feature selection, followed by 
cleansing data and data transformation, is carried out. When this research was 
conducted, the data pre-processing procedures accounted for almost 40% of 
the time taken for the whole research process. The following are details of each 
process involved during this phase: 
 
I.  Feature selection  
     In this research, the data from the VX Heavens source was retrieved in 
multiple formats. In order to use this data, it needs to be transformed into an 
understandable format; hence the need for feature selection using static and 
dynamic analyses. It should be remembered that feature selection is a search 
strategy process where only relevant data is chosen with the goal that the 
selected data can be valid and useful for the subsequent analysis. In this thesis, 
the chosen data, as already defined under section 3.2.1, was analysed using 
static and dynamic analyses in a controlled lab environment (refer to section 
3.2.2). 
     Before and during the static and dynamic analyses, the incident response 
approach was applied. Standard operating procedures before and during the 
analysis must be followed and all the related procedures documented. Initially, 
all the listed software in Table 3.1 was checked to ensure all were already 
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installed and working properly. Secondly, the condition of the testing computers 
and the network setting for each computer were checked. Thirdly, it was 
ensured that all the monitoring and test results were being documented. This 
was to make certain that there is always documentation if anything needs to be 
referred later. With reference to the incident response methodology by Prosise 
et al. (2003), as illustrated in Figure 3.6, in order to reach any solution which 
includes recovery steps or to implement security measures, all these seven 
steps play an important role.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Incident Response Methodology. 
 
     However, according to the SANS Institute, six steps are required to handle 
any incident effectively, namely: preparation, identification, containment, 
eradication, recovery, and lessons learned (SANS 2008). Indeed, MyCERT 
used the SANS steps to produce the computer worm incident handling standard 
operating procedures (MyCERT 2002–see Figure 3.7). Therefore, in the 
STAKCERT KDD processes, the incident response methodology by Prosise et 
al. (2003) and SANS (2008), together with the MyCERT SOP for worm handling, 
are used as a basis and a guide. 
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Figure 3.7. MyCERT Worm IH SOP. 
Adapted from MyCERT  MA-041.052002:  
Computer Worm Incident Handling Standard Operating Procedure 2002. 
 
    The incident response methodology and MyCERT SOP in worm handling are 
reflected in STAKCERT KDD Processes in step number 3 and number 5 ( refer 
to Figures 3.1). These are designated as ‘Define the research design’ and 
‘Integrate static, dynamic analysis and incident response procedures’ 
accordingly, where incident response is integrated. Before data analysis starts, 
preparation is carried out by examining the checklist to ensure all the installed 
software is working properly with the right testing lab network settings. 
Furthermore, all the analyses and findings are documented for all the 
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experiments conducted. Table 3.2 displays how findings and analysis are 
documented. 
     Table 3.2. Documentation Template for Worm Analysis. 
Activity Observed Results 
1. Load specimen into victim 
computer 
 
2. Run anti-virus program  
3. Analyse the anti-virus results and 
the file names 
 
4. Conduct strings analysis  
5. Look for scripts  
6. Conduct binary analysis  
7. Disassemble code  
8. Reverse-compile code  
9. Monitor file changes  
10. Monitor file integrity  
11. Monitor process activity  
12. Monitor local network activity  
13. Scan for open ports remotely  
14. Scan for vulnerabilities remotely  
15. Check promiscuous mode locally 
and remotely 
 
16. Sniff network activity  
17. Monitor registry activity  
18. Check registry changes  
19. Run code with debugger  
 
     As a whole, in the STAKCERT KDD processes, the incident response is 
already integrated in worm detection, analysis and isolation. It is hard to 
separate  incident response, since it plays an important role in the security field, 
especially in responding to worm incidents. 
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II. Static analysis 
     Static analysis is also known as white box analysis. It involves analysing and 
understanding source code where the worm code is not executed, which is 
opposed to dynamic analysis. Dynamic analysis involves executing the worm 
and watching its actions. The steps involved in static analysis are anti-virus 
checking, strings analysis, scripts analysis, binary analysis and disassembling; 
these stages are illustrated in Figure 3.8. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Static Analysis. 
     Static analysis is very effective in identifying the program flow, any files 
associated with the worm and any flaws or programming and implementation 
errors in the worm code, without actually running the worm code. In certain 
conditions, if only binary code is available, it has to be compiled to access the 
source code. This static analysis is in contrast with dynamic analysis which is 
explained in the next sub section. 
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A) Anti-virus checking  
     When the worm specimen has been copied to the test computer, the anti-
virus program is run to check if it detects anything. If the anti-virus detects the 
worm, the worm’s name is identified and further information is accessible on any 
anti-virus website. The format of the specimen is also verified. If it is in a 
compressed or archived form, it will be decompressed or unpacked. 
B) String analysis 
     An alternative way to identify the worm’s characteristics and functions is via 
extracting the strings from the worm specimen. Strings.exe is used to extract the 
strings; TDS-3 can also be used for string extraction. The information that could 
be retrieved from the extracted strings comprises the worm specimen’s name, 
user dialogue, password for backdoors, URLs associated with the malware, the 
email address of the attacker, help or command-line options, libraries, function 
calls and other executables used by the specimen. 
C) Script analysis 
     The language written for the worm can be identified based on strings 
extracted from it. Table 3.3 can be used as guidance. 
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Table 3.3. Programming and Scripting Language. 
Programming and 
Scripting Language 
Identifying Characteristics Inside the File File’s 
Common 
Suffix 
Perl  Start with line !#usr/bin/perl  .pl, .perl 
Bourne Shell 
Scripting language 
Starts with line !#/bin/sh .sh 
C C programming language  .c 
C++ Can be standalone program or  many files 
referenced within the language  
.cpp 
Java Contain java source code. .java, .j, .jav 
Assembly Language Close to binary machine code .asi 
Active Server Page 
(ASP) 
Can be built using Visual Basic, Jscript or 
Perl. Can combine HTML, scripts, Active-X 
server components. 
.asp 
JavaScript Includes the word javascript or JavaScript, 
especially in the form <Script language = 
“JavaScript”> 
.js, .html, 
.htm 
Visual Basic Script 
(VBScript) 
Includes the word VBScript, or characters vb 
scattered throughout the file 
.vbs, .html, 
.htm 
  
D) Disassemble code 
     Disassemble and debugger codes are used to convert a raw binary 
executable into assembly language for further analysis. Ida Pro and OllyDbg are 
used to disassemble and debug the computer worm. 
III. Dynamic analysis 
     Dynamic analysis involves executing the worm and watching its actions. The 
worm is activated in a controlled lab computer. The steps involved in dynamic 
analysis are: Monitoring file activities, monitoring processes, monitoring network 
activities and monitoring registry access. All of these are illustrated in Figure 
3.9. 
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Figure 3.9. Dynamic Analysis. 
 
A) Monitoring file activities 
     Most computer worms read from or write to the file system. It might attempt 
to write files, alter existing programs, add new files or append itself to the file 
system. By using a tool such as Filemon, all actions associated with opening, 
reading, writing, closing and deleting files can be monitored. 
B) Monitoring process 
     A monitoring tool such as Prcview v3.7.3.1 or Process Explorer displays 
each running program on a computer, showing the details of what each process 
is doing. With this tool, the files, registry keys and all of the DLLs that each 
process has loaded can easily be monitored. For each running process, the tool 
displays its owner, its individual privileges, its priority and its environment 
variables.  
C) Monitoring network activities 
     From a remote computer, which will be in the same LAN as the infected 
testing computer, the port scanner, Nmap program and a sniffer will be installed. 
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The port scanner and Nmap program are used to monitor the listening port. A 
sniffer will be installed to sniff the worm traffic. All of the related tools like 
Ethereal, NeWT and TDS-3 use the sniffer. By using the sniffer, details of 
individual packets and all packets transmitted across the LAN can be monitored. 
In addition, the local network monitoring tool (TDIMon) will monitor and record 
all requests to use the network interface and show how the worm grabbed the 
network resources and used them. 
The worm might have placed the network interface in promiscuous 
(broadcast) mode, which allows it to sniff all packets from a LAN. To determine 
if the infected computer is in the promiscuous mode state of interface, the 
Promiscdetect.exe tool must be run. 
D) Monitoring registry access 
     The registry needs to be monitored, as it is the hierarchical database 
containing the configuration of the operating system and most programs 
installed on the computer. The monitoring of registry access is carried out by 
using Regmon. 
 
IV. Data cleaning and transformation 
     The data cleaning process that is part of the data pre-processing process is 
already conducted under the data source section. This is where all the 
duplicates, noise and outlier data are removed. When conducting the static and 
dynamic analysis, a pattern of worm characteristics is identified. Each dataset 
has its own way of being recognised and simplified. This leads to the selection 
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of useful worm characteristics, which are: The worm payload, infection, 
propagation, operating algorithm and activation. Selection of the wrong worm 
characteristics (also known as attribute selection) might lead to inaccurate 
results and wasted time. Later, these five worm characteristics are used to 
represent all the datasets used for the experiments.  Then, to use these 
datasets in SPSS and data mining (using JAVA–WEKA), the worm 
characteristics are transformed into nominal data with a certain number 
representation.  
     Furthermore, in this research, the dataset from the VX Heavens source 
consists of executables source code in the Windows PE format ( i.e. file name 
executables .cpl, .exe, .dll, .ocx, .sys, .scr, and .drv) and some of them in 
programming and scripting language (i.e. .pl, .sh, .c, .cpp, .java, .vbs). If the 
source code was not executable, the static analysis was conducted to extract 
the main features of the worm, which later are transformed into an 
understandable format as an input for WEKA software. As for the executable 
source code, the dynamic analysis was conducted. In certain condition, both 
static and dynamic analyses were conducted to extract the main patterns or 
features of the worm, which subsequently were used as input for machine 
learning algorithm (WEKA software).  
     From the worm source code, once it has been analysed using the static or 
dynamic analysis, the five main features of the worm algorithm are being 
extracted into semi format structure comprising five different of subareas which 
are the payload, infection, activation, operating algorithm and propagation to 
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capture the worm characteristics. These five different subareas (refer to Table 
3.4) later is transformed into nominal data with five numeric values which are 
used as the input to the machine learning algorithms, where the WEKA software 
is used. 
Table 3.4. Example of Data Transformation. 
Dataset 1 New format for dataset 
1 Infection  Activation  Propagation Operating 
algorithm 
Payload 
File, email 
and sharing 
directories 
Self 
activation 
Random Terminate 
stay 
resident 
Backdoor 
and 
autorun 
registry 
 i21,a4,p1,o3,l59 
 
 
 
worm characteristics are extracted from the worm                transformed  worm code  
           source code       into nominal data with 
numeric values  
where:   
     i21 represents infection – as file, email and sharing directories, 
          a4 represents activation – as self activation, 
          p1 represents propagation – as random,  
        o3 represents operating algorithm – as terminate and stay resident  
     and l59 represents payload – as backdoor and autorun registry. 
 
 
 
Numeric values as the input into 
machine learning algorithms. 
WEKA software only accepts data 
input in these format. 
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     The formation of the new STAKCERT worm classification and STAKCERT 
worm relational model, which are the subsequent processes after the static and 
dynamic analyses, are not explained in this chapter. The details can be found in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.3).  
 
3.2.4.2 Chi-square and Symmetric Measures 
     Once the data pre-processing process is completed, statistical analysis is 
conducted to analyse the datasets. The statistical analysis gives added value to 
data mining analysis (Giudici 2010). For this research, the Chi-square, 
symmetric measure, Euclidean distance and 10-cross validation under data 
mining are implemented. Details of Euclidean distance and 10-cross validation 
are explained under data mining in section 3.2.4.4. 
     To test the relevance of the STAKCERT worm classification and the 
STAKCERT relational model, Chi-square and symmetric measure tests are 
used. These tests are used to determine the relationship which exists between 
worm characteristics chosen in the STAKCERT relational model, followed by the 
symmetric measure to quantify the strength of the relationship. 
     Chi-Square is a statistical test for cross tabulation which works by comparing 
the result of the actual frequencies and the expected frequencies to verify 
whether the result happens by chance or not (Greasley 2008). Indeed, it is also 
capable of measuring the discrepancy between the observed cell counts (from 
the experiment) and what would be expected if the rows and columns were 
unrelated. The Chi-square formula used on these data is displayed in equation 
60 
 
1, where O stands for observed frequency, E stands for expected frequency and 
X2 for Chi-square. 
                                         
E
EO
X
)( 22 
                                                        (1) 
 
Expected frequencies are those which would be expected if data were randomly 
distributed. The expected count in this cell is the average count which would be 
anticipated under the null hypothesis. In general, the expected count for each 
cell of the contingency table is calculated as displayed in equation 2. 
 
Expected
GrandTotal
lColumnTotaRowTotalCount *                                          (2) 
 
     The Chi-square test becomes invalid if the expected frequency is less than 5. 
Since the dataset is categorical (also known as nominal) data, testing was 
conducted based on the frequencies. They are later converted into percentage 
format for further analysis. Software SPSS has been used to conduct this 
statistical analysis. 
     The Chi-square and symmetric measures involve null hypothesis (H0) and 
alternative hypothesis (Ha). The null hypothesis (H0) states that there is no 
significant difference between expected and observed frequencies. In other 
words, there is no relationship between features. If there were no relationship 
between the features, the observed and the expected count would be similar 
(equal to 0). The alternative hypothesis (Ha) states that they are different. Thus, 
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if H0, is rejected, it can then be concluded that there is a relationship between 
the features. The level of significance chosen is 95% confidence; in other words, 
the benchmark where the difference is not due to chance alone is set at 0.05. If 
the significance or probability (p) value is less than 0.05, it means there is a less 
than 5 out of 100 probability that it happened by chance. Details of the Chi-
square and symmetric measure and how they are applied can be found in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.4.2). 
     If the expected counts for the nominal data are less than five, with the 
condition that it is a 2x2 contingency table (the number of degrees of freedom is 
always 1), the alternative test that can be carried out is known as Fisher’s exact 
test (Weisstein 2011). Fisher’s exact test formula is displayed in equation 3. 
 
                                    
E
EO
Y
)5.0]([ 2


                                              (3) 
where, 
Y= Fisher’s Exact Test 
O= Observed frequency 
E= Expected frequency 
 
     This Fisher’s exact test has the same objective as the Chi-square test, but it 
is dedicated to expected counts of less than five. As discussed, in Chi-square 
the expected counts should be more than five. This is the adjusted formula 
where only one side is being used, which results in the two-sided significance 
value being halved. Hence, the value of exact significance 1 sided is considered 
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to be the result. Details of how Fisher’s exact test is applied can be found in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.4.2). 
     Since the data involved in this research is nominal data, it therefore can be 
summarised that the importance of applying the Chi-square and symmetric 
measure in this research is due to its functionality, which enables the 
determination of the relationship existing between worm characteristics and the 
strength of the relationship chosen in the STAKCERT relational model to be 
quantified.  
 
3.2.4.3 Security Metrics Method 
     Two important attributes being measured when conducting a depth study in 
this research are weight and severity. In order to decide how to assign the 
weight and severity values, which are explained in detail in Chapter 5, a solution 
known as security metrics is used. Security metrics is a method that helps to 
quantify, classify and measure information on security operations. In security 
metrics, the studied threats are defined, then threats are transformed into 
metrics or representations that can easily be measured. Then understand and 
identify the vulnerabilities, flaws, problems, weaknesses or damage they can 
cause to the security infrastructure, check the existing countermeasure process 
performance and, if necessary, recommend the improvement of any technology 
or countermeasure process (Jaquith 2007). 
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     The security metrics processes are already being applied in STAKCERT 
KDD Processes for worm detection and worm response as displayed in Table 
3.5. 
     Table 3.5. Security Metrics in STAKCERT Processes. 
Security metrics processes Applying security metrics in STAKCERT  
1) Define worm threats Yes 
 
2) Represents worm threats into 
metrics  
Yes.  
 Worm data is represented based on payload, 
infection, activation, propagation and operating 
algorithm. 
 Formation of the STAKCERT worm 
classification and STAKCERT relational 
model. 
 
3) Understand and identify the 
vulnerability, flaw, problem, 
weakness and damage to security 
infrastructure 
Yes. 
 Run the static and dynamic analysis. 
 Identify the need to assign weight and severity 
value to assign the countermeasure process. 
 
4) Check the performance of the 
existing countermeasures 
Yes. 
 Integrate and run data mining using JAVA-
WEKA to check the accuracy rate of weight 
and severity assigned. 
 
5) Recommend any technology or 
countermeasure process for 
improvement 
Yes. 
 Apoptosis to isolate the most severe worm 
attacks. 
 
 
     For STAKCERT research, in order to understand the threat posed by a 
worm, a deep and thorough understanding of worm architecture is necessary; in 
this thesis, this led to the formation of STAKCERT worm classification and the 
STAKCERT worm relational model. Initially, the characteristics that need to be 
observed are defined. Then, during the static and dynamic analysis, the worms 
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are analysed and simplified into worm representation, which comprises payload, 
activation, operating algorithm, infection and propagation. 
     A thorough analysis related to the vulnerabilities, flaws, problems, 
weaknesses or the damage the worm can cause to the security infrastructure is 
closely monitored. As a result, weight and severity are chosen as two main 
attributes in assigning the countermeasure process. Detailed reasons for the 
selection of weight and severity can be found in Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
     To analyse the performance of a worm that has already been assigned with 
different weight and severity values, it is tested using the JAVA-WEKA software, 
in which different data mining algorithms are also integrated. As a result, all 
worms with a high severity level are recommended to be isolated using the 
apoptosis concept. 
     Apart from the elements stated above, security metrics can also be 
measured based on the perimeter defence, control and coverage, availability 
and reliability and application risks. All these measurements were already taken 
into consideration when the worm analysis was conducted. Therefore, as a 
result, the weight and severity performance and value are tested based on data 
criticality level, infrastructure availability and loss of productivity. Moreover, an 
algorithm has been developed using the above as a basis. Details of this 
algorithm can be found in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.1). 
     Lastly, the main reason why security metrics method has been chosen in this 
research is due to its capabilities to make the job of defining, understanding, 
identifying and measuring information security efficient, accurate, measurable 
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and reliable. This is also supported by Atzeni and Lioy (2006), where they state 
that work can be more profitable if it is enhanced using the security metrics and 
is more efficient if it is measurable.  
 
3.2.4.4 Data Mining 
     Clustering and classification play important roles in data mining. Clustering is 
also known as unsupervised learning, while classification is known as 
supervised learning. Both of these techniques have been applied in this 
research. However, it must be remembered that the datasets used in this 
research are nominal data. 
I. Clustering 
     Earlier, the STAKCERT worm relational model was tested using the Chi-
square and symmetric measures. Subsequently, the k-means clustering 
technique is used to cluster all the datasets into different types of worm group or 
type. For STAKCERT research, five different types of worm group have been 
identified, further details of which can be found in Chapter 4 (section 4.4.3.1). In 
k-means, datasets are partitioned based on centroids, also known as mean. The 
basic steps of how the k-means works are as follows: firstly, the number of 
clusters is chosen. Secondly, the datasets are assigned to their closest cluster 
centre based on Euclidean distance(ED). The Euclidean distance equation is 
displayed in equation 4 where x and y are two different objects and the 
Euclidean distance is the square root of the summation from the squares of the 
differences between x and y values. 
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Thirdly, the centroid of each cluster is calculated and taken as the new centre 
value for each of the clusters. Lastly, the whole process is repeated with a new 
cluster centre until the same point is assigned to each cluster. The k-means is 
chosen due to its effectiveness and simple method. WEKA is used to apply the 
k-means technique. WEKA is open source software, implemented in JAVA and 
it has a collection of machine learning algorithms to solve data mining problems 
(Hall et al 2009). 
II. Classification 
     Referring to Figure 3.1, processes 8 and 12 involve data mining. With regard 
to process number 8, once the clustering is complete, the clusters of the five 
different types of worm are integrated with five different classification algorithms. 
Earlier on, the clustering is meant to obtain the label or the five different groups 
of worm type. In order to test the accuracy of the five different types of worm 
assignment, the classification algorithms are integrated (the findings can be 
examined in Chapter 4, section 4.4). The classification algorithms chosen are 
the Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO), Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Naïve 
Bayes, Decision Tree (J48) and K-nearest Neighbours (IBk). Details of the 
above classification algorithms can be found in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6. Classification of Algorithm Functions.  
Name Function 
Naïve Bayes Standard probabilistic Naïve Bayes classifier where it 
used as an estimator and probability technique. 
 
J48 To generate a pruned or unpruned C4.5 Decision Tree. It 
is the descendent of ID3. 
 
Multilayer Perceptron To train and test data using backpropagation in a neural 
network 
 
SMO To train and test data using the sequential minimal 
optimisation algorithm for support vector classification. 
 
IBk It is the k-nearest neighbour classifier 
 
 
These classifications are applied so that a comparison can be made between 
these algorithms, which therefore enable identification of the most accurate 
classification algorithm. This concept is applied once again in process number 
12 (also from Figure 3.1) to different attributes which are weight and severity 
(details of findings can be found in Chapter 5, section 5.3.2). While in Table 3.7, 
are the configuration settings used for the testing conducted. 
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Table 3.7. WEKA Classification Algorithms Configuration. 
Algorithm 
name 
 
Configuration  Description 
Naïve 
Bayes 
weka.classifiers.bayes. 
NaiveBayes 
False for debug, display mode in old format, 
kernel estimator and supervised discretization. 
 
J48 weka.classifiers.trees.J4
8 -R  
–N 7 –Q 3  -M 2 
 
Binary splits: false, reduced error pruning with 
confidence of factor for pruning= 0.1, number 
folds=7, seeds for randomizing the data=3 and 
restrict the minimum number of instances in a 
leaf=2. 
  
Multilayer 
Perceptro
n 
weka.classifiers.function
s. 
MultilayerPerceptron —L 
0.3 –M 0.2 –N 500 –V 0 
–S 0 –E 20 –H 0 
The learning rate= 0.3, momentum = 0.2, 
training time= 500, validation set size=0, 
seed=0, validation threshold = 20 and hidden 
layer =0. 
SMO weka.classifiers.function
s.SMO  -C 1.0 -L 0.0010 
-P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V -1 -W 
1 -K 
“weka.classifiers.function
s.supportVector.PolyKer
nel -C 250007 -E 1.0” 
Build logistic models=false, complexity 
parameter=1.0, checks turned off=false, 
debug=false, epsilon for round-off error=1.0E-
12, data transformation = normalize training 
data, kernel=polykernel with cache size 250007 
and exponent 1.0, number folds=use training 
data, random number seed for the cross 
validation=1 and tolerance parameter=0.0010. 
  
IBk weka.classifiers.lazy.IBk 
-K 8  
-W 0 -I -A 
"weka.core.neighboursea
rch.LinearNNSearch -A 
\"weka.core.EuclideanDi
stance -R first-last\”” 
The number of neighbours to use=8, cross 
validate=false, debug=false, the distance 
weighting method used=weight by 1/distance, 
mean squared =false, the nearest neighbour 
search algorithm to use=Euclidean distance and 
window size =0, where no limit to the number of 
training instances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
III. STAKCERT Worm Apoptosis Algorithm 
     Once the security metrics processes are complete, a set of STAKCERT rules 
are formed based on the implications from the data criticality level, infrastructure 
availability and loss of productivity perspectives. These rules are part of the 
STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm and presented in IF-THEN-ELSE form. 
Basically, the rules are expressed in the form of:  
If (Attribute-1, value -1) and (attribute -2, value -2) and…. 
and (attribute –n, value –n) then (decision, value) 
The decision made is the dependent variable, since it relies on the worm’s 
selected attributes, which are: The payload, activation, infection, operating 
algorithm and propagation. Each of these attributes are assigned with a weight 
that is either low, medium or high, based on the worm implications (using 
security metrics method, refer Table 3.5). The next decision is the severity level, 
which leads to the apoptosis condition. The severity level is categorised as low, 
medium or high. Details of the weight assignment, severity value categorisation 
and the rules and algorithm can be found in Chapter 5. Once the datasets have 
been assigned with the related weight and severity values, the performance 
criteria of the STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm is verified based on the 
accuracy and false positive rate.  
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IV. Performance Criteria Definition 
     The performance criteria is also applied to the whole STAKCERT model. The 
accuracy also refers as the correct classification. The false positive (FP) means 
the data is being misclassified as class A but actually it belongs to a different 
class and false negative (FN) occurs when the data is wrongly classified as a 
different class but actually it belongs to class A. While true positive (TP) occurs 
when data is correctly classified as class A and true negative (TN) occurs when 
data is correctly classified wrong in class A. So the correct classifications are 
the TP and TN. The FP rate (FPR) is the false positive (FP) divided by the 
summation of false positive (FP) and true negative (TN). While the TP rate 
(TPR) is true positive (TP) divided by the summation of true positive (TP) and 
false negative (FN). Precision is the proportion of relevant documents in the 
results returned and Recall is the ratio of relevant documents found in the 
search result to the total of all relevant documents (same like TP rate equation). 
The higher the Precision and Recall values mean the more relevant documents 
are returned more quickly. Lastly the F-measure is a way of combining Recall 
and Precision scores into a single measure of performance (Tewolde 2011). 
The equations used were the following:  
True positive rate = TP / (TP + FN)                                                            (5)                                                       
False positive rate = FP / (FP + TN)                                                           (6) 
F-measure = 2 * recall * precision / (recall + precision)                                     (7) 
Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)                                                    (8) 
Error rate = 1- Accuracy                      (9) 
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Precision = TP / (TP+ FP)                    (10) 
False negative rate = FN / (FN + TP)                                                               (11) 
 
     A confusion matrix also known as a contingency table, is an easy way to 
describe experimental results. It is a matrix to show predictions and actual 
classifications (Kohavi and Provost 1998). The dimension of the confusion 
matrix is m x m where m is the number of different label values. An example of 
the confusion matrix and how different values are calculated is displayed in 
Table 3.8. For confusion matrix 5 X 5, class w1 is used for an example where 
different colours are used to represent the terms. 
 
Table 3.8. Examples of Confusion Matrix 2x2 and 5x5. 
 Predicted class 
Yes No 
 
Actual class 
Yes true positive (TP) false negative(FN) 
No false positive (FP) true negative(TN) 
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     Apart from the confusion matrix, a Receiver-Operating characteristics (ROC) 
curve is the alternative way to examine the classifiers performance (Swets 
1988). It is useful in assessing the accuracy of the predictions. It is a graph plot 
with X axis representing the FP rate (FPR) and Y axis representing as the TP 
rate (TPR). Moreover, according to Scharenbroich (2003), the ROC curve 
identifies how many false positives acceptable to be guaranteed a certain 
percentage of true positives. An ideal ROC curve is the step-function. While 
ROC area represents the area under the ROC curve. For the ROC area, if the 
point is (0,1) it means all positive cases and negative cases are correctly 
classified. This indicates as the perfect classifier since the FPR is 0 (none) and 
the TPR is 1(all). If the point is (1,0) it shows the classifier is wrongly classified 
all the cases since the FPR is 1 and TPR is 0. While the point is (0,0) predicts 
all cases to be negative and when the point is(1,1) as all cases to be positive. 
An example of a ROC curve diagram can be seen in Figure 3.10. The X axis 
represents the FP rate and Y axis represents the TP rate. 
 
Figure 3.10. A ROC Curve Diagram 
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     For evaluation, the 10-fold cross validation, which is also known as leave-
one-out, is used to conduct this testing. This cross validation is widely used as a 
standard way of verifying the rule sets (Grzymala-Busse 2010). All cases are 
randomly reordered and then a set of all cases is divided into ten equal sizes. 
During each run, one of the partitions is used as the test and the rest are used 
for training. This process is repeated ten times so that each partition is used for 
testing exactly once. The reasons behind the choice of this kind of test are, 
firstly, that it uses as much data as possible for training and testing and 
secondly, the better accuracy of its findings. Details of the STAKCERT worm 
apoptosis algorithm and test results for the accuracy and FP rate can be found 
in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2.4.5 Data Post-processing 
     At this stage, the complete pattern extracted from the data is interpreted so 
useful knowledge is produced by the end of all the processes. Later, the pattern 
extracted can be simplified using graphs or any suitable methods to represent 
the complete extracted pattern for any further exploration or analysis. In 
STAKCERT, at this point, a conclusion and summary can be made based on all 
the findings to ensure all the objectives for this research are achieved 
successfully. 
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3.3 Summary 
     In this chapter, the STAKCERT research processes used for this study are 
discussed. It is believed that these processes act as the backbone that provides 
guidance on how research should be developed and proper activities carried 
out. It ensures that a consistent and reproducible approach is used from the first 
activity of the research processes until all the processes are complete. Details of 
how these research processes are applied and the findings can be found in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
MODELLING STAKCERT FOR WORM DETECTION 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the STAKCERT model for the detection of worm infection. 
This chapter discusses the methods integrated within the STAKCERT model, in 
terms of worm detection, and a new STAKCERT worm classification and 
relational model are introduced in this research as part of the STAKCERT 
model. The experimental results gained from the use of the STAKCERT model 
were compared with existing works and it was found that the STAKCERT model 
successfully addressed the problems left by existing works: STAKCERT yielded 
a 98.75% accuracy rate for worm detection, using the Multilayer Perceptron 
algorithm. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
     Chapter 3 discussed the enhancements of the data-preprocessing 
processes, which consist of the added processes of the Chi-square, symmetric 
measures and security metrics. In this chapter, all the processes involved in the 
STAKCERT KDD processes (Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3) are applied within the 
STAKCERT model for worm detection are explained. Generally, there are 2 
phases involved in the formation of the STAKCERT model, which are worm 
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detection (Phase 1) and worm isolation (Phase 2) (as displayed in Figure 4.1). 
In this chapter, this thesis focuses on phase 1. As displayed in Figure 4.1, there 
are five main processes involved in phase 1, which are worm detection, worm 
analysis, STAKCERT worm classification and the data matching processes. 
Each of these processes plays an important role and has its own integrated 
processes, which are explained in detail in Section 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. An Overview of STAKCERT Phases 1 and 2. 
 
4.2 Related Works 
     Prior to the introduction of the STAKCERT model of worm detection, a 
thorough study of the existing literature on worm architecture, worm implication, 
worm detection and worm response issues was undertaken. Such literature was 
reviewed in order to see where further improvements could be made and it was 
ascertained that the studies on worm architecture and the threat implications 
should be the initial consideration in producing improved worm detection and 
better response techniques. These details have already been discussed and 
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outlined in Chapter 2. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 a few works on worm detection 
using different methods and algorithms are discussed. 
     In order to test the effectiveness of the STAKCERT model for worm 
detection, a comparison of the work with research conducted by Siddiqui et al. 
(2009) and Dai et al. (2009) was undertaken. Both works used the same 
datasets as in this thesis and had the same objective; i.e., to detect worms and 
increase the worm detection rate. Indeed, Siddiqui et al. (2009) used the static 
features of a worm programme, while Dai et al. (2009) incorporated dynamic 
instruction sequence mining techniques involving the runtime features of a worm 
programme. These two works are the closest to this thesis and this thesis has 
focused on bridging the gaps that arose from the aforementioned works by 
integrating static features and dynamic analysis within the STAKCERT model. In 
terms of performance, Siddiqui et al. (2009) yielded a better accuracy rate of 
96% by using random forest, while Dai et al. (2009) detection rate was 91.9% by 
using SVM. Their results and the results of this thesis are further discussed in 
Section 4.4 and it became apparent that this thesis has outperformed both these 
accuracies, with a 98.75% success rate (using the Multilayer Perceptron). 
Improvement in the STAKCERT KDD processes, the integration of STAKCERT 
worm classification and STAKCERT relational model and performance 
optimisation by using MLP algorithm, were the key factors in this achievement, 
as explained in detail in the next section. 
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4.3 STAKCERT Model for Worm Detection 
Phase 1 of worm detection is outlined in detail in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Phase 1 of STAKCERT. 
 
In terms of STAKCERT KDD processes, specifically data pre-processing and 
dataset collection, the cleanup processes and the static and dynamic analyses 
have already been ascertained. The worm detection and analysis were 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4, while the STAKCERT worm 
classification and the involved data matching processes are explained in the 
next section. 
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4.3.1 STAKCERT Worm Classification  
 
Figure 4.3. STAKCERT Worm Classification. 
 
STAKCERT worm classification consists of five main attributes, which are 
infection, activation, payload, operating algorithm and propagation. 
 
A) Infection  
     This is the phase concerned with how a computer becomes infected by a 
worm. There are two ways in which a worm infects a computer and these are 
via a host or a network. The host is a mechanism that the worm requires in 
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order to copy itself to a new system that is not yet infected; a worm cannot 
autonomously propagate across a network. The host computer worm refers to 
where the original worm terminates itself after launching a copy onto another 
host. Thus, there is only one copy of the worm running elsewhere on the 
network at any given moment and human help is required in moving the worm 
from one computer to another. CD, USB (thumb-drive and external hard disk), 
file and smart phone are the most common hosts available today.  
     Whilst a network comprises multiple parts, each worm can run on different 
computers and perform different actions for communication purposes. Most 
worms simply copy themselves to a vulnerable computer that can share data, 
while most Windows networks allow computers within defined subgroups to 
exchange data freely, making it easier for a worm to propagate itself.  
 
B) Activation 
     Activation is defined as a worm’s trigger mechanism and this phase refers to 
the worm entering the host, once it finds a computer. 
I. No Activation 
A worm with no activation will just remain within a computer, doing nothing other 
than taking up some hard disk space.  
II. Human Trigger 
The human trigger is the slowest activation mechanism, where email is 
commonly used as the medium with which to spread a worm. Then, social 
engineering techniques are used to encourage a user to click on the file and 
activate the worm Zou et al. (2004). According to Christoffersen and Mauland 
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(2006), some worms are activated when the user performs a certain activity, 
such as resetting the computer or logging onto the system, thereby running the 
login scripts or executing a remote infected file.  
III. Scheduled Process 
According to Weaver et al. (2003), the second fastest method of worm activation 
is through the use of scheduled system processes. A schedule process is an 
activation that is based on a specific time and date and many computer 
operating systems and applications include auto-update programmes; i.e., they 
periodically download, install and run software updates. 
IV. Self Activation 
The quickest way in which worms are activated is through the exploiting of 
vulnerabilities in services that are always on and always available (e.g., Code 
Red (Berghel 2001) exploiting IIS Web servers) or within the libraries that the 
services use (e.g. XDR (CERT 2002)). These worms either attach themselves to 
running services or execute other commands, using the permissions associated 
with the attacked service. 
V. Hybrid Launch 
The hybrid launch employs a combination of two or more activation mechanisms 
in order to launch a worm, with ExploreZip (Nanchenberg 1999) being an 
example of a hybrid-launch worm. Such a worm sends an e-mail that requires 
the user to launch the infected attachment, so that control of the system may be 
gained. Once activated, the worm automatically spreads itself to other 
computers over the peer-to-peer network. These targeted computers then 
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become infected on the next reboot, without the requirement of user 
intervention. Stuxnet worm is another example of a hybrid-launch worm. It 
spreads itself by exploiting five Windows vulnerabilities and via network shares 
with weak passwords (Shearer 2010). 
 
C) Payload 
     A payload is defined as the destructive mechanism of a worm and is a code 
designed to do more than spread a worm (Castaneda et al. 2004). Many worms 
have been created that are simply designed to spread without actually 
attempting to alter the systems they pass through. 
I. No Payload 
A worm with no payload does not do any harm to a computer system. Indeed, 
this kind of worm will just propagate without initiating any destructive 
mechanisms within a computer. 
II. Installing a Backdoor 
Backdoor is a term used to describe a secret or undocumented means of getting 
into a computer system. Many worms’ programmes have backdoors 
incorporated into them by the worms’ writers, so that they may gain access, in 
terms of troubleshooting or changing the programme. They create backdoors 
once they gain access, in order to allow themselves an easier way in, or in case 
their original entrance is discovered. An example of the worm is the Blaster 
worm (Bailey et al. 2005), which used the backdoor mechanism to transfer the 
worm payload to newly-infected systems. 
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III. Denial of Services 
A denial of service (DoS) attack floods a network with an overwhelming amount 
of traffic, slowing its response time for legitimate traffic or grinding it to a halt 
completely. The more common attacks use the built-in features of the TCP/IP 
protocol, in order to create exponential amounts of network traffic. An example 
of a worm that uses DoS attack is Code Red (Berghel 2001). It was 
programmed to unleash a DoS attack on the Whitehouse.gov website, targeting 
the actual Whitehouse.gov IP address. 
IV. Destructive 
This will cause harm to the computer or the host. According to Shannon and 
Moore (2004), the Witty worm deletes a randomly chosen section of the hard 
drive, which results in the computer becoming unusable. Viking worm is another 
example of a worm that infects executable files in both local drives and network 
shares, which harm to the victim’s computer (Anton 2009). 
V. Phishing 
Phishing is a criminal activity that employs social engineering techniques (Tsow 
2006). Phishers attempt to acquire sensitive information fraudulently, such as 
usernames, passwords and credit card details, by presenting themselves as a 
trustworthy entity through electronic communication. Phishing can be 
undertaken through email or instant messaging and may ask the user to provide 
details of a website of which they are a member. Attempts to deal with the 
growing number of reported phishing incidents include legislation, user training 
and technical measures. 
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VI. Command and Control 
Command and control refers to the capability of a worm to send important 
information, such as usernames and passwords, from the infected computer to 
the worm’s writer via the Internet. This allows the worm’s writer to remotely 
control any infected computer and Koobface is an example of such a worm. 
VII. Infect Registry 
The easiest way to ensure that a worm remains within a victim’s computer is by 
hooking at a victim’s computer registry. This is due to the fact that there are 
many registry entries that control the launching programme or service. Thus, to 
infect the windows operating system of a computer, the worm just has to drop 
itself at the registry. The most common entry where a worm would drop itself is 
‘Computer\ HKEY_Local_Machine\ Software\ Microsoft\ Windows\ 
CurrentVersion\ Run ’: this allows the worm to run when the computer boots up. 
 VIII. Mass Mailing 
Mass mailing refers to a worm that is capable of sending itself to the email 
addresses found on an infected computer, using the victim’s email client system 
or any other email client. Some mass mailing worms have their own SMTP 
email engine server, in order to ensure they succeed. Examples of mass mailing 
worms are Netsky and Mydoom. 
IX. OS Version 
Code Red II is an example of worm that has a different payload; thus, it relies on 
the operating system that it infects. For example, if an infected computer has a 
Chinese version of its operating system, the worm may produce up to 600 
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threads of propagation rate and then it may infects other systems for two days 
(Cisco 2004).  
X. Metamorphic 
The metamorphic worm has the same features as the polymorphic worm, where 
the code is programmed to change after a set duration of time. In addition, the 
functionality or the behaviour of the metamorphic worm is also programmed to 
change for a particular length of time, which is at odds with the polymorphic 
worm. This worm keeps on changing the code and its functionality for the 
purpose of avoiding being detected by anti-virus software. 
XII. Apply Patch or Harden Configuration 
The Nachi worm, also known as the W32.Welchia.Worm, spreads through and 
exploits the multiple vulnerabilities that exist within Windows operating system. 
Blaster worm is another example of a worm that downloads a Microsoft 
Windows update to a vulnerable computer and then removes the worm that 
already resided within the victim’s computer. These worms are then used and 
exploit the same vulnerabilities for the purpose of infecting the victim’s computer 
(Symantec 2003). 
XIII. Degrade Performance 
Once the worm succeeds in infecting the victim’s computer, it degrades normal 
computer performance and stability down to 80% from its normal condition.  
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D) Operating Algorithm 
     An operating algorithm is defined as a technique used by worms in order to 
avoid detection and Albanese et al. (2004) defined and classified the concept as 
a worm survival method. There are various categories of operating algorithm, as 
outlined below: 
I. Polymorphic 
A polymorphic worm changes all or part of their code each time an infected 
computer is rebooted and this helps the worm to avoid detection through the 
anti-virus scanning process. Kruegel et al. (2005) defined the polymorphic worm 
as a worm that is able to change its binary representation as part of the 
spreading process. This is done by employing self-encryption mechanisms or 
semantic-preserving code manipulation techniques. Consequently, a copy of a 
polymorphic worm may no longer share a common invariant substring of 
sufficient length and the existing systems will not recognise the worm’s copy in 
the network streams.  
II. Stealth 
The stealth worm employs a concealment mechanism: it spreads slowly, evokes 
no irregular communication pattern and spreads in such a manner that detection 
proves difficult. Cheetancheri (1998) stated that the goal of the stealth worm is 
to spread to as many hosts as possible without being detected. However, once 
such a worm is detected, manual means of mitigation are possible. 
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III. Terminate and Stay Resident (TSR) 
The terminate and stay resident (TSR) worm exploits a variety of techniques to 
remain resident in memory once the host programme that it infected is 
terminated. This kind of worm is also known as a resident or indirect worm, as it 
remains within the memory whilst searching for another file to infect. 
IV. Anti Anti-virus 
An anti anti-virus worm corrupts anti-virus software by deleting or changing anti-
virus software and the data files, in order to ensure that the anti-virus software 
does not function properly. According to Nachenberg (2000), the anti anti-virus 
worm, also known as a retrovirus, is a computer virus that attacks anti-virus 
software in order to prevent itself from being detected. Retrovirus deletes anti-
virus definition files, disables resident memory for anti-virus protection and 
attempts to disable anti-virus software in many ways. 
 
E) Propagation 
     Propagation is a worm capability of spreading itself to another host or 
network and there are two ways in which such a worm can reproduce itself:  
through scanning or in a passive way. 
I. Scanning 
Scanning is a method employed by worms to find a victim, similar to the method 
proposed by Weaver et al. (2003). There are two possible scanning methods, 
which are random scanning and sequential scanning. 
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Random Scanning  
This is the most popular scanning method, where the worm simply picks a 
random IP address from the network and then tries to connect to and infect it. 
An example of a random scanning worm is the Blaster worm (Bailey et al. 
2005).  
Sequential Scanning (Hitlist) 
The worm releaser scans the network in advance and develops a complete hit 
list of all vulnerable systems on the network. The worm carries this address list 
with it and spreads throughout the list. 
II. Passive 
A worm that employs a passive monitoring technique does not actively search 
for new victims. Rather, it waits for a new target or relies on the user in 
discovering new targets. Christoffersen and Mauland (2006) asserted that the 
passive worm tends to have a slow propagation rate and is often difficult to 
detect because it generates modest anomalous reconnaissance traffic. Modest 
anomalous reconnaissance traffic means only small amount of abnormal 
scanning traffic is generated to the victim’s computer, and most of the 
monitoring security tool will not assume it as a malicious activity since the 
quantity of the abnormal traffic is too small. For monitoring tool, the traffic has to 
reach certain limit in order for it to trigger any alert. 
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4.3.2 STAKCERT Worm Relational Model 
     Skoudis and Zeltser (2004) stated that one of the ways to prepare for a super 
worm is through the formation of a computer incident response team, with 
defined procedures for battling the worm. It is easier to confront a worm attack, 
if awareness of the threats posed by worms is taken into consideration. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to know what threats future worms will pose and thus it 
is important for us to know how to act upon the threats posed by any worm. 
     In order for organisations or users to defend their system or computer from 
the threat of a worm, the architecture and relationship with worm parameters 
and the environment should be well defined (Saudi et al. 2009, Saudi et al. 
2010a). Ellis (2003) defined the worm relational model as the mathematical 
articulation of the relationship between the worm parameters, the current state 
of the environment and the subsequent state of the environment. Furthermore, 
Ellis (2003) presented a framework for the worm relational model that 
incorporated targeting, vulnerability, visibility and infectability. This is a well-
structured relational model and is represented by relational algebra. An 
improvement that could be made to this relational model is by integrating the 
worm response so that it isolates itself if danger is apparent (also known as 
apoptosis), which is implemented in the STAKCERT worm model for worm 
response. By integrating the apoptosis for worm response, the worm will not 
propagate further. This model is related to worm parameters, attributes of the 
environment and the worm’s subsequent potency. However, it is worth bearing 
in mind that the development of the STAKCERT worm relational model is based 
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on the testing of the STAKCERT worm classification, using dynamic, static and 
statistical analyses. All the procedures and the details of static and dynamic 
analysis can be found in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.1.  
     Referring to the STAKCERT relational model, a frequency analysis was 
conducted to locate the highest frequently-occurring number to the lowest for 
each attribute that exists in this relational model. Then the relationship is 
verified, in terms of the STAKCERT relational model, by conducting the Chi-
square and symmetric measure tests. Figure 4.4 below features the STAKCERT 
relational model. 
 
Figure 4.4. STAKCERT Relational Model. 
 
With regards to frequency analysis, the top ten ways in which worms infect 
computer systems are identified, followed by the three main ways of 
propagation, the seven main methods of worm activation, the top ten payload 
types and the four main operating algorithm methods. All of these relationships 
can trigger the apoptosis condition and details of this condition can be found in 
Chapter 5. In the next section, the frequency analysis details are outlined and 
the Chi-square and symmetric measure tests are discussed. 
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4.4 Experimental Results on VX Heavens Datasets 
     The experimental results were divided into two categories, which are 
statistical analysis testing and the STAKCERT model for worm classification 
detection testing. The statistical analysis testing, which consisted of frequency 
analysis and the Chi-square and symmetric measures, was conducted in order 
to identify the highest frequency to the lowest frequency of the worm occurrence 
and to show that the features of and the relationship with the STAKCERT 
relational model did not occur by chance. Under the STAKCERT model for 
worm classification detection testing, clustering was initially conducted, in order 
to identify different types of worms from the datasets. Five different worms were 
identified as a result of clustering testing and these were later used as the input 
for classification detection testing. The classification detection testing was 
undertaken in order to demonstrate the accuracy of the STAKCERT model for 
worm detection and a comparison with other existing work was also undertaken. 
 
4.4.1 Frequency Analysis 
     In order to identify the most important attributes of worm detection and to 
determine the relationship between these attributes, the frequency analysis and 
Chi-square and symmetric measure tests are conducted. In terms of frequency 
analysis, an analysis of the infection results showed that 27.3% of infection 
occurred through files, followed by email (9.9%). The rest of infection categories 
were sharing directories, file and sharing directories and file, email and 
vulnerability (representing 8.7%; 4.3% represented vulnerability and 3.1% each 
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for file and vulnerability). Three categories (email, chatting channels and sharing 
directories) represented 2.5% vulnerability each and others were a combination 
of the different categories, in terms of infection. A few interesting associations 
were noted, in terms of the current way in which a worm infects and our 
findings. Based on the infection analysis results, as outlined in Figure 4.5, file, 
email, vulnerability and sharing directories are the most common methods of 
worm infection. 
     The top threats for January 2010, as presented by Eset (2010), were 
vulnerability, file and email. These are still being employed by worms in infecting 
victims’ computers. As established by Eset (2010) paper, the Win32/Conficker 
worm exploits the vulnerabilities that exist within the Windows operating system, 
while the INF/Autorun worm uses the autorun.inf file to infect a system. The 
Win32/PSW.OnlineGames worm uses a phishing attack to steal information 
from games players who participate in online games and phishing can also 
rapidly spread through email. When the trend of how worms spread between the 
years 2001-2010 was analysed, it was ascertained that file, vulnerability and 
email were the most common methods of transport. 
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Figure 4.5. Analysis of Infection Results. 
 
For the infection analysis, the relationship between file, vulnerability and email 
was explored in more depth and there was a scenario where the worm only 
infected via a file, email or vulnerability. Nevertheless, certain worms use two or 
three way combination of these to infect a victim’s computer. Between 1971 and 
2010, there were many methods of worm infection (Trend Micro 2008). 
Examples of worms exploiting vulnerabilities in websites or Windows operating 
system include the Code Red worm (2001), the Nimda worm (2001) and the 
Conficker worm (2008). However, the other sources of worm infection cannot 
simply be ignored. Chatting channels, social network websites, removable 
drives (such as USB), P2P (peer-to-peer) networks and smart phones are 
alternative sources of worm infection and are becoming increasingly so. 
Worm_Autorun.AZ is an example of a worm that spreads via chatting channels, 
P2P networks and removable drives. 
94 
 
     In terms of the analysis of the propagation results, only 10% incorporated 
random scanning, followed by 3% sequence scanning: the remainder had no 
scanning implications. This analysis is outlined in Figure 4.6. Once a worm has 
infected a victim’s computer, it needs to spread itself to another computer or 
network. However, based on the testing results with the datasets, more than 
50% of worms did not propagate themselves. 
 
Figure 4.6. Analysis of Propagation Results. 
 
The question that is thus raised is: should propagation be highlighted as one of 
the important components in classifying worms? Even though random and 
sequence propagation represents only 10% and 3% of worms respectively, we 
cannot underestimate these methods of propagation. Worms such as Code 
Red, Nimda, Blaster, Nachi and Sobig.F have their own propagation rate (Saudi 
2005). Moreover, based on this thesis analysis, propagation is one of the most 
important elements in detecting a worm attack. 
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     In terms of the analysis of the activation results (as shown in Figure 4.7), 
more than half of worms (54.8%) were self activated, while others were 
activated through a combination of self activation and a human trigger (at 21.7% 
and 18% respectively).  
 
Figure 4.7. Analysis of Activation Results. 
 
No activation accounted for 3.7% of worms, with the remainder of the factors 
representing 0.6% each. Self activation refers to the ability of worms to spread 
themselves to other computers without the need for human intervention; i.e., the 
Conficker worm, which exploits vulnerabilities in Microsoft programmes. The 
human trigger is implemented by several factors, such as social engineering 
techniques, logging onto certain websites or downloading certain files, which 
leads to file or script execution or the opening of certain ports on the victim’s 
computer. There are different ways how worm activation is triggered have been 
identified in this thesis and based on the analysis conducted, activation is 
considered as one of the important characteristics in worm detection. 
96 
 
     Figure 4.8 displays the top ten types of payload: Destructive implication 
yielded a figure of 14.3%, while performance degradation came second, at 
9.3%. The autorun registry was third, at 5%, and the combination of backdoor 
and autorun registry yielded a figure of 1.9%. 
 
Figure 4.8. Analysis of Top 10 Payload Results. 
 
The rest, which are backdoor, infect PE executable, the combination of 
backdoor and drives infection, the combination of the autorun registry, the 
creation of infected .exe, the combination of autorun registry, drive infection and 
the creation of infected .exe, represented 1.2% each. Other payloads not 
discussed here are mostly based on a combination of the different payloads. 
The target towards the end of this research is to produce a STAKCERT model 
for worm detection and response and payload is seen as one of the important 
elements being incorporated as input for this model. There have been so many 
payloads identified as a result of conducted research and in the STAKCERT 
model, the STAKCERT worm classification is used as the basis and thus it is 
97 
 
important to ensure that each component is well tested. It is interesting to note 
that all the features selected are related to each other, based on the static, 
dynamic and statistical analyses. This shows that the STAKCERT worm 
classification proposed in this thesis is useful and plays significant role for worm 
detection. 
     Last but not least is the operating algorithm, which refers to the technique 
employed by worms in order to avoid detection. The operating algorithm is 
considered an added feature that should be taken into account when building up 
a STAKCERT model because it is important to know the features integrated by 
a worm to avoid from being detected. As a result of the conducted tests, it was 
ascertained that a majority of 96% of worms were categorised as terminate and 
stay resident (TSR) as displayed in Figure 4.9.  
 
Figure 4.9. Analysis of Operating Algorithm Results. 
 
Stealth referred to 2% of worms, followed by the polymorphic and anti anti-virus 
worms, at 1% each. Each of the operating algorithm has its own method of 
spreading and replicating to other computers. Many researchers within the 
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worm field focus on the polymorphic worm, but still the other techniques should 
not be ignored. If, in the near future, a worm uses a combination of polymorphic, 
stealth, TSR and anti anti-virus to conceal itself, an in-depth study regarding this 
new features should be carried out, so a good solution to detect this worm can 
be developed. If a good understanding of how each of these techniques works 
is established, it is possible to produce a defensive mechanism using such 
methods in combination. 
     Based on the analysis of the tests conducted, it can be concluded that each 
of the features in question are related to one another. The formation of the 
STAKCERT relational model is based on the premise that each feature plays an 
important role in worm detection and isolation and supports the relevance of 
current issues related to worm infection. 
 
4.4.2 Chi-square and Symmetric Measure Results 
     The formation of the STAKCERT relational model is based on the features of 
the STAKCERT worm classification. Previously, under frequency analysis, the 
importance of each feature was identified and this generally gave an idea of the 
relationship between the features. To support this, the Chi-square and 
symmetric measure tests are conducted, in order to determine the relationship 
between the features. A detailed explanation of the Chi-square and symmetric 
measure definitions, equations and purposes can be found in Chapter 3, section 
3.2.4.2. Only three of the main features (infection, activation and payload) were 
tested using the Chi-square and symmetric measure tests, as the other features 
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did not meet the testing requirements of the Chi-square tests. However, this 
should not be a problem as the frequency analysis and the Fisher’s exact test 
have been conducted. The Chi-square test becomes invalid if the expected 
frequency is less than 5. If the expected counts for the nominal data are less 
than five, with the condition that it is a 2x2 contingency table (the number of 
degrees of freedom is always 1), the alternative test that can be carried out is 
known as Fisher’s exact test. This Fisher’s exact test has the same objective as 
the Chi-square test, but it is dedicated to expected counts of less than five. 
Using the p value of 0.05 for both tests yielded the result that most of the 
features showed a statistically significant relationship and details of the tests 
and other further information can be found in Appendix A. Based on Chi-square, 
symmetric measures and Fisher’s test findings, it can be concluded that each 
relationship has its own representation and interpretation. For subsequent 
analyses, 160 datasets resulting from these findings are further analysed and 
tested. 
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4.4.3 STAKCERT Model for Worm Detection Results 
     Figure 4.10 shows an overview of how the datasets were clustered and 
classified, once the feature selection process was completed. Features 
selection is part of the STAKCERT KDD processes and thus all the datasets 
were previously tested, using the STAKCERT relational model as the basis for 
this. This is later used as the input for the clustering and classification 
processes. 
Figure 4.10. An Overview of Worm Clustering and Classification. 
 
4.4.3.1 STAKCERT Worm Clustering 
     In a test that was conducted using WEKA software, the datasets retrieved 
from the 160 datasets where each dataset has five main features: infection, 
propagation, activation, payload and operating algorithm, were clustered using 
simple k-means. The clustering was first conducted to discover a new set of 
worm categories from the datasets. The datasets retrieved from the VX 
Heavens consisted of thousands of data items that were not yet clustered or 
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classified. Thus, clustering was conducted in order to group all the datasets into 
different groups of worms. Once the clustering was completed, then the 
classification between predicted and actual different groups of worm can be 
carried out. If this clustering was not carried out, it is hard to conduct the 
classification testing. The datasets were clustered using the k-means algorithm, 
with five sets of clusters, ten random seeds and using Euclidean distance as a 
metric. The k-means is chosen due to its effectiveness, where the datasets are   
partitioned based on centroids (also known as mean) and then the datasets are 
assigned to their closest cluster centre based on Euclidean distance. The whole 
process is repeated with a new cluster centre until the same point is assigned to 
each cluster. Details of how k-means works can be found in Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.4.4. 
     In terms of this clustering, cluster 1 accounted for 46% of the datasets, 
followed by cluster 2 at 19%, cluster 3 at 15%, cluster 4 at 11% and cluster 5 at 
9% (see Figure 4.11). Cluster 1 is also known as worm type I, whilst cluster 2 is 
also known as worm type 2, cluster 3 as worm type 3, cluster 4 as worm type 4 
and cluster 5 as worm type 5. Prior to the clustering method; static, dynamic and 
statistical analyses were conducted, in order to verify the relationship between 
the five main features used as variables in the clustering method. All the results 
related with the static, dynamic and statistical analyses are already explained 
under subsection 4.41 and 4.42 and can be found in the paper published by 
Saudi et al. (2010a, 2010b). The details of the clustering results and the details 
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of the different types of worm categorised as worm types 1-5 can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure 4.11. Worms Clustering. 
 
Once the clustering processes were completed, classification was undertaken. 
The clustered worms were classified using five different algorithms (which were 
the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Sequential Minimal Optimisation (SMO), Naïve 
Bayes, J48 and IBk) and were tested using the 10-fold cross validation test. In 
order to identify the most accurate classification algorithm, WEKA is used by 
running five different algorithms. 
 
4.3.2 Results Summary 
     In terms of the tests conducted, the configuration used for the different 
algorithms can be found in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.4 (Table 3.7). Figure 4.12 
shows the percentages correctly classified or known as the overall accuracy by 
these five different algorithms. The Multilayer Perceptron has the highest 
accuracy, followed by SMO, IBk, Naïve Bayes and J48. 
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Figure 4.12. Percentage Correctly Classified by Different Algorithms. 
 
     As the datasets were nominal, the performance criteria of the STAKCERT 
model for worm detection focused on the accuracy of the correctly classified and 
incorrectly classified. In addition to this, other performance criteria (TP Rate, FP 
Rate, FN Rate, Precision, Recall and F-measure) were also discussed, in order 
to get a clearer picture of the output results. Details of the definitions and the 
equations of the above performance criteria terms can be found in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.4.4 (entitled ‘Performance Criteria Definitions’). 
     The results of the five different algorithms used for testing are summarised in 
Table 4.1. Thus, Table 4.1 outlines detection accuracy, based on the TP Rate, 
the FP Rate, the FN Rate, overall accuracy for the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), 
SMO, IBk, Naïve Bayes and J48. As displayed in Table 4.1, MLP outperformed 
the other algorithms; thus the results for the MLP are explained in detail. The 
interpretations of the other algorithms were similar to the MLP algorithm, but 
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had a different analysis conclusion. Furthermore, how each of the performance 
criteria was calculated and the meaning of each value was presented, are 
explained in the next subsection. 
     Referring to Table 4.1, there are four main characteristics presented, which 
are TP Rate (TPR), FP Rate (FPR), FN Rate (FNR) and overall accuracy (OA). 
These four main performance criteria were chosen as they represented the 
most important features in verifying the classifier algorithm for worm detection. 
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Table 4.1.  Summarisation of the Results for All Algorithms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* TPR = True Positive Rate (also known as detection accuracy), FPR = False Positive Rate, OA = Overall Accuracy, FNR= False 
Negative Rate 
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4.4.3.2.1 Multilayer Perceptron Findings   
     In this section, detailed results of the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) algorithm 
are presented. All of the outputs were generated using the WEKA. It is open 
source and JAVA based. Once the outputs are already being analysed and 
understood, it could be concluded whether the predicted results were the same 
as the actual results. Based on this thesis test results and comparing the 
predicted results with the actual results, the Multilayer Perceptron algorithm 
demonstrated the highest performance of all the algorithms and Figure 4.13 
displays the results for this.  
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Figure 4.13. Multilayer Perceptron Results. 
Next, the outputs from Figure 4.13 are explained in detail. 
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Figure 4.14. Extracted Output 1 from MLP Results. 
 
 
     The above extracted output (Figure 4.14) is the configuration setting for the 
Multilayer Perceptron algorithm. The first line shows that, for this testing, the 
learning scheme was ‘weka.classifiers.functions.MultilayerPerceptron’ or the 
neural network algorithm: this uses backpropagation to classify the datasets. 
The first line shows ‘scheme’, where the parameters are shown as ‘—L 0.3 –M 
0.2 –N 500 –V 0 –S 0 –E 20 –H 0’, which states that the learning rate is equal to 
0.3, momentum is equal to 0.2, training time is 500, zero validation set size, 
zero seed, validation threshold is equal to 20 and the hidden layer is zero. The 
second line shows the file used for testing and the third line shows there are 160 
instances involved in this testing. On the next line, there are seven main 
attributes, which are the instance number (for numbering), infection, activation, 
propagation, operating, payload and worm. The ‘test mode’ used was the 10-
fold cross validation. 
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Figure 4.15. Extracted Output 2 from MLP Results. 
 
     The extracted output in Figure 4.15 was among the most important aspects 
of verifying the classifier performance. The first 2 lines are the most useful, as 
our class variable is nominal. The first line shows the number and percentage of 
cases that were correctly classified (also known as accuracy) and the accuracy 
for this classifier was 158 (98.75%). For the incorrectly classified, there were 2 
cases at 1.25% and the Kappa statistic shows that the 0.9825 and 98.25% 
predictions within the actual classes are correlated. The Kappa statistic was 
used to measure the agreement of predictions with the actual class; the nearer 
the Kappa statistic is to the value of 1, the stronger the correlation between 
predictions and actual classes. The next few lines show the error values for this 
testing but were not taken into account as our testing only involved the nominal 
classes and classification tasks. Furthermore, these values are applicable, yet 
error values would be reasonable criteria if it were involved with regression 
testing. 
     This following extract (Figure 4.16) is the detailed accuracy results for all 
worm classes that were extracted from Figure 4.13. 
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Figure 4.16. Extracted Output 3 from MLP Results. 
 
     The first two columns in Figure 4.16 are the TP Rate (true positive rate) and 
the FP Rate (False Positive Rate), followed by Precision, Recall, F-Measure, 
ROC Area and Class. The TP Rate is the ratio of predicted correctly classified 
cases (as worm 1, worm 2, worm 3, worm 4 and worm 5) to the total of positive 
cases. The FP Rate is the ratio of predicted incorrectly classified cases (as 
worm 1, worm 2, worm 3, worm 4 and worm 5) to the total of incorrectly 
classified cases and correctly classified as the wrong cases. Precision refers to 
the proportion of cases that are correctly classified as worm 1, worm 2, worm 3, 
worm 4 and worm 5 from the all the cases being classified for the dedicated 
classes of worm 1, worm 2, worm 3, worm 4 and worm 5. The recall is 
equivalent to the TP Rate and F-Measure is a combined measure of Precision 
and Recall. The ROC area is based upon the TP rate and the FP rate and the 
Weighted Avg. refers to the average values for the five different worm classes. 
     Referring to Figure 4.16, the ROC area represents the area under the ROC 
curve and it can be concluded that, the nearer the ROC area value to 1, the 
more accurate the prediction of the classifier correctly classified. This was 
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based on the average of the ROC area value of 0.997, with a FP Rate of 0.002 
and a TP Rate of 0.988. 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Extracted Output 4 from MLP Results. 
 
     A confusion matrix is a simple way of displaying the results of the 
experiments and is also known as a contingency table. In this testing, there 
were 5 classes (worm 1, worm 2, worm 3, worm 4 and worm 5) and thus a 5 x 5 
confusion matrix was formed (as displayed in Figure 4.17). The rows of this 
confusion matrix represent the actual classes, while the columns represent the 
prediction classes. The predicted numbers of correctly classified instances are 
the sum of diagonals in the matrix i.e. 72+15+31+16+24=158. The other 
numbers from these diagonals represent the incorrectly classified; for example, 
for worm 1, (based on the confusion matrix 5x5 in Figure 4.17) the output values 
were calculated in the following way:  
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TP represents True Positive, TN represents True Negative, FP represents False 
Positive and FN represents False Negative. The values for TP = 72, TN = 0, FP 
= 0 and FN = 1. 
 
TP Rate = TP / (TP+FN)  
     = 72 / (72 + 1) 
     = 0.986 
FP Rate = FP / (FP+TN) 
    = 0 / (0 +87) 
               = 0 
 
Precision= TP / (TP+FP) 
                = 72 / (72+0) 
      = 1 
Accuracy= (TP+TN)/  
       (TP+TN+FP+FN) 
               = (72 + 87) / (72 +87+0+ 1) 
      = 0.9938 
Error rate = 1- Accuracy 
      = 1- 0.9938 
      = 0.0062 
F-measure = 2 * recall * precision /  
(recall + precision) 
        = 2 * 0.986*1 /(0.986 +1) 
        = 0.993 
 
Recall       = TP Rate 
        = 0.986 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
In referring to the confusion matrix in Figure 4.17, (for worm 1), there were 72 
correctly classified (TP=72), 87 were correctly classified not as worm 1 (TN=87), 
none from the other cases of different classes were wrongly classified as worm 
1(FP=0) and 1 from class worm 1 was wrongly classified (FN=1). Thus, the TP 
rate was 0.986, the FP Rate was 0 and the FN Rate was 0.0137. Precision was 
1. Recall equivalents to TP rate was 0.986 and the F-Measure was 0.993. The 
ROC area was 1. Based on the TP rate, which was almost 1, the FP rate and 
the FN Rate was 0 and the ROC area was 1: this showed that worm 1 was 
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correctly classified, with an accuracy of 99.38%, and the classifier prediction 
was likely to be the actual class of worm 1. 
     The rest of the calculations for the different classes of worms 2 to 5 used the 
same equations as above. For worm 2, there were 15 correctly classified 
(TP=15), while 145 were correctly classified as not worm 2 (TN=145). None 
from the other cases of different classes were wrongly classified as worm 2 
(FP=0) and zero from worm 2 were wrongly classified (FN=0). Thus, TP rate 
was 0.986, while the FP rate and FN rate were 0 and Precision was 1. The 
Recall equivalent to TP rate was 1, as were the F-measure and the ROC area. It 
can be thus concluded that worm 2 was perfectly classified, based on the TP 
rate value (which was 100%). The FP rate and FN rate were 0% and the ROC 
area was 1. The classifier prediction was 100% correct, compared to the actual 
class of worm 2. 
     For worm 3, there were 31 correctly classified (TP=31), 0 from class worm 3 
were wrongly classified (FN=0), 129 were correctly classified as not worm 3 
(TN=129) and none from the other cases of different classes were wrongly 
classified as worm 3 (FP=0). TP rate was 31/(31+0)=1, FP rate was 0 and the 
FN rate was 0. Precision was 31/(31+0) =1, while recall equivalents to TP rate 
was 1. The F-Measure was (2 *1 *1)/(1+1) =1. It can be concluded that worm 3 
was perfectly classified, as the TP rate value was 100%, the FP rate and FN 
rate were 0% and the ROC area was 1. The classifier prediction was 100% 
correct, compared to the actual class of worm 3. 
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     In terms of worm 4, there were 16 correctly classified (TP=16), 1 from class 
worm 4 was wrongly classified (FN=1), 142 were correctly classified as not 
worm 2 (TN=142) and 1 from other cases of different classes was wrongly 
classified as worm 4(FP=1). TP rate was 16/(16+1)=0.941, FP rate was 
1/(1+142)=0.007 and the FN Rate was 0.588. Precision was 16/(16+1)=0.941, 
while Recall equivalents to TPR was 0.941. F-Measure was (2 *0.941 
*0.941)/(0.941+0.941)=0.941. Based on the TP rate (94.1%), the FP rate 
(0.7%), the FN Rate (5.88%) and the ROC area (0.984), it was shown that worm 
4 was correctly classified: accuracy was 98.75%, compared to the actual class 
of worm 4. 
     For worm 5, there were 24 correctly classified (TP=24), 0 from class worm 5 
were wrongly classified (FN=0), 135 were correctly classified as not worm 5 
(TN=135) and 1 from the other cases of different classes was wrongly classified 
as worm 5 (FP=1). TP rate was 24/(24+0)=1, FP Rate=1/(1+135)=0.007 and the 
FN rate was 0. Precision was 24/(24+1)=0.96, while recall equivalents to TP 
rate was 1. The F-Measure was (2 *1 *0.96)/(1+0.96)=0.98. Based on the TP 
rate (96%), the FP rate (0.7%), the FN Rate (0%) and the ROC area (0.993), it 
was ascertained that worm 5 was correctly classified: accuracy was 99.38%, 
compared to the actual class of worm 5. 
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4.4.3.2.2 SMO Findings 
     In this section, a detailed explanation of the Sequential Minimal Optimisation 
(SMO) algorithm is presented. The SMO algorithm yielded the second highest 
overall performance, with an overall accuracy of 98.13% and a FP rate of 0.2%. 
The average of the TP rate for the five different classes was 98.1% and 0.2% 
represented a FP rate. Referring to the TP rate for each class under the 
‘detailed accuracy by class’ heading in Figure 4.18 , it can be seen that worm 1 
was 98.6%, worm 2, worm 3 and worm 5 were all 100% and worm 4 was 
88.2%. The FP rate for worm 1 and worm 3 was 0% and worm 2, worm 4 and 
worm 5 had a FP rate of 0.7%. Note that, this thesis only discussed the TP rate, 
the FP rate, the FN rate, the ROC area and accuracy, as these five main 
performance criteria play an important role in verifying classifier algorithm 
performance. If the ROC area has the same value, in identifying the highest 
worm class performance, then the accuracy of each class is referred. 
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Figure 4.18. SMO Results. 
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Figure 4.19. Extracted Output from SMO Results. 
 
The extracted outputs from the SMO results which consist of ‘detailed accuracy 
by class’ and ‘confusion matrix’ can be found in Figure 4.19. 
     In terms of the analysis of the ROC curve, a high result for the TP rate and a 
low result for the FP rate are good indicators of the produced predicted classifier 
result. The ROC area of worm 1 was 0.995, worm 2 was 0.997, worm 3 was 1, 
worm 4 was 0.964 and worm 5 was 0.996 and the accuracy for each worm class 
was 99.38% for worm 1, 99.38% for worm 2, 100% for worm 3, 98.13% for 
worm 4 and 99.38% for worm 5. The FN rate for each worm class was 1.37% 
for worm 1, 0% for worm 2, worm 3 and worm 5 and 11.77% for worm 4. 
     As mentioned earlier, the nearer the ROC area value to 1 indicates a better 
performance. Worm 3 had the highest performance, with a TP rate of 100%, a 
FP rate and FN rate of 0% and an accuracy rate of 100%. The prediction 
classifier was 100% just like the actual classifier. 
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4.4.3.2.3 IBk Findings 
     In this section, the detailed results for the IBk algorithm are presented (the 
IBk is the k-nearest neighbour classifier). The IBk algorithm was third ranking for 
overall performance, with an overall accuracy of 93.13%, an average FP rate of 
2.8% and an average TP rate of 93.1%. Referring to the ‘detailed accuracy by 
class’ results in Figure 4.20, the TP rate for worm 1 was 94.5%, 80% for worm 
2, 96.8% for worm 3, 88.2% for worm 4 and 95.8% for worm 5. The FP rate for 
worm 1 was 4.6%, 0% for worm 2, 0.8% for worm 3, 2.1% for worm 4 and 2.2% 
for worm 5. The FN rate for each worm class was 5.48% for worm 1, 20% for 
worm 2, 3.23% for worm 3, 11.77% for worm 4 and 4.17% for worm 5. 
     Although the TP rate for worm 2 was only 80%, which was the lowest of all 
the classes, the FP rate was 0% and the ROC area was 0.998, which indicated 
an almost perfect performance. The accuracy of each worm class was 95% for 
worm 1, 98.13% for worm 2, 98.75% for worm 3, 96.88% for worm 4 and 97.5% 
for worm 5. 
     However, when the ROC area of worm 3 is looked closely, it has the same 
value as worm 2 (0.998). As worm 3 has the highest overall accuracy and the 
lowest FN rate, it can be concluded that worm 3 yielded the highest 
performance of all the classes. The extracted outputs from the IBk results which 
consist of ‘detailed accuracy by class’ and ‘confusion matrix’ can be found in 
Figure 4.21. 
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Figure 4.20. IBk Results. 
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Figure 4.21. Extracted Output from IBk Results. 
 
4.4.3.2.4 Naïve Bayes Findings 
     In this section, the detailed results for the Naïve Bayes algorithm are 
presented. The overall accuracy for the Naïve Bayes algorithm was 90.63%, 
while the average FP rate was 3.3% and the average TP rate was 90.6%. 
Referring to the ‘detailed accuracy by class’ results in Figure 4.22, the TP rate 
for worm 1 was 87.7%, worm 2 was 86.7%, worm 3 was 100%, worm 4 was 
76.5% and worm 5 was 100%. The FP rate for worm 1 was 4.6%, worm 2 was 
0%, worm 3 was 2.3%, worm 4 was 3.5% and worm 5 was 2.2%, while the FN 
rate for each worm class was 12.33% for worm 1, 13.33% for worm 2, 0% for 
worm 3 and worm 5 and 23.53% for worm 4. The accuracy for each worm class 
was 91.88% for worm 1, 98.75% for worm 2, 98.13% for worm 3, 94.38% for 
worm 4 and 98.13% for worm 5. The extracted outputs from the Naïve Bayes 
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results which consist of ‘detailed accuracy by class’ and ‘confusion matrix’ can 
be found in Figure 4.23. 
 
Figure 4.22. Naïve Bayes Results. 
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Figure 4.23. Extracted Ouput from Naïve Bayes Results. 
 
When the ROC areas are examined, it can be seen that worms 2, 3 and 5 have 
the same value (0.999). Although worm 2 had the highest overall accuracy, the 
FN rate was much higher than worm 3, with a 16.77% difference between them. 
In order to decide who was the highest performer, in terms of worm detection, 
(as the two different classes were the same or only slightly different in accuracy) 
the next performance criteria taken into account was the FN rate: since the 
implications of a high FN rate are very harmful to a user’s computer. Thus, it 
was concluded that worm 3 yielded the highest performance of all the classes: it 
had 99.99% of ROC area and 0% of FN rate. 
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4.4.3.2.5 J48 Findings 
     In this section, the detailed results for the J48 algorithm are presented (the 
J48 algorithm generates the pruned C4.5 Decision Tree and the ID3 
descendent). The overall accuracy for the J48 algorithm was 90.63%, the 
average FP rate was 6.2% and the average TP rate was 90.6%. Referring to the 
‘detailed accuracy by class’ results in Figure 4.24, the TP rate for worm 1 was 
98.6%, 86.7% for worm 2, 100% for worm 3, 29.4% for worm 4 and 100% for 
worm 5. The FP rate for worm 1 was 12.6%, 0.7% for worm 2, 0.8% for worm, 
0% for worm 4 and 1.5% for worm 5. The FN rate for each worm class was 
1.37% for worm 1, 13.3% for worm 2, 0% for worm 3 and worm 5 and 70.59% 
for worm 4. 
     The accuracy for each worm class was 92.5% for worm 1, 98.13% for worm 
2, 99.38% for worm 3, 92.5% for worm 4 and 98.75% for worm 5. The extracted 
outputs from the J48 results which consist of ‘detailed accuracy by class’ and 
‘confusion matrix’ can be found in Figure 4.25. The TP rate for worm 3 and 
worm 5 was 100%, while the FP positive rate for worm 3 was 0.8% and 1.5% for 
worm 5. In order to identify the highest performance between these two classes, 
the ROC area, accuracy and the FN rate are being referred. The ROC area for 
worm 5 was slightly higher than worm 2, with a 0.2% difference, whilst the 
accuracy for worm 3 was higher than worm 5 (0.63%); worm 3 also had 0% of 
FN rate. Thus, worm 3 yielded the highest performance of the worm classes. 
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Figure 4.24. J48 Results. 
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Figure 4.25. Extracted Output from J48 Results. 
 
4.5 Comparison with Existing Works 
     Table 4.2 summarises the results of all the tests conducted and compares 
them with existing works undertaken by Siddiqui et al. (2009) and Dai et al. 
(2009). It was found that their works were similar to this thesis. As seen in Table 
4.2, the performance criteria for comparison consists of the TP rate (TPR), 
overall accuracy (OA), the FP rate (FPR) and the FN rate (FNR). The details of 
the definition and equation of these performance criteria can be found in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.4. 
 
 126 
 
Table 4.2. Experiment Results. 
 
 
 
Classifier 
 
STAKCERT Result (%) Existing Work (%) 
Dai et al (2009) Siddiqui et al (2009) 
T 
P 
R 
O 
A  
F 
P 
R 
F 
N 
R 
T 
P 
R 
O 
A  
F 
P 
R 
F 
N 
R 
T 
P 
R 
O 
A  
F 
P 
R 
F 
N 
R 
Multilayer 
Perceptron 
98.8
8 
98.75 0.2 1.45 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
SMO 98.1 98.13 0.2 2.63 93.2 91.9 9.6 6.8 NA NA NA NA 
Naïve 
Bayes 
 
90.6 90.63 3.3 9.84 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
IBk 93.1 93.13 2.8 8.93 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Decision 
Tree 
J48 
 
90.6 90.63 6.2 17.6 93.5 91 12.6 6.5 93.4 90 13.
4 
6.6 
Random 
Forest 
 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 95.6 96 3.8 4.4 
Bagging NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 94.3 93.8 6.7 5.7 
 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
* TPR = True Positive Rate (also known as detection accuracy), FPR = False Positive 
Rate, FNR=False Negative Rate, OA = Overall Accuracy, NA=Not Applicable. Figures 
in bold show the highest results for each work. 
 
 
     By referring to Table 4.2, STAKCERT results show that the Multilayer 
Perceptron algorithm outperformed those of the existing work. Overall accuracy 
was 98.75%, which is 2.75% higher than Siddiqui’s work and 6.85% higher than 
Dai’s work. The STAKCERT TP rate (98.8%) was also higher than in the 
comparable works and the FN rate (1.45%) was lower. Furthermore, 
STAKCERT FP rate (0.2%) was also lower. 
     However in worm detection, a FN rate plays a more important role than a FP 
rate because a higher FN rate will cause severe damage to a user’s computer. 
When FN rate is higher, this indicates that there are more of the datasets not 
classified as worms even though actually the datasets are worms. This is the 
 127 
 
reason why it is important to have a lower FN rate for worm detection testing. 
Yet in dealing with worms, these four main criteria should always be taken into 
consideration. A lower FP rate, a lower result for the FN rate and a higher value 
for the TP rate and overall accuracy are preferable in worm detection. If a result 
yields the same value for overall accuracy and TP rate and a higher value for 
the FP rate and different value for the FN rate, the best result should be chosen 
from the lower FN rate value. 
     This thesis offers its own significant contribution towards computer security 
and the novelty of this thesis lies in the method being implemented, where data 
mining is part of it and the goals achieved by the end of this thesis. This is 
summarised in Table 4.3. Such improvement implemented methods are the 
integration of static and dynamic analyses, the statistical analysis and incident 
response techniques. The work done by Siddique et al. (2009) applied the static 
analysis in their work where the limitation lies when there is a dynamic decision 
point in the program control flow. Dai et al. (2009) overcame this limitation by 
applying the dynamic analysis. Yet the static or dynamic analysis alone cannot 
solve the worm detection problem with guarantee. For example, to analyse 
worm payload, certain worm needs both static and dynamic analyses, so the 
payload can be monitored and executed. Therefore, STAKCERT model has 
combined both static and dynamic analyses to provide an improved detection 
result as shown in Table 4.2.  
     Prior to the results retrieved (Table 4.2), the standard operating procedures 
using incident response techniques were used, in order to conduct static and 
dynamic analysis on the worm. In contrast with the existing works where they 
do not integrate the standard operating procedures using the incident response 
technique, their methods can be arguable. The standard operating procedures 
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ensure all the related procedures are followed accordingly before and during the 
worm analysis and all related procedures documented.  
 
Table 4.3 Comparison with Existing Works for Worm Detection. 
 STAKCERT Existing Works 
  Dai et al (2009) Siddique et al (2009) 
Method of 
analysis 
1) Involves dynamic 
analysis. 
 
2) Involves static 
analysis. 
 
3) Integrates standard 
operating procedures 
using the incident 
response technique. 
 
 
4) Involves statistical 
analysis: Independent 
testing (Chi-square, 
symmetric measure 
and frequency 
analysis). 
 
5) Applies data mining 
as part of STAKCERT 
KDD processes to 
model building. 
1) Involves dynamic 
analysis. 
 
2) Does not involve 
static analysis. 
 
3) Does not integrate 
standard operating 
procedures using the 
incident response 
technique. 
 
4) Involves statistical 
analysis: Frequency 
analysis.  
 
 
 
 
5) Applies data mining 
as a complete process 
from data preparation 
to model building. 
 
1) Does not involve 
dynamic analysis. 
 
2) Involves static 
analysis. 
 
3) Does not integrate 
standard operating 
procedures using the 
incident response 
technique. 
 
4) Involves statistical 
analysis: Independent 
testing (Chi-square 
and frequency 
analysis). 
 
 
5) Applies data mining 
as a complete 
process from data 
preparation to model 
building. 
 
 
Once the static and dynamic analyses were completed, a STAKCERT worm 
classification was formed. The relationships between the main features within 
the STAKCERT worm classification were then verified by undertaking statistical 
analysis, in order to show the relationship amongst these features. The 
statistical analysis consists of Chi-square, symmetric measure and frequency 
analysis. Such features were later used as the input for the data mining 
analysis, which resulted in a higher overall performance. As for Dai et al (2009) 
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they applied frequency analysis and Siddique et al (2009) applied frequency 
analysis and Chi-square. 
     For this thesis, data mining is a part of the STAKCERT KDD processes 
(refer Figure 3.5) used to optimise worm detection accuracy. In this thesis, the 
static analysis, dynamic analysis, standard operating procedures of incident 
response, Chi-square, symmetric measure and frequency analysis are part of 
the whole STAKCERT KDD processes. The STAKCERT KDD processes are 
used to build the STAKCERT model. In contrast with Dai et al. (2009) and 
Siddique et al. (2009) works, they used data mining as a process to form their 
model. The better result accuracy achieved and presented in Table 4.2 is 
therefore as a result of the STAKCERT KDD processes. 
     In conclusion, this thesis results yielded a better performance than 
comparable, existing work which could be due to the improvement made by 
applying both static and dynamic analyses and statistical analysis( i.e: Chi-
square, symmetric measure and frequency analysis) and by integrating the 
standard operating procedures using an incident response technique. Such 
results were used as the input in triggering the apoptosis process, which is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4.6 Limitations 
     In this thesis, a performance comparison for the different learning algorithms 
that were applied to the datasets is conducted and the only apparent drawback 
of the MLP algorithm is that it requires more training time than other algorithms. 
In addition, this thesis may be improved by considering different types of 
malicious code, such as spyware, Trojan horse and botnet. Apart from that, the 
integration of dynamic and static analyses may require more investigation and 
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refinement to produce a better result for worm detection, which is to be explored 
in the future. Furthermore, an expansion of the different types of datasets would 
improve the robustness of the STAKCERT model, although a few modifications 
would have to be implemented under the pre-processing procedures. 
 
4.7 Summary 
     In this section, the STAKCERT worm classification and the STAKCERT 
relational model are proposed, which are both part of the STAKCERT model for 
worm detection. Experimental results indicate that the proposed model can 
detect worms, with as high as a 98.75% overall accuracy rate and as low as a 
0.2% FP rate and a 1.45% FN rate. The comparison of STAKCERT model with 
existing work showed that STAKCERT model for worm detection resulted in 
improved performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
MODELLING STAKCERT FOR WORM RESPONSE 
 
Chapter 5 explains the details of the STAKCERT model for worm response. 
This contribution relates to how the end user responds towards a worm incident 
where apoptosis is part of the response. Apoptosis, also known as cell-
programmed death, is a concept borrowed from the human immune system 
(HIS). Once the user’s computer detects any indication of being infected 
severely by a worm, apoptosis is triggered, which isolates the infected computer 
from any network. In order to trigger apoptosis, the weight and the severity 
value of the worm play important roles, since these two factors help to decide 
either apoptosis should be triggered or not. An in-depth study was carried out 
by implementing security metrics in identifying the weight and severity of the 
infection, which resulted in new STAKCERT apoptosis algorithm for detecting 
worms. Based on the experimental results, the assigned rate of severity was 
100% accurate. Furthermore, the STAKCERT model was simulated with the 
eradication solutions, which yielded an overall accuracy rate of 98.08% and F-
measure rate of 100%. The performance criteria results indicated that the 
STAKCERT model was an efficient worm response model. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
     Over the last few years, there has been increasing interest in studying the 
human immune system (HIS). Computer scientists, engineers, mathematicians, 
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philosophers and other researchers are particularly interested in HIS’ 
capabilities, the complexity of which is comparable to the brain. HIS is not new 
and much research has been published since 1996 such as by Hunt and Cooke 
(1996), Dasgupta (1997), Dasgupta (1999) and Hofmeyr and Forrest (1999). 
Apoptosis is part of these studies. 
     In the human body, apoptosis also known as cell-programmed death is used 
to destroy cells infected with a virus, cells with DNA damage, and some 
cancerous cells, which may be a threat to the organism. The main benefit of 
apoptosis is that cells can be disposed of without causing harm or stress to 
other cells in the same part of the body. Apoptosis is a process that prevents 
the virus in the infected cell from spreading to other parts of the body which 
could cause a lot of trouble to the overall system (Raff 1998). Chapter 2 
provides details of apoptosis and compares it with worm security problems. 
     From a worm response perspective, apoptosis is implemented to avoid the 
worm propagating to other computers in the same network or via the Internet. 
Prior to apoptosis, there are several factors which should be taken into 
consideration. In Chapter 4, the detection of worms was based on the five main 
characteristics of a worm, which were based on the STAKCERT worm 
classification and the STAKCERT relational model. Furthermore, for apoptosis, 
these five main characteristics of a worm are further refined and reused by 
assigning it with a weight and severity value, based on security metrics method. 
Security metrics is explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.4.3). Based on this thesis 
analysis and experimentation with regard to the security metrics, the data 
criticality, infrastructure availability and loss of productivity were used as the 
basis for assigning a weight and severity value. Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 shows 
the security metrics processes already mapped into the STAKCERT model. As 
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a result, the STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm was formed. Section 5.3 
explains this in detail. The simplified flowchart for the weight and assigned 
severity values are shown in Figure 5.1. 
Datasets with 5 different types of worms.
Decided apoptosis condition.
Analyse the worm characteristics.
Identified and prioritised 5 worm characteristics, which 
are payload, infection, activation, propagation and
operating algorithm. These were based on the data 
criticality, infrastructure availability and loss of 
productivity.
Assigned weight and level of severity level for each 
characteristic. Weight was assigned based on the 
prioritization of the characteristic. Severity was divided 
into 3 level: low, medium and high.
Conducted testing of the weight and assigned severity 
value.
 
Figure 5.1. Weight and Severity Assignment Flowchart. 
 
5.2 Related Works 
     Apoptosis provides a lot of scope for exploring its implementation or 
integration in the computer security field. Prior to the introduction to the 
STAKCERT model for worm response, a thorough study of the existing 
literature on apoptosis was undertaken as already discussed and outlined in 
Chapter 2. The challenge, which should be considered thoroughly from all of 
these previous works, was the method of assigning apoptosis and the scope of 
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its implementation. These are still lacking in handling the response to a worm 
incident. For the past few years, much research is focusing on worm detection 
though worm response has the same important role in confronting worm 
attacks. It is suggested here that results may be improved by considering the 
weight and severity value, which triggers apoptosis and focuses on responding 
to a worm incident. This has been taken into consideration when developing the  
STAKCERT model. In the next section, this thesis explains in detail how weight 
and severity are integrated into the STAKCERT model. The security metrics 
and frequency analysis were used to retrieve the rank and the value of the 
weights and the severity. 
     Furthermore, in order to test the effectiveness of the STAKCERT model for 
worm response, a comparison of the work with research conducted by Kim et 
al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2010) was undertaken. Kim et al. (2010) implemented 
a system called DSS, which applied a collaborative response, whilst Liu et al. 
(2010) implemented a system using an ontological approach. According to Liu 
et al. (2010), ontology is a term borrowed from philosophy that is used to 
provide formal specification in a domain, where the concepts and relationships 
that exist between entities are part of it. As for Liu et al. (2010), ontology is used 
to represent the security incident based on incident response to retrieve the 
best match incident case. Both of them had the same objective, which was to 
respond to the incident. The improvement made in the STAKCERT model 
compared to these two works was to add one further new step. This was 
applying apoptosis during the response process and the scope of 
implementation, where the STAKCERT model was dedicated, especially, for 
detecting and responding to a worm. 
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5.3 STAKCERT Model for Worm Response 
     The following are the details of the formation of the STAKCERT model for 
responding to a worm. It consists of the algorithm and rules for worm apoptosis, 
weight and severity. 
 
5.3.1 STAKCERT Worm Apoptosis Algorithm 
An overview of the pseudocodes to generate the STAKCERT worm apoptosis 
algorithm is simplified as the following: 
 
Given:   
 
- Set security metrics. 
- Set worm attributes: {payload, infection, activation, operating algorithm and   
  propagation}. 
- Set frequency analysis. 
  
Output: 
- Weight ranks. 
- Severity ranks. 
- Weight values. 
- Severity values. 
- Triggers or halts Apoptosis. 
 
Algorithms: 
1) Apply security metrics to worm attributes. 
a. Go to Weight_cases to determine the weight ranks.  
b. Go to Severity_cases to determine the severity ranks. 
2) Apply frequency analysis to worm attributes. 
a. Go to Frequency_cases to compute the weight and severity values. 
3) Apply apoptosis to Severity_cases. 
a. Go to Apoptosis_cases to trigger the apoptosis. 
 
Figure 5.2. An Overview of STAKCERT Worm Apoptosis Algorithm. 
 
A detail of the pseudocodes used to generate the STAKCERT worm apoptosis 
algorithm are as follows: Weight_cases (refer Figure 5.3); Severity_cases and 
Apoptosis_cases( which both are combined together in pseudocodes called 
Severity_cases and Apoptosis_cases – refer Figure 5.4); and Frequency_cases 
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(refer Figure 5.5). All of these pseudocodes explain how the weight and severity 
was assigned for each attribute of the worm. The attributes were the payload, 
infection, activation, propagation and operating algorithm. Covering algorithm, 
also known as the separate-and-conquer algorithm is used to form the 
STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. Indeed rules were formed as part of the 
STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. Based on this covering algorithm, there 
is a rule for the attributes in each stage. It was based on the PRISM method for 
constructing rules and generated only correct or perfect rules with 100% 
accuracy (Witten and Frank 2005). The accuracy formula uses p/t where p 
represents the positive examples of the class and t represents the total of the 
datasets. The covering algorithm was applied to generate the rules in the 
STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. 
     Nevertheless, these algorithms lead to the creation of the STAKCERT rules 
for weight, severity and apoptosis which can be referred in Appendix C. The 
Weight_cases and Severity_cases pseudocodes in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 
accordingly, show how all of the worm attributes consisting of infection, 
activation, payload, operating algorithm and propagation were assigned with 
either a low, medium or high weight, which later resulted in the assignment of 
severity ranks. For example if a payload with security metrics is high either 
singly or in combination with other attributes; then the weight is high. While for 
severity assignment the example is, if payload or activation is high either singly 
and the weight combination of the propagation, infection and operating 
algorithm is high, medium or low; then the severity is high. 
     Initially the following worm characteristics weight are being assigned as high, 
medium or low based on security metrics (i.e data criticality,infrastructure 
availability and loss of productivity). The details of how worm weight 
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categorisation assigned can be referred in Appendix C. Basically the rule is 
presented in IF-THEN-ELSE form. The rules are expressed in the form of:  
If (Attribute-1, value -1) and (attribute -2, value -2) and…. 
and (attribute –n, value –n) then (decision, value) 
For example : 
1) Firstly, define each weight for each of the worm characteristics. For 
example worm X, has the following features: 
Infection vulnerability Referring to the weight rules in 
assigning weight in Appendix C, this 
characteristic is categorised as 
High. (Based on rule no 29) 
Payload Mass mailing and forward user’s 
info to the attacker 
Referring to the rules for weight 
assignment in Appendix C, these 
characteristics are categorised as 
High. (Based on rule no 13 and 10) 
Activation Self activation Referring to the weight rules in 
assigning weight in Appendix C, this 
characteristic is categorised as 
High. 
(Based on rule no 34) 
Propagation None Referring to the weight rules in 
assigning weight in Appendix C, this 
characteristic is categorised as Low. 
(Based on rule no 43) 
Operating 
Algorithm 
TSR Referring to the weight rules in 
assigning weight in Appendix C, this 
characteristic is categorised as 
Medium. 
(Based on rule no 46) 
 
2) Based on the weight from above table, the severity is being assigned.  
Infection Payload Activation Operating 
Algorithm 
Propagation Severity 
High High High Medium Low Referring to the rules for 
severity assignment in 
Appendix C, this 
characteristic is 
categorised as High.  
(Based on rule no 2) 
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3) Then apoptosis is being assigned based on the severity weight. 
 
Infection Payload Activation Operating 
Algorithm 
Propagation Severity Apoptosis  
High High High Medium Low High Referring to 
the rules for 
apoptosis 
assignment 
in Appendix 
C, this 
characteristic 
is 
categorised 
as High.  
(Based on 
rule no 2) 
 
The above worm X characteristics rule is based on severity and apoptosis rules 
where: 
 
If it involves the combination of rule 1* and the weight combination of the propagation, 
activation and operating algorithm is high, medium or low, then the severity is high and 
triggers apoptosis. 
 
*rule 1 is from severity and apoptosis assignment in Appendix C. (rule 1: If the weight 
for the payload and infection is high, then the severity is high and triggers apoptosis.) 
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Weight_cases Pseudocodes 
 
Given: 
- Set characteristics value : {low, medium, high} 
- Set HighFlag = 0 
- Set MediumFlag = 0 
- Dataset A 
Output: 
- Weight rank of Dataset B 
Algorithms: 
While (case ≤ 160) 
{ 
   -  get the worm attributes 
    
      While ( worm_attributes != null) 
      { 
             While (Dataset A != empty) 
  { 
     - determine characteristic value for each type of worm attributes from the Dataset A 
     - Dataset B = Dataset A (worm_attributes[case,type]) 
  If (characteristic_value = high) 
          {  
        HighFlag = 1 
                              break 
       }   
  If (characteristic_value = medium) 
           MediumFlag = 1 
               }  
    If (HighFlag = 1) 
                              Weight_rank = high. 
    else if (MediumFlag = 1) 
                              Weight_rank = medium. 
               else 
        Weight_rank = low 
                 -  get the next worm attributes from Dataset A 
} 
} 
 
Figure 5.3. Weight Cases Pseudocodes. 
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Severity_cases and Apoptosis_cases Pseudocodes 
 
Input: 
- Weight rank of Dataset B 
Output: 
- Severity rank of Dataset B  
- Apoptosis triggers or halts 
Algortihms: 
While  ( case ≤ 160 cases ) 
{ 
If Dataset B (case[payload]) || Dataset B (case[infection])  ==    
   High 
   {  
        SeverityRank [case] = High 
        Apoptosis = Triggers 
      -  disconnect network and notify user 
    } 
Else if Dataset B (case[payload]) || Dataset B (case[infection])  == Medium 
   { 
        SeverityRank [case] = Medium 
        Apoptosis = Halts 
        -  network connected and notify user 
   }    
Else 
   { 
        SeverityRank [case] = Low 
        Apoptosis = Halts 
        - network connected and does not notify user 
- get the next case from Dataset B 
 } 
Figure 5.4. Severity Cases and Apoptosis Cases Pseudocodes. 
 
Frequency_cases Pseudocodes 
 
Input: 
- Weight rank of Dataset B 
- Severity rank of Dataset B 
Output: 
- Weight values  
- Severity values  
Algorithms: 
While  ( case ≤ 160 cases ) 
{ 
- get the weight rank and severity rank for worm attributes from  
Dataset B 
 - compute the weight rank and severity rank 
 - get the total for weight rank and severity rank 
 
- get the next worm attributes and case from Dataset B 
} 
Figure 5.5. Frequency Cases Pseudocodes. 
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     The Severity_cases and Apoptosis_cases pseudocodes were generated to 
decide (based on the assigned severity) whether or not apoptosis should be 
carried out. The apoptosis is fundamentally is a binary, which is either to 
disconnect or to remain connected to the network. In this thesis, three level of 
severity categorization is used which are high, medium and low. The main 
reason of using three level of severity is because each severity level has it owns 
respond method. If the severity value is high, then apoptosis is triggered, the 
user is notified and the network is disconnected. When the severity is medium, 
the apoptosis is halted, the user is notified, and the network is still connected. If 
the severity is low, apoptosis is halted, the user is not notified, and the network 
is still connected.  In practise, alternatively a binary classifier could be used 
which is either to connect or disconnect the network instead of using three level 
of severity categorisation, as being proposed in this thesis. 
     As for Frequency_cases pseudocodes, these were generated to get the 
worm attributes ranking and to retrieve exact value for each worm attribute 
which later was used for the model simulation purpose in section 5.4.2. 
     The rationale for selecting the covering algorithm for the formation of the 
STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm was its capabilities to develop an 
algorithm based on the datasets. These were provided by separating them from 
the datasets already created by the rule. Then, the rule developing process 
continued on those datasets that remained. The algorithm used in this covering 
algorithm, increased the effectiveness of the rules since each rule was revised 
until it became ideal, and the rules developed could be executed independent of 
order. The only limitation was the need for a revision when conflicting rules 
occurred. 
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     Based on the STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm, there were 66 rules 
generated. These consisted of 48 rules for weight assignment and 18 rules for 
severity and apoptosis. Moreover, the structural pattern from these rules can be 
generated from the weight rules and the severity and apoptosis rules. These 
structural pattern rules are simplified in a table and the details of these rules can 
be seen in Appendix C. 
 
5.3.2 Weight and Severity  
     Studies and experiments on weight and severity are very important in 
triggering apoptosis. Earlier, in section 5.3.1, the algorithms on how to assign 
the weight and severity were explained in detail. Based on studies of previous 
works, there was no standard in assigning weight. Therefore, the data criticality, 
infrastructure availability and loss of productivity are used, which was part of the 
security metrics, as a basis and guide for assigning weight and severity. 
Moreover, this thesis adopted a novel approach to the assignment of weight 
and severity, which resulted in apoptosis. This makes the STAKCERT model for 
worm response unique. 
     Furthermore, to retrieve the exact number of values for each of the worm’s 
attributes, relative frequency is used. The relative frequency for each attribute 
was based on the STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm, and further tested 
with different algorithms to identify the best overall accuracy value. The 
equation used for relative frequency is shown in equation 12. 
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                                              
n
rErf n                                                           (12) 
where 
rfn  = relative frequency 
E = number of events 
n = total number of experiments conducted 
r = number of times an event occurs 
 
Relative frequency is another term for proportion. It is the value calculated by 
dividing the number of times an event occurs by the total number of times an 
experiment is carried out. Since the cases involved a long run relative 
frequency, probability was seen as the best way to calculate the weight. It was 
in the range of 0 to 1. The equation is simplified in equation 13. 
                                           E
n
EP rf n
lim
)(                                              (13) 
where, 
)(EP  number of outcomes corresponding to event E / total number of outcomes 
rfn  = relative frequency 
 
Based on the frequency analysis, the worm’s attributes are ranked. The next 
section, 5.4.1, details the frequency analysis results and worm attribute 
rankings. 
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5.4 Experimental Results on VX Heavens Datasets  
     This section presents the results for weight and severity, based on the 
frequency analysis. This section also presents the simulation results for the 
STAKCERT model for responding to a worm. 
 
5.4.1 Weight and Severity Results 
     The frequency analysis was conducted to support the fact that the weight, 
severity and apoptosis algorithm, formed under section 5.3.1 and based on 
security metrics, were effective. Furthermore, based on the frequency analysis 
testing results in Table 5.1, the ranking of worm attributes was identified as 
follows: 
(1)Payload ; (2) Infection ; (3) Activation; (4) Propagation and (5) Operating 
algorithm 
Table 5.1. Frequency Analysis Results. 
 
 
 
 
 Payload Infection Activation Propagation Operating 
Algorithm 
Severity  
High 150 0.938 129 0.806 121 0.756 22 0.138 8 0.05 430 0.538 
Medium 
9 0.056 26 0.163 33 0.206 0 0 152 0.95 220 0.275 
Low 1 0.006 5 0.031 6 0.038 138 0.863 0 0 150 0.188 
Total 160 1 160 1 160 1 160 1 160 1 800 1 
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Table 5.2. Severity Results using Different Algorithms. 
*TPR=true positive rate, FPR=false positive rate, FNR=false negative rate, OA = 
overall accuracy, H= high, M= medium, L=low. 
 
     160 cases were tested from the datasets. Then, the accuracy of each case 
with an assigned severity value was further tested using different data mining 
algorithms by means of WEKA. Table 5.2 presents the results. 
     With regard to Table 5.2, five different algorithms were tested. These were 
the Multilayer Perceptron, SMO, Naïve Bayes, J48 and IBk. The results of each 
algorithm are detailed in Appendix E. The equations detailing the overall 
accuracy, FP rate, FN rate and TP rate and the details of each algorithm 
conducted, are provided in Section 3.2.4.4. The objective of this testing was to 
identify the overall accuracy for the assigned class of severity. Each of the 
worm’s attributes, which were payload, infection, activation, propagation and 
operating algorithm, were assigned with either a high, medium or low weight 
value. Based on the testing conducted, the average overall accuracy for each 
algorithm was more than 98.13%. SMO had the highest overall accuracy of 
100%, followed by 100% of TP rate and 0% of both the FP rate and FN rate of 
Classifier 
 
Multilayer 
Perceptron 
SMO Naïve Bayes J48 IBk 
Severity 
in %  
H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L 
TPR 100 83.3 0 100 100 0 99.4 100 0 98.7 83.3 0 100 83.3 0 
FPR 16.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 16.7 1.3 0 16.7 0 0 
FNR 0 16.7 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 1.299 16.7 0 0 16.7 0 
OA 99.38 99.38 0 100 100 0 99.38 99.38 0 98.13 98.13 0 99.38 99.38 0 
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severity assigned. The overall accuracy rate of Multilayer Perceptron, Naïve 
Bayes and IBk yielded was 99.38%, and the overall accuracy rate of J48 was 
98.13%. 
     These excellent results, as noted in Table 5.2, were based on the proper and 
effective algorithm implemented prior to this testing. This included the 
assignment of the weight, severity and apoptosis algorithms and the significant 
STAKCERT worm classification and relational model formed earlier. 
 
5.4.2 STAKCERT Model Simulation for Apoptosis Results 
     By the end of this research, it was this research aims that the developed 
STAKCERT model should be implemented in real time for worm detection and 
response incident software. Therefore, a simulation of the model was carried 
out using WEKA. At this point, all the attributes which had been tested in 
Chapter 4 together with the weight, severity and eradication solution, were 
simulated to test the rate of accuracy, and to identify the Precision, Recall and 
F-measure results. Since the aim for this simulation was to test apoptosis,  only 
156 relevant high severity cases which would trigger apoptosis, were tested. 
Table 5.3 summarises the results of this testing. This simulation was simulated 
to know whether or not the retrieved eradication solution was relevant. The 
most important performance elements of the STAKCERT model were based on 
the Precision, Recall and F-measure results. The higher Recall value suggested 
that the relevant solution was returned more quickly, and that the higher 
Precision value meant that the returned solution was more relevant. Moreover, 
the model’s performance could be measured in terms of a single measure of 
performance by using the F-measure, which was a combination of the Recall 
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and Precision values. Section 3.2.4.4 details the Precision, Recall and F-
measure equations. 
     With regard to Table 5.3, the Multilayer Perceptron algorithm yielded the 
highest overall performance, with an overall accuracy of 98.08% and an 
average F-measure of 100%. The averages of both the Precision and Recall 
values were 100%. This showed that 100% of the returned solutions were the 
quickest and were rightly relevant. Although the overall accuracy was not 100%, 
there is always room to improve the accuracy of the results produced. All of 
these results showed good indication and promise for the future and 
consequently, the STAKCERT model could be implemented in real time worm 
detection and response incident software. 
     The second highest overall performance was by the SMO algorithm with an 
overall accuracy of 96.79%, while the F-measure averaged 97%, the Precision 
averaged 100% and the Recall averaged 94.1%. Even though the other results 
were below those produced by the Multilayer Perceptron result, the 100% 
Precision value indicates its abilities to retrieve the most relevant solution. 
     The overall accuracy of the IBk algorithm was 96.15%, with the F-measure 
averaging 94.1% and the Precision and Recall averaging 94.1%. The results 
showed that it had the ability to return and retrieve 94.1% from the relevant 
solution, though it was not as high as the result produced by the Multilayer 
Perceptron. 
     As for J48, it had a 100% Precision value but a lower Recall value of 88.2%, 
which resulted in an F-measure value of 93.8%. The Recall value indicated a 
lower ability to retrieve the solution, but the overall accuracy was still 94.23%, 
which could be considered a good result. Lastly was the Naïve Bayes with an 
overall accuracy of 92.31% and a 100% Recall value. However, the Precision 
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was only 81% which resulted in the value of the F-measure being 89.5%. If this 
algorithm were to be implemented, improvement has to be made prior to this. 
     In conclusion, a comparison of the five different algorithms tested showed 
that the Multilayer Perceptron yielded the highest overall performance criteria 
result. This indicated that the STAKCERT model is an effective model. With the 
integration of the Multilayer Perceptron and STAKCERT model, there is no 
doubt that its implementation for future worm detection and response incident 
software would provide promising results.  
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Table 5.3. The Simulation Results for STAKCERT Model Worm Simulation. 
*FM= F-measure, PR=Precision, RC= Recall, and OA=overall accuracy 
 
Algorithm Multilayer Perceptron SMO IBk Naïve Bayes J48 
Performa
nce 
criteria 
F 
M 
P 
R 
R 
C 
O 
A 
F 
M 
P 
R 
R 
C 
O 
A 
F 
M 
P 
R 
R 
C 
O 
A 
F 
M 
P 
R 
R 
C 
O 
A 
F 
M 
P 
R 
R 
C 
O 
A 
Average 
result  
in % 
100 100 100 98.08 97 100 94.1 96.79 94.1 94.1 94.1 96.15 89.5 81 100 92.31 93.8 100 88.2 94.23 
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5.5 Comparison with Existing Works 
     Even though there is no specific measurement that can be compared for 
worm response, it is possible to make a comparison with other related works to 
create a point of reference. In terms of an incident response perspective, this 
thesis has improved works done by Kim et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2010) by 
adding one further step to the worm response and refining procedures prior to 
worm response. This is done by applying security metrics method, standard 
operating procedures in incident response before the worm response and 
apoptosis during the worm response process. A comparison with existing work 
is summarised in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4. Comparison with Existing Works for Worm Response 
 STAKCERT Existing Works 
 
Kim et al (2010) Liu et al (2010) 
 
Methods of 
responding 
to the 
incident. 
1) STAKCERT model 
consists of 
STAKCERT KDD 
processes to detect 
and respond to the 
incident. SOP in IR is 
part of the 
STAKCERT KDD 
processes (refer 
Figure 3.5). 
 
2) Applies security 
metrics for weight and 
severity assignment 
prior to the incident 
response which leads 
to the formation of a 
new STAKCERT 
worm apoptosis 
algorithm.  
 
3) Applies apoptosis 
to stop worm from 
further propagation. 
 
 
1) Applies DSS 
framework which is the 
combination of 
Recency, Frequency, 
Monetary (RFM) 
analysis methodology 
and CBR to detect and 
respond to the incident.  
 
 
 
2) Does not apply 
security metrics and 
does not have weight 
and severity 
assignment prior 
responding to an 
incident.  
 
 
 
3) Does not have 
specific method to stop 
worm from further 
propagation. 
 
1) Applies ontology 
and CBR to detect 
and respond to the 
incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Does not apply 
security metrics and 
does not have weight 
and severity 
assignment prior 
responding to an 
incident. 
 
 
 
3) Does not have 
specific method to 
stop worm from 
further propagation. 
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     Kim et al. (2010) developed a DSS framework which is based on Recency, 
Frequency, Monetary (RFM) analysis methodology and case-based reasoning 
(CBR) and Liu et al. (2010) applied ontology and CBR to detect and respond to 
the incident. These works could greatly improve matters by detailing the 
required procedures for handling a worm incident. This is one of the precepts of 
the formation of the STAKCERT model for worm detection and response, of 
which incident response is a part. The result of worm detection accuracy in 
Table 4.3 has indicated the effectiveness of applying standard operating 
procedures (SOP) in incident response (IR).  
     Furthermore, to respond to a worm incident in deciding whether or not the 
incident is severe enough, a method called security metrics is used to help in 
quantifying, classifying and measuring information in security operations. In 
Table 3.5 is a summarisation on how security metrics was being applied in this 
thesis. The security metrics helps us to assign the weight and severity ranks 
which is either low, medium or high based on data criticality, infrastructure 
availability and loss of productivity. Later, the apoptosis is triggered based on 
the weight and severity rank. If the weight and severity rank are high, apoptosis 
is triggered and the network will be disconnected to avoid the worm from 
spreading further. Based on the experimental results conducted, the assigned 
rate of severity was 100% accurate. The STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm 
was introduced, which explained in detail how to assign the weight and severity 
values to trigger apoptosis by using the security metrics approach. The security 
metrics and SOP in IR are parts of the STAKCERT KDD processes. To 
establish if the stated methods applied above were working effectively, the 
STAKCERT model was simulated with the eradication solutions and yielded an 
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overall accuracy rate of 98.08% and F-measure rate of 100%. These results 
indicate that the STAKCERT model is an effective worm response model. 
     In addition, the existing work by Kim et al. (2010) and Dai et al. (2010) looks 
at detecting and responding to incidents. This may need further work into detail 
their detection and response solutions. In contrast, the STAKCERT model was 
built specifically to detect and respond to worm incidents. A thorough study and 
experiments carried out on worm incidents leads this thesis to the development 
of the STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. 
     In conclusion, the STAKCERT model has a promising future to be 
implemented as worm detection and response software based on the methods 
introduced which consist of SOP in IR, security metrics and apoptosis. This is 
suggested here as future work. 
 
5.6 Limitations 
     The test conducted were based on a simulation using the WEKA software. If 
the STAKCERT model was to be implemented in real time, the retrieval method 
should be improved for a better accuracy. In addition, the proposed STAKCERT 
model is based on a worm associated with Windows applications. Future work 
could expand scope of this research to provide greater opportunity to explore 
the different types of malicious code and the use of this model on different 
platforms. 
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5.7 Summary 
     Based on the results of the experiments and testing conducted, the 
STAKCERT model for worm response successfully achieved its objective with 
an overall accuracy rate of 96.08% and 100% F-measure value. Prior to that, 
the weight and the severity assigned to the worm characteristics were tested 
and showed an overall accuracy rate of 100%. Moreover, the novelty of this 
thesis in worm response lies in the implementation of apoptosis. As part of this, 
studies and experiments were conducted into the assigned weights and levels 
of severity in order to trigger apoptosis. Furthermore, the STAKCERT worm 
apoptosis algorithm was developed by integrating the weight and level of 
severity. Some indication of how this work can be developed and improved is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
The main contribution of this thesis is the development of a new model called 
STAKCERT for worm detection and response. The strength of this model lies in 
the novel methods used and integrated which consist of an enhanced 
STAKCERT KDD Processes, a STAKCERT worm classification, a STAKCERT 
worm relational model and a STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. The 
STAKCERT model has succeeded to fill in all the gaps identified in the existing 
works, furthermore it has achieved a better accuracy rate compared to the 
existing works. The new methods prove the effectiveness of the STAKCERT 
model developed.  
     In this Chapter the conclusions of the research are discussed by 
summarising the main contributions that have been made and possible 
directions for future work that could be undertaken as a way forward with 
regards to continuing the research in this area. 
 
6.1 Main Contributions 
 
I) STAKCERT Worm Classification and Relational Model. 
     A good understanding of the worm architecture is a must, prior to the 
creation of a worm detection and response model. This is not only limited to the 
worm’s structure, but also by considering the threats it poses, the way it 
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spreads, and the survival methods it uses to avoid being detected by anti-virus 
software. Therefore a thorough study and experimentation with regard to worm 
architecture are conducted, and a related correlation is made which leads to the 
new formation of the STAKCERT worm classification and the STAKCERT worm 
relational model. The STAKCERT worm relational model is based on the 
STAKCERT worm classification. Both of them have a similar goal which is to 
make worm detection easier and more effective. They are a part of the whole 
STAKCERT model. 
     The STAKCERT worm classification consists of five main attributes - the 
payload, infection, activation, propagation and operating algorithm. No matter 
what kind of worm variations have been introduced, based on these five main 
attributes, the new or existing worm can be easily categorised into a different 
type of worm group. Once the worm group identified, the detection and removal 
steps can easily be applied to the new worm variation. Even as time evolves, it 
is believed that these five main attributes are vital in deciding what kind of 
techniques should be applied in terms of the worm detection and removal steps. 
These five main worm attributes are of great value and can help to reduce the 
response time and the solution provided is more accurate than previous 
methods. 
 
II) Enhanced STAKCERT KDD Processes. 
     A good and efficient model is built using a comprehensive methodology. For 
this thesis, an enhanced and comprehensive methodology for worm analysis, 
starting from data pre-processing and moving through to post-processing is 
developed. This methodology is called the STAKCERT KDD processes which 
can be seen in Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3. One of the most common problems 
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faced by the virus security analyst or the researcher in the worm research area, 
is how and where to start analysing the worm. In this STAKCERT KDD 
processes, the original KDD processes are enhanced by integrating the worm 
analysis together with standard operating procedures (SOP) in incident 
response, statistical analysis, security metrics and data mining. As far as the 
researcher is aware, this is a novel approach to addressing the issues raised. 
This methodology offers a good point of reference for future work in worm 
research. This methodology not only helps to reduce analysis time, it also helps 
to improve the worm detection and worm response accuracy results, an 
outcome which has been indicated by this thesis. 
 
III) STAKCERT model for worm detection outperforms existing works with a 
better accuracy.  
     A comparison with existing worm detection work was conducted to test the 
efficiency of STAKCERT model for worm detection. The performance criteria for 
worm detection consist of overall accuracy rate, TP rate (TPR), FP rate (FPR) 
and FN rate (FNR). Based on the experimentation conducted, the STAKCERT 
model yielded 98.75% of overall accuracy rate, 98.88% of TPR, 0.2% of FPR 
and 1.45% of FNR. In comparison, Dai et al. (2009), yielded 93.2% overall 
accuracy rate, 91.9% TPR, 9.6% FPR and 6.8% FNR while Siddiqui et al. 
(2009) yielded 95.6% overall accuracy rate, 96% TPR, 3.8% FPR and 4.4% 
FNR. The STAKCERT model results have outperformed these two approaches 
in terms of higher overall accuracy and TPR and lower FPR and FNR. This 
thesis has accomplished one of its objectives which is to improve the existing 
worm detection technique with a better accuracy. In fact, this thesis overall 
accuracy rate is 3.15% higher than Siddiques et al. (2009). These encouraging 
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results produced by the STAKCERT model have been achieved with the help of 
the STAKCERT worm classification and STAKCERT relational model and by 
applying the STAKCERT KDD process as part of the methodology. 
 
IV) Apoptosis as a new technique for worm response. 
     From an incident response perspective, comparisons were made with the 
existing works of Kim et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2010), where both had the 
same objective, which was to detect and respond to an incident. The 
improvement made in the STAKCERT model compared to these two works was 
to add one further new step. This was applying apoptosis during the response 
process and altering the scope of implementation, whereby the STAKCERT 
model was dedicated specifically to detecting and responding to a worm. 
Apoptosis, also known as cell-programmed death, is a concept borrowed from 
the human immunology system, where once a cell has been identified as being 
severely infected by a virus, it destroys itself. In the worm response context, 
apoptosis is implemented by disconnecting the infected computer from the 
network or from the Internet to avoid the worm propagating to other computers.  
 
V) STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm. 
     Prior to the formation of the STAKCERT worm apoptosis algorithm, analysis 
and experimentation are conducted to identify the most important features for 
triggering apoptosis. As a result, weight and severity have been identified as the 
most important features. Consequently, an algorithm called the STAKCERT 
worm apoptosis algorithm has been formed. The weight, severity and 
STAKCERT worm classification are part of this algorithm. The five main 
attributes extracted from the STAKCERT worm classification are the payload, 
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infection, activation, propagation and operating algorithm and these were later 
assigned with weight and severity values. Moreover, the security metrics have 
been used as a method for quantifying and assigning the weight and severity 
values. Based on the experimental results, the assigned rate of severity was 
100% accurate. 
 
VI)       STAKCERT model for worm response with an accuracy rate.  
     This thesis cannot directly compare the accuracy result with existing work for 
worm response, since none of the existing work provides any accuracy results. 
Still it is possible to make a comparison with the existing works by comparing 
the methods they applied in their works. Based on the comparison made under 
section 5.5, applying the standard operating procedures in incident response, 
security metrics and apoptosis to STAKCERT model, help to give a good 
performance for worm response. To show these methods are working 
effectively, the STAKCERT model was simulated with the eradication solutions 
and yielded an overall accuracy rate of 98.08% and F-measure rate of 100%. 
These results indicate that the STAKCERT model is an effective worm 
response model. With these results, this thesis final objective which is to 
provide an accuracy rate for worm response has been accomplished, which can 
be used as a reference in future.  
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6.2 Future Work 
     For future work, broaden plans have been made to the scope of this 
research which currently focuses on worms based on Windows operating 
system. This provides greater opportunities to explore the different types of 
malicious code and use of STAKCERT model on different platforms. 
Furthermore, an expansion of the different types of malicious code would 
improve the robustness of the STAKCERT model (although a few modifications 
would have to be implemented under the pre-processing procedures). In 
addition, the integration of dynamic and static analyses needs more 
investigation and refinement to produce improved results for worm detection. 
     In Chapter 5, the STAKCERT model was simulated with the plan that it can 
be applied in worm detection and response software in the future. There are a 
few challenges that can be met to make this model work more effectively in 
software implementation. Firstly, the integration of the intelligent system 
concept, with the aim of providing a better eradication solution and to reduce 
false alarms. The retrieval method could be improved to ensure the accuracy 
and solution return is 100%. Secondly, future software must be secure from any 
intrusion by integrating the software integrity check. Lastly it will have to have a 
centralised repository to save all the worm detection and response descriptions 
and accuracy results, which later can be accessed all over the world. Then 
other researchers can measure the effectiveness of their works by referring to 
this repository and make comparison with this thesis results.  
     These suggested improvements could greatly enhance current solutions 
aimed at handling worm detection and response. 
     In addition, since one of the thesis future works is to develop software, an 
effective approach to teach end users how to use this software is desirable. 
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Therefore, another future work planned is to apply the worm detection and 
response techniques software to video games. This is to help the end user 
visualizes how the complete process is carried out; from pre-processing until 
the post-processing for worm detection, subsequently together with the worm 
response. Furthermore, to make the video game more interactive, the end user 
will be given the opportunity to get involved in performing the worm analysis and 
consequent implications will be seen if the procedures while performing the task 
were not being done properly. The more interesting part is the visualisation of 
the apoptosis into worm response since apoptosis is part of human immunology 
study. To make this video game a success, thorough studies need to be carried 
out in the first place. These include applying the appropriate methodology, 
graphics and integrating data mining to make the video game more interactive 
and intelligent and as well as optimising the game performance. Even though 
not much research in applying security into video games has been conducted 
for the past few years, still there are few works carried out in such area for 
example by Cone et al. (2007), who built CyberCIEGE to support education and 
training in computer and network security. Indeed a part of the video game 
consists of an overview of malicious code, which caught the researcher 
attention and the researcher plans to broaden this scope for future work. This 
work can be used as guidance and basis in developing this interactive video 
game. It is believed that applying video game within security context has a 
bright potential and is a promising field to be explored more in the future. 
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Chi-square and symmetric measure results 
 
Null hypothesis(Ho) 
and alternative hypothesis(Ha) 
 
Chi-square 
tests 
Symmetric 
measure 
Conclusion 
Pearson 
Chi-
square 
value 
p 
value 
Phi value 
Finding 1:  Relationship between 
Vulnerability and Email. 
H0 = There is no relationship between 
vulnerability and email. 
Ha = There is relationship between 
vulnerability and email. 
39.961 0.00 0.498 As a result, the H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted since 
the p value is less than 0.05. This indicates that the 
relationship did not happen by chance, which is based 
on the Chi-Square tests. The value of the probability 
(p) for the distribution occurs by chance is 0.00 (refer 
to Table 1). As a conclusion, there is a positive strong 
relationship between vulnerability and email.  
Finding 2. Relationship between 
Vulnerability and File. 
 
H0 = There is no relationship between 
vulnerability and file. 
Ha = There is relationship between 
vulnerability and file. 
7.835 0.005 -0.221 Therefore, the H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted since 
the p value is less than 0.05. This indicates that the 
relationship did not happen by chance, which is based 
on the Chi-Square tests. The value of the probability 
(p) for the distribution occurs by chance is 0.005. The 
result of the analysis is summarised in Table 2. As a 
conclusion, there is a negative weak relationship 
between vulnerability and file. 
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Finding 3. Relationship between  
Email,Vulnerability and File. 
H0 = There is no relationship between 
vulnerability, file and  
email. 
Ha = There is relationship between 
vulnerability, file and email. 
 
16.460 0.128 0.227 The relationship that would like to be tested is email 
influencing the vulnerability and the file. Based on the 
statistical analysis conducted, email did not influence 
the vulnerability and file. In the table Chi Square and 
symmetric measure, the ‘Yes’ column is being 
referred. The Pearson Chi-Square value is 16.460, 
significance or probability (p) value of 0.128 and Phi 
value is 0.227 using the Chi-Square tests and 
symmetric measure. Based on the result analysis that 
is summarised in Table 3, H0 is accepted since the p 
value is more than 0.05. Therefore, the relationship 
might happened by chance with 22.7%. This is 
calculated by using the Chi-Square equation.  
 
Finding 4. Relationship between 
Vulnerability and Sharing Directories. 
 
H0 = There is no relationship between 
vulnerability and sharing directories. 
Ha = There is relationship between 
vulnerability and sharing directories. 
 
16.460 0.000 -0.321 Based on the statistical analysis conducted, the 
relationship between vulnerability and sharing 
directories has a negative weak relationship with 
Pearson Chi-Square value is 16.460, significance or 
probability (p) value of 0.000 and Phi value is -0.321 
using the Chi-Square tests and symmetric measure. 
Therefore, the H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted since 
the p value is less than 0.05. Based on the Chi-Square 
tests, the relationship did not happen by chance. The 
value of the probability (p) for the distribution occurs 
by chance is 0.00. The result of the analysis is 
summarised in Table 3.1. It is concluded that there is 
a relationship between vulnerability and sharing 
directories. 
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Finding 5. Relationship between Self  
Activation and Human Trigger. 
 
H0 = There is no relationship between self 
activation and human trigger. 
Ha = There is relationship between self 
activation and human trigger. 
 
28.308 0.000 -0.419 Based on the statistical analysis conducted, the 
relationship between self activation and human trigger 
has almost a strong negative relationship with 
Pearson Chi-Square value is 28.308, significance or 
probability (p) value of 0.000 and Phi value is -0.419 
using the Chi-Square tests and symmetric measure. 
The result of this analysis is summarised in Table 3.2. 
Since the p value is less than 0.05, the H0 is rejected 
and Ha is accepted. This indicates that the relationship 
did not happen by chance, which is based on the Chi-
Square tests. The value of the probability (p) for the 
distribution occurs by chance is 0.00. As a conclusion, 
there is a relationship between self activation and 
human trigger. 
 
Finding 6. Relationship between  
Autorun Registry and Backdoor. 
 
H0 = There is no relationship between 
autorun registry and backdoor. 
Ha = There is relationship between autorun 
registry and backdoor. 
 
6.630 0.010 0.203 Based on the statistical analysis conducted, the 
relationship between autorun registry and backdoor 
has almost positive weak relationship with Pearson 
Chi-Square with a value of 6.630, significance or 
probability (p) value of 0.010 and Phi value is 0.203 
using the Chi-Square tests and symmetric measure. 
As a result, the H0 is rejected and Ha is accepted since 
the p value is less than 0.05. This indicates that the 
relationship did not happen by chance, which is based 
on the Chi-Square tests. The value of the probability 
(p) for the distribution occurs by chance is 0.010. The 
result of the analysis is summarised in Table 3.3. As a 
conclusion, there is a relationship between autorun 
registry and backdoor. 
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I) Finding 1. Results for relationship between vulnerability and email. 
 
Vulnerability Exploit * Email Crosstabulation
96 14 110
79.3 30.7 110.0
87.3% 12.7% 100.0%
82.8% 31.1% 68.3%
20 31 51
36.7 14.3 51.0
39.2% 60.8% 100.0%
17.2% 68.9% 31.7%
116 45 161
116.0 45.0 161.0
72.0% 28.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within Email
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within Email
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within Email
No
Yes
Vulnerability
Exploit
Total
No Yes
Email
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
39.961b 1 .000
37.610 1 .000
38.613 1 .000
.000 .000
39.712 1 .000
161
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.25.b. 
 
Symmetric Measures
.498 .000
.498 .000
.446 .000
161
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
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II) Finding 2. Results for relationship between vulnerability and file. 
 
Vulnerability Exploit * File Crosstabulation
43 67 110
51.2 58.8 110.0
39.1% 60.9% 100.0%
57.3% 77.9% 68.3%
32 19 51
23.8 27.2 51.0
62.7% 37.3% 100.0%
42.7% 22.1% 31.7%
75 86 161
75.0 86.0 161.0
46.6% 53.4% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
No
Yes
Vulnerability
Exploit
Total
No Yes
File
Total
Chi-Square Tests
7.835b 1 .005
6.913 1 .009
7.877 1 .005
.007 .004
7.786 1 .005
161
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.76.b. 
 
Symmetric Measures
-.221 .005
.221 .005
.215 .005
161
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
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III) Finding 3. Results for relationship between vulnerability, file and email. 
 
Vulnerability Exploit * File * Email Crosstabulation
32 64 96
38.9 57.1 96.0
33.3% 66.7% 100.0%
68.1% 92.8% 82.8%
15 5 20
8.1 11.9 20.0
75.0% 25.0% 100.0%
31.9% 7.2% 17.2%
47 69 116
47.0 69.0 116.0
40.5% 59.5% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
11 3 14
8.7 5.3 14.0
78.6% 21.4% 100.0%
39.3% 17.6% 31.1%
17 14 31
19.3 11.7 31.0
54.8% 45.2% 100.0%
60.7% 82.4% 68.9%
28 17 45
28.0 17.0 45.0
62.2% 37.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within File
No
Yes
Vulnerability
Exploit
Total
No
Yes
Vulnerability
Exploit
Total
Email
No
Yes
No Yes
File
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
11.923b 1 .001
10.257 1 .001
11.908 1 .001
.001 .001
11.820 1 .001
116
2.311c 1 .128
1.412 1 .235
2.434 1 .119
.188 .116
2.260 1 .133
45
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Email
No
Yes
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.10.b. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.29.c. 
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Symmetric Measures
-.321 .001
.321 .001
.305 .001
116
.227 .128
.227 .128
.221 .128
45
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Email
No
Yes
Value Approx. Sig.
 
 
IV) Finding IV. Results for relationship between Vulnerability and Sharing 
 directories. 
 
Vulnerability Exploit * Sharing Directories Crosstabulation
67 43 110
77.9 32.1 110.0
60.9% 39.1% 100.0%
58.8% 91.5% 68.3%
47 4 51
36.1 14.9 51.0
92.2% 7.8% 100.0%
41.2% 8.5% 31.7%
114 47 161
114.0 47.0 161.0
70.8% 29.2% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within Sharing Directories
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within Sharing Directories
Count
Expected Count
% within Vulnerability Exploit
% within Sharing Directories
No
Yes
Vulnerability
Exploit
Total
No Yes
Sharing Directories
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
16.460b 1 .000
14.983 1 .000
19.189 1 .000
.000 .000
16.358 1 .000
161
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction a
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.89.b. 
 
Symmetric Measures
-.320 .000
.320 .000
.305 .000
161
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
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V) Finding V. Results for relationship between self activation and human  
trigger. 
 
Self activation * Human Trigger Crosstabulation
7 27 34
20.5 13.5 34.0
20.6% 79.4% 100.0%
7.2% 42.2% 21.1%
90 37 127
76.5 50.5 127.0
70.9% 29.1% 100.0%
92.8% 57.8% 78.9%
97 64 161
97.0 64.0 161.0
60.2% 39.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Self activation
% within Human Trigger
Count
Expected Count
% within Self activation
% within Human Trigger
Count
Expected Count
% within Self activation
% within Human Trigger
No
Yes
Self activation
Total
No Yes
Human Trigger
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
28.308b 1 .000
26.248 1 .000
28.557 1 .000
.000 .000
28.132 1 .000
161
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.52.b. 
 
Symmetric Measures
-.419 .000
.419 .000
.387 .000
161
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
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VI) Finding VI. Results for relationship between autorun registry and 
backdoor. 
 
Autorun at registry * Backdoor Crosstabulation
77 11 88
70.5 17.5 88.0
87.5% 12.5% 100.0%
52 21 73
58.5 14.5 73.0
71.2% 28.8% 100.0%
129 32 161
129.0 32.0 161.0
80.1% 19.9% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Autorun at registry
Count
Expected Count
% within Autorun at registry
Count
Expected Count
% within Autorun at registry
No
Yes
Autorun at
registry
Total
No Yes
Backdoor
Total
 
Chi-Square Tests
6.630b 1 .010
5.648 1 .017
6.654 1 .010
.016 .009
6.589 1 .010
161
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.51.b. 
 
Symmetric Measures
.203 .010
.203 .010
.199 .010
161
Phi
Cramer's V
Contingency Coefficient
Nominal by
Nominal
N of Valid Cases
Value Approx. Sig.
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CLUSTERING AND 
DETAILS ON WORM 
TYPE 
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I) WEKA clustering results 
 
*i4 = file, i8 = sharing directories, i26 = email and vulnerability. 
a2 = human trigger, a4 = self activation, a6 = human trigger and self activation. 
p1 = random, p4 = none.o3 = TSR. 
l5= destruction, l54 = degrade performance, l59 = backdoor and autorun 
registry. 
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II) Details on the worm group type 
Infection Activation Propagation Operating 
Algorithm 
Payload  Worm 
Type 
vulnerability self 
activation 
none TSR worm generator tool & autorun 
registry 
worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none polymorphi
c 
download file from website & 
compress, append & encrypt 
worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR mass mailing & autorun registry worm1 
email no activation none TSR backdoor & autorun registry worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR infect microsoft office, autorun 
registry & create infected file 
worm1 
USB self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry worm1 
file no activation none TSR worm generator tool & autorun 
registry 
worm1 
chat self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry worm1 
file scheduled 
process 
none TSR modify system.ini & format hard 
disk 
worm1 
file human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none stealth autorun registry, infect PE 
executable, send spam via 
chatting channel & format hard 
disk 
worm1 
vulnerability self 
activation 
none TSR command & control, autorun 
registry, infect PE executable, 
forward info to attacker, display 
message, kill certain processes, 
open port 
worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
no activation none TSR worm generator tool & autorun 
registry 
worm1 
file & email no activation none TSR mass mailing, autorun registry, 
infect PE executable & hijack web 
browser 
worm1 
file human 
trigger, 
scheduled 
process & 
self 
activation 
none Stealth destruction, command & control, 
autorun registry, infect PE 
executable, display message, 
steal password, privilege 
escalated 
worm1 
file, sharing  
directories & 
chat 
no activation none TSR download file from website, 
autorun registry, upload/download 
file, forward info to attacker, infect 
autoexec.bat 
worm1 
file & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
sequence TSR destruction, command & control, 
download file from website 
worm1 
file, website 
& P2P 
self 
activation 
none TSR command & control  worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, mass mailing, infect 
local & removable drives, infect 
PE executable, forward info to 
attacker, create infected file, 
disable security protection 
worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR create infected .exe file worm1 
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file self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor worm1 
file human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry & create infected 
.exe file 
worm1 
file human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, download file from 
website & infect PE executable 
worm1 
file human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, DOS, autorun registry, 
infect PE executable, steal 
password, privilege access 
escalated & create infected .exe 
file 
worm1 
vulnerability self 
activation 
sequence TSR backdoor, autorun registry, 
upload/download file & display 
message 
worm1 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction, display message, 
disable security protection 
worm1 
sharing  
directories & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR command & control, create 
infected.exe file & startup with .pif 
or .exe file 
worm1 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR command & control, infect 
microsoft office & create, delete 
or corrupt file 
worm1 
website self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, autorun registry, 
forward info to attacker, steal 
password & disable security 
protection 
worm1 
vulnerability self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry worm1 
file human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR infect PE executable, scan 
network & display message 
worm1 
floppy & 
USB 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction &  infect local & 
removable drives 
worm1 
chat self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, create infected 
.exe file & disable security 
protection 
worm1 
sharing  
directories & 
P2P 
self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry & create infected 
.exe file 
worm1 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR steal online banking info worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR mass mailing, autorun registry, 
forward info to attacker, steal 
password, create infected .exe 
file, rename .exe with other 
worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR mass mailing, autorun registry, 
forward info to attacker, steal 
password, create infected .exe 
file, rename .exe with other name 
worm1 
sharing   
directories & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction, autorun registry, 
privilege access escalated & 
create, delete or corrupt file 
worm1 
P2P & chat self 
activation 
none TSR forward info to attacker & disable 
security protection 
worm1 
vulnerability self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, display 
message, create infected .exe 
file, startup with .pif and .exe file, 
infect HTML file& disable security 
protection 
worm1 
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email, 
sharing  
directories, 
P2P & chat 
self 
activation 
none TSR command & control, mass 
mailing,autorun registry, modify 
system.ini, create infected .exe 
file & startup with .pif or .exe file 
worm1 
email & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR mass mailing & forward info to 
attacker 
worm1 
email scheduled 
process & 
self 
activation 
sequence TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable, infect link on dekstop, 
scan network, display message, 
rename .exe with other & infect 
HTML file 
worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR infect microsoft office, autorun 
registry, display message & 
create infected .exe file 
worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, autorun registry, infect 
local & removable drives, infect 
PE executable & open port 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR destruction & degrade 
performance 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, create infected 
.exe file & degrade performance 
worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable & display message 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry & degrade 
performance 
worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, infect local & 
removable drives& create 
infected .exe file 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable & degrade 
performance 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
email & 
sharing 
self 
activation 
none TSR forward info to attacker  worm1 
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email self 
activation 
none TSR mass mailing, autorun registry, 
deny access to security website, 
display message, kill certain 
processes, create infected .exe 
file, rename .exe with other & 
disable security protection 
worm1 
CD self 
activation 
sequence TSR download file from website, infect 
PE executable, upload & 
download file & disable security 
protection 
worm1 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR DOS, autorun registry, delete file 
in writable drives, kill certain 
processes, steal password, 
create infected .exe file, create 
&delete & corrupt file 
worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, autorun registry & 
infect local & removable drives 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR worm generator tool & autorun 
registry 
worm1 
file self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry & infect PE 
executable 
worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR degrade performance worm1 
file, email & 
sharing 
self 
activation 
random TSR backdoor, DOS, destruction, 
autorun registry & disable security 
protection 
worm2 
sharing self 
activation 
random TSR backdoor & autorun registry worm2 
file self 
activation 
random TSR backdoor, destruction, command 
& control & autorun registry 
worm2 
vulnerability self 
activation 
random TSR DOS, command & control & 
autorun registry 
worm2 
file human 
trigger 
random TSR backdoor & autorun registry worm2 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
random TSR exploit vulnerability based on OS 
version, infect PE executable & 
infect link on desktop 
worm2 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
random TSR DOS, command & control, upload 
file 
worm2 
file human 
trigger & self 
activation 
random TSR backdoor, command & control, 
autorun registry & privilege 
access escalated 
worm2 
sharing  
directories & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
random TSR backdoor, destruction, command 
& control, display message, steal 
password & privilege access 
escalated 
worm2 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
random Stealth scan network, format hard disk, 
startup with .pif or .exe file & 
autowar dialer 
worm2 
vulnerability 
& chat 
self 
activation 
random anti anti-
virus 
command & control, download file 
from website, autorun registry & 
create, delete & corrupt file 
worm2 
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sharing   
directories & 
chat 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
random TSR destruction, autorun registry, 
privilege access escalated & 
create, delete or corrupt file 
worm2 
file & P2P self 
activation 
random TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable & print garbage 
worm2 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
random TSR command & control, autorun 
registry, scan network, privilege 
access escalated & create 
infected .exe file 
worm2 
file self 
activation 
random TSR backdoor, DOS, autorun registry, 
open port & create infected .exe 
file 
worm2 
email human 
trigger 
none TSR mass mailing worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR backdoor, command & control & 
autorun registry 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR display message worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR destruction worm3 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry worm3 
File human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry worm3 
USB & file human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry, infect local & 
removable drives & infect PE 
executable 
worm3 
chat human 
trigger 
none polymorphi
c 
infect local & removable drives worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR infect local & removable drives worm3 
chat human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry & display 
message 
worm3 
floppy human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry worm3 
email & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger 
none TSR backdoor, command & control, 
infect autoexec.bat & create 
infected .exe file 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry worm3 
floppy human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry, redirect PC 
ports, display message & create 
infected .exe file 
worm3 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable, display message & 
privilege access escalated 
worm3 
file & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry, kill certain 
processes, delete registry with 
security & startup with .pif or .exe 
file 
worm3 
floppy & file human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable & disguises as flash 
animation 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR create infected .exe file & startup 
with .pif and .exe file 
worm3 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger 
none TSR destruction worm3 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger 
none TSR mass mailing & create infected 
.exe file 
worm3 
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file human 
trigger 
none TSR backdoor, autorun registry, 
forward info to attacker, 
delete/ammend win.ini, modify 
system.ini & create infected .exe 
file 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR backdoor, compress, append & 
encrypt, create infected file, steal 
password & create infected .exe 
file 
worm3 
floppy human 
trigger 
none TSR autorun registry, forward info to 
attacker, create infected .exe file 
& startup with .pif  or .exe file 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR destruction worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR backdoor & infect local & 
removable drives 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR display message, create infected 
.exe file & disguises as flash 
animation 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR destruction worm3 
vulnerability 
& chat 
human 
trigger 
none TSR command & control, autorun 
registry, infect PE executable, 
open port & create infected .exe 
file 
worm3 
file human 
trigger 
none TSR worm generator tool & autorun 
registry 
worm3 
floppy & file human 
trigger 
none TSR delete/ammend win.ini, delete file 
in writable drives & display 
message 
worm3 
chat human 
trigger 
none TSR backdoor & infect local & 
removable drives 
worm3 
sharing 
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, destruction & autorun 
registry 
worm4 
sharing  
directories 
no activation none TSR backdoor, download file from 
website, autorun registry, deny 
access to security website & 
disable security protection 
worm4 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, autorun registry & 
delete network drives 
worm4 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
sequence TSR destruction worm4 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR create log file capture malicious 
activity, infect local & removable 
drives & create infected .exe file 
worm4 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, DOS, command & 
control, reboot or log off, autorun 
registry, infect PE executable, 
upload/download file, forward info 
to attacker & create infected .exe 
file 
worm4 
sharing  self random TSR destruction worm4 
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directories activation 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, DOS, command & 
control, reboot or log off, autorun 
registry, forward info to attacker & 
create infected .exe file 
worm4 
file & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
file, email & 
vulnerability 
self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm4 
sharing  
directories 
self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry worm4 
vulnerability human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
email, 
website & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, destruction & infect 
local & removable drives 
worm5 
file & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none stealth DOS, upload/download file, 
forward info to attacker, display 
message & disable security 
protection 
worm5 
website, 
vulnerability 
& chat 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR download file from website, 
autorun registry & upload 
/download file 
worm5 
file, sharing  
directories  
& chat 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR backdoor, DOS, download file 
from website, autorun registry, 
infect PE executable, send spam 
via chatting channel, redirect PC 
ports, scan network & display 
message 
worm5 
file & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none Stealth autorun registry, infect PE 
executable, forward info to 
attacker & open port 
worm5 
sharing  
directories & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR install hacker's tool, backdoor, 
command & control, 
upload/download file, install 
spyware  & steal password 
worm5 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry & infect local & 
removable drives 
worm5 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR infect microsoft office, autorun 
registry &  & infect PE executable 
worm5 
file, email & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR delete registry with security & 
disable security protection 
worm5 
chat human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR download file from website worm5 
file & 
sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
sequence TSR delete/ammend win.ini worm5 
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email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
floppy, USB 
& sharing  
directories 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR infect local & removable drives, 
infect PE executable & infect link 
on desktop 
worm5 
email, 
sharing  
directories, 
P2P & chat 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR DOS, infect PE executable, 
delete file in writable drives & 
create infected .exe file 
worm5 
email & P2P human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, infect PE 
executable, display message, 
create infected .exe file & create 
,delete or corrupt file 
worm5 
sharing  
directories & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry, infect local & 
removable drives& create 
infected .exe file 
worm5 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
email & 
vulnerability 
human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR destruction worm5 
smartphone human 
trigger & self 
activation 
none TSR autorun registry,infect PE 
executable & create infected .exe 
file 
worm5 
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APPENDIX C: 
DETAILS OF STAKCERT 
RULES FOR ASSIGNING 
WEIGHT, SEVERITY 
AND APOPTOSIS 
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Rules for weight assignment: 
1. If payload involves any backdoor activities, then the weight is high. 
2. If payload involves any activities, which compromise security setting, then 
the weight is high. 
3. If payload involves any activities, which install any new file or application by 
exploiting vulnerability in the user’s computer and without the user’s consent, 
then the weight is high. 
4. If payload compromises the security setting, then the weight is high. 
5. If payload opens an unrelated network connection, then the weight is high. 
6. If payload involves polymorphic techniques for worm self-mutation, then the 
weight is high. 
7. If payload involves any activities, which disable the security software or 
access to the security website, then the weight is high. 
8. If payload involves any system file modification, then the weight is high. 
9. If payload involves any malicious file installation, then the weight is high. 
10. If payload involves any activities, which collect and transmit personal 
identifiable information either from the user’s computer, remotely or via website, 
then the weight is high. 
11. If payload involves any performance or stability degradation up to 80% from 
normal operation, then the weight is high. 
12. If payload involves any activities, which disconnect the network or Internet 
connection, then the weight is high. 
13. If payload involves any mass mailing feature, then the weight is high. 
14. If payload involves any vulnerability exploitation, which is based on 
operating systems version, then the weight is high. 
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15. If payload involves any activities, which create or infect any executable file, 
then the weight is high. 
16. If payload involves any activities of file deletion or alteration, then the 
weight is high. 
17. If payload involves any activities, which escalate account privilege without 
administrator consent, then the weight is high. 
18. If payload involves any activities which steal or compromise the password, 
then the weight is high. 
19. If payload involves any activities listed in rules 1 to 18 either singly or in 
combination, then the weight is high. 
20. If payload involves any malicious activities related with registry, then the 
weight is medium. 
21. If payload involves any link to infect the user’s computer, then the weight is 
medium. 
22. If payload involves any network scanning or collecting any data from user’s 
computer, then the weight is medium. 
23. If payload involves any activities, which print any unrelated document, then 
the weight is medium. 
24. If payload involves other than rules 1 to 19 and rules 25 to 28 and involves 
rule 20 to rule 23 either singly or in combination with  a weight lower than 
medium, then the weight is medium. 
25. If payload involves other program running, which did not bring any harm to 
the user’s computer, then the weight is low. 
26. If payload involves online habit tracking as displayed in the installed end 
user law agreement (EULA) software, then the weight is low. 
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27. If payload involves any activities, which do not involve or compromise any 
serious privacy risk or security setting, then the weight is low. 
28. If payload involves any activities, which display advertisement messages, 
then the weight is low. 
29. If infection involves the vulnerability of a file or email, then the weight is 
high. 
30. If infection involves any combination featuring in rules 29 and 31, then the 
weight is high. 
31. If infection involves website(s), sharing file(s) or directories, P2P, USB or 
chatting channel, then the weight is medium. 
32. If infection involves other than rules 29 and 30 and involves rule 31 either 
singly or in combination with lower weight than medium, then the weight is 
medium. 
33. If infection involves other than rules 29 to 32, then the weight is low. 
34. If activation involves self activation or a hybrid launch, then the weight is 
high. 
35. If activation involves rule 34 either singly or in combination with a weight 
lower than high, then the weight is high. 
36. If activation involves a human trigger or scheduled process, then the weight 
is medium. 
37. If activation involves rule 36 either singly or in combination with a weight 
lower than medium, then the weight is medium. 
38. If activation involves other than rules 34 to 37, then the weight is low. 
39. If propagation involves random or sequence, then the weight is high. 
40. If propagation involves rule 39 either singly or in combination with a weight 
lower than high, then the weight is high. 
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41. If propagation involves passive, then the weight is high. 
42. If propagation involves rule 41 either singly or in combination with a weight 
lower than medium, then the weight is medium. 
43. If propagation involves other than rules 39 to 42, then the weight is low. 
44. If operating algorithm involves polymorphic, stealth, or anti-virus, then the 
weight is high. 
45. If operating algorithm involves rule 44 either singly or in combination with a 
weight lower than high, then the weight is high. 
46. If operating algorithm involves terminate stay resident (TSR), then the 
weight is medium. 
47. If operating algorithm involves rule 46 either singly or in combination with a 
weight lower than medium, then the weight is medium. 
48. If operating algorithm involves other than rules 44 to 47, then the weight is 
low. 
 
Next is the set of rules for assignment of severity and apoptosis. Earlier the 
weight was assigned for each of the five main attributes of a worm. 
Consequently, the severity and apoptosis rules were generated based on the 
weight assignment mentioned earlier. 
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Rules for severity and apoptosis assignment: 
1. If the weight for the payload and infection is high, then the severity is high 
and triggers apoptosis. 
2. If it involves the combination of rule 1 and the weight combination of the 
propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, medium or low, then the 
severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
3. If the weight for the payload is medium and infection is high, then the 
severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
4. If it involves the combination of rule 3 and the weight combination of the 
propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, medium or low, then the 
severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
5. If the weight for the payload is high and infection is medium, then the 
severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
6. If it involves the combination of rule 5 and the weight combination of the 
propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, medium or low, then the 
severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
7. If the weight for the payload is high and infection is low, then the severity is 
high and triggers apoptosis. 
8. If it involves the combination of rule 7 and the weight combination of the 
propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, medium or low, then the 
severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
9. If the weight for the payload is low and infection is high, then the severity is 
high and triggers apoptosis. 
10. If it involves the combination of rule 9 and the weight combination of the 
propagation, activation and operating algorithm are high, medium or low, then 
the severity is high and triggers apoptosis. 
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11. If the weight for the payload is medium and infection is medium, then the 
severity is medium and there is no apoptosis. 
12. If the weight for the payload is low and infection is medium and the weight 
combination of the propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, 
medium or low, then the severity is medium and there is no apoptosis. 
13. If the weight for the payload is medium and infection is low and the weight 
combination of the propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, 
medium or low, then the severity is medium and there is no apoptosis. 
14. If the weight for the payload is low and infection is low and the weight 
combination of the propagation, activation and operating algorithm is high, then 
the severity is medium and there is no apoptosis. 
15. If the weight for the payload is low and infection is low and the weight 
combination of the two attributes either from propagation, activation and 
operating algorithm is high and the other attributes weight is medium or low, 
then the severity is medium and there is no apoptosis. 
16. If the weight for the payload is low and infection is low and the weight one 
of the attributes either from propagation, activation and operating algorithm is 
high and the other attributes weight is medium or low, then the severity is 
medium and there is no apoptosis. 
17. If the weight for the payload is low and infection is low and the weight one 
of the attributes either from propagation, activation and operating algorithm is 
medium and the other attributes weight is low, then the severity is medium and 
there is no apoptosis. 
18. If the weight for the payload, activation, propagation, infection and operating 
algorithm is low, then the severity is low and there is no apoptosis. 
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 STAKCERT Worm Structural Pattern based on STAKCERT Weight, Severity 
and Apoptosis rules 
No Payload Infection Activation Propagation Operating 
algorithm 
Severity 
1 High High High High High High 
2 High High High High Medium High 
3 High High High High Low High 
4 High High High Medium High High 
5 High High High Low High High 
6 High High Medium High High High 
7 High High Low High High High 
8 High Medium High High High High 
9 High Low High High High High 
10 High High High Medium Medium High 
11 High High High Low Medium High 
12 High High Medium High Medium High 
13 High High Low High Medium High 
14 High Medium High High Medium High 
15 High Low High High Medium High 
16 High High Medium Medium Medium High 
17 High High Low Medium Medium High 
18 High Medium High Medium Medium High 
19 High Low High Medium Medium High 
20 High Medium Medium Medium Medium High 
21 High Low Medium Medium Medium High 
22 High High High Medium Low High 
23 High High High Low Low High 
24 High High Medium High Low High 
25 High High Low High Low High 
26 High Medium High High Low High 
27 High Low High High Low High 
28 High High Medium Low Low High 
29 High High Low Low Low High 
30 High Medium High Low Low High 
31 High Low High Low Low High 
32 High Medium Low Low Low High 
33 High Low Low Low Low High 
34 High High High Low High High 
35 High High High Low Medium High 
36 High High Medium High High High 
37 High High Low High High High 
38 High High Low Low Low High 
39 High High Low Low Medium High 
40 High High Low Low High High 
41 High High Low Medium High High 
42 High High Medium Medium Medium High 
43 High High Medium Low Medium High 
44 High High Medium Low High High 
45 High High Medium Medium High High 
46 High Medium High High High High 
47 High Medium High High Medium High 
48 High Medium High High Low High 
49 High Medium High Medium High High 
50 High Medium High Low High High 
51 High Medium High Low Medium High 
52 High Medium Medium High High High 
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53 High Medium Low High High High 
54 High Medium Low Low Medium High 
55 High Medium Low Low High High 
56 High Medium Low Medium High High 
57 High Medium Medium Medium Medium High 
58 High Medium Medium Low Low High 
59 High Medium Medium Low Medium High 
60 High Medium Medium Low High High 
61 High Medium Medium Medium High High 
62 High Medium Medium High Medium High 
63 High Low High High High High 
64 High Low High High Medium High 
65 High Low High High Low High 
66 High Low High Medium High High 
67 High Low High Low High High 
68 High Low High Low Medium High 
69 High Low Medium High High High 
70 High Low Low High High High 
71 High Low Low Low Low High 
72 High Low Low Low Medium High 
73 High Low Low Low High High 
74 High Low Low Medium High High 
75 High Low Medium Medium Medium High 
76 High Low Medium Low Low High 
77 High Low Medium Low Medium High 
78 High Low Medium Low High High 
79 High Low Medium Medium High High 
80 Medium High High High High High 
81 Medium High High High Medium High 
82 Medium High High Medium Medium High 
83 Medium High Medium Medium Medium High 
84 Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
85 Medium High High High Low High 
86 Medium High High Low Low High 
87 Medium High Low Low Low High 
88 Medium Low Low Low Low Medium 
89 Medium High High High High High 
90 Medium High High High Medium High 
91 Medium High High High Low High 
92 Medium High High Medium High High 
93 Medium High High Low High High 
94 Medium High Medium High High High 
95 Medium High Low High High High 
96 Medium Medium High High High Medium 
97 Medium Medium High High Medium Medium 
98 Medium Medium High High Low Medium 
99 Medium Medium High Medium High Medium 
100 Medium Medium High Low High Medium 
101 Medium Medium Medium High High Medium 
102 Medium Medium Low High High Medium 
103 Medium Medium Medium High High Medium 
104 Medium Medium Medium High Medium Medium 
105 Medium Medium Medium High Low Medium 
106 Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
107 Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium 
108 Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
109 Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Medium 
110 Medium High Medium Low High High 
111 Medium High Medium High High High 
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112 Medium Medium Low High High Medium 
113 Medium Medium High High High Medium 
114 Medium Low High High High Medium 
115 Medium High High High High High 
116 Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium 
117 Medium Medium Medium High High Medium 
118 Medium Medium Low High High Medium 
119 Medium Medium High High High Medium 
120 Medium Low High High High Medium 
121 Medium High High High High High 
122 Medium High High High Medium High 
123 Medium High High High Low High 
124 Medium High High Medium High High 
125 Medium High High Low High High 
126 Medium High Medium High High High 
127 Medium High Low High High High 
128 Medium High Low Low Low High 
129 Medium High Low Low Medium High 
130 Medium High Low Low High High 
131 Medium High Low Medium High High 
132 Medium High Medium Medium Medium High 
133 Medium High Medium Low Low High 
134 Medium High Medium Low Medium High 
135 Medium High Medium Low High High 
136 Medium High Medium Medium High High 
137 Medium Medium High High High Medium 
138 Medium Medium High High Medium Medium 
139 Medium Medium High High Low Medium 
140 Medium Medium High Medium High Medium 
141 Medium Medium High Low High Medium 
142 Medium Medium Medium High High Medium 
143 Medium Medium Low High High Medium 
144 Medium Medium Low Low Low Medium 
145 Medium Medium Low Low Medium Medium 
146 Medium Medium Low Low High Medium 
147 Medium Medium Low Medium High Medium 
148 Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
149 Medium Medium Medium Low Low Medium 
150 Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Medium 
151 Medium Medium Medium Low High Medium 
152 Medium Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
153 Medium Low High High High Medium 
154 Medium Low High High Medium Medium 
155 Medium Low High High Low Medium 
156 Medium Low High Medium High Medium 
157 Medium Low High Low High Medium 
158 Medium Low Medium High High Medium 
159 Medium Low Low High High Medium 
160 Medium Low Low Low Low Medium 
161 Medium Low Low Low Medium Medium 
162 Medium Low Low Low High Medium 
163 Medium Low Low Medium High Medium 
164 Medium Low Medium Medium Medium Medium 
165 Medium Low Medium Low Low Medium 
166 Medium Low Medium Low Medium Medium 
167 Medium Low Medium Low High Medium 
168 Medium Low Medium Medium High Medium 
169 Low High High High High High 
170 Low High High High Medium High 
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171 Low High High Medium Medium High 
172 Low High Medium Medium Medium High 
173 Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
174 Low High High High Low High 
175 Low High High Low Low High 
176 Low High Low Low Low High 
177 Low High High High High High 
178 Low High High High Medium High 
179 Low High High High Low High 
180 Low High High Medium High High 
181 Low High High Low High High 
182 Low High Medium High High High 
183 Low High Low High High High 
184 Low Medium High High High Medium 
185 Low Low High High High Low 
186 Low Low High High Medium Low 
187 Low Low High High Low Low 
188 Low Low High Medium High Low 
189 Low Low High Low High Low 
190 Low Low Medium High High Low 
191 Low Low Low High High Low 
192 Low Low Low High Medium Low 
193 Low Low Low High Low Low 
194 Low Low Low Medium High Low 
195 Low Low Low Low High Low 
196 Low Low Low Low Medium Low 
197 Low Low Low Low Low Low 
198 Low High High High High High 
199 Low High Medium Low High High 
200 Low Medium Low High High Medium 
201 Low Medium High High High Medium 
202 Low Low Medium Low High Low 
203 Low Low Low High High Low 
204 Low High High High High High 
205 Low High High High Medium High 
206 Low High High High Low High 
207 Low High High Medium High High 
208 Low High High Low High High 
209 Low High Medium High High High 
210 Low High Low High High High 
211 Low High Low Low Low High 
212 Low High Low Low Medium High 
213 Low High Low Low High High 
214 Low High Low Medium High High 
215 Low High Medium Medium Medium High 
216 Low High Medium Low Low High 
217 Low High Medium Low Medium High 
218 Low High Medium Low High High 
219 Low High Medium Medium High High 
220 Low Medium High High High Medium 
221 Low Medium High High Medium Medium 
222 Low Medium High High Low Medium 
223 Low Medium High Medium High Medium 
224 Low Medium High Low High Medium 
225 Low Medium Medium High High Medium 
226 Low Medium Low High High Medium 
227 Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
228 Low Low High High High Low 
229 Low Low High High Medium Low 
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230 Low Low High High Low Low 
231 Low Low High Medium High Low 
232 Low Low High Low High Low 
233 Low Low Medium High High Low 
234 Low Low Low High High Low 
235 Low Low Low Low Low Low 
236 Low Low Low Low Medium Low 
237 Low Low Low Low High Low 
238 Low Low Low Medium High Low 
239 Low Low Medium Medium Medium Low 
240 Low Low Medium Low Low Low 
241 Low Low Medium Low Medium Low 
242 Low Low Medium Low High Low 
243 Low Low Medium Medium High Low 
 
Firstly, above table presents all the combinations of possible values for weight 
and severity. In this STAKCERT structural pattern table, the six main attributes 
are payload, infection, activation, propagation, operating algorithm, and 
severity. Each of these attributes has three classes: low, medium and high. The 
243 rows presented are the three possible values for each attribute (3x3x3x3x3 
=243). All of these patterns were generated based on the STAKCERT worm 
apoptosis rules. 
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